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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 799963 |
Time | |
Date | 200808 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : teb.airport |
State Reference | NJ |
Altitude | msl single value : 1500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : teb.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air taxi |
Make Model Name | Premier 1 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial |
Route In Use | departure sid : teb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air taxi |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 60 flight time total : 4700 flight time type : 150 |
ASRS Report | 799963 |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : excursion from assigned altitude conflict : airborne critical |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment : tcas |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Airspace Structure Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Ambiguous |
Narrative:
The situation developed after departing runway 24 at teb. The assigned departure procedure was the teb 5 departure; which is a critical procedure that has become somewhat infamous for deviations. Due to arrs into a larger airport to the south; initial climbs are restr to 1500 ft MSL; a turn to the west; and a further climb within 4.5 miles of the teb VOR. Knowing that this departure was critical; I briefed it to the sic; and he briefed it back to me. We programmed the procedure in the FMS; and armed the flight director to 'fly' the procedure. We were not rushed as a crew because we had a delay of over 30 mins for WX on our departure route. We also routinely operate out of teb. During our delay; I heard a single engine cessna communicating with the tower about flying in the vicinity for aerial photo work. When we were cleared for takeoff; tower advised us that a cessna was flying over an interchange on a highway. I concluded that the interchange was south of the airport in the vicinity of our departure; but I assumed that it would not be an immediate conflict off the runway. Upon our departure; climbing out of approximately 1000 ft MSL; the TCAS called 'traffic; traffic.' I began to look for the traffic visually while paying attention to the critical departure procedure. At approximately 1300 ft MSL; the TCAS called 'monitor vertical speed;' and I saw that I needed to increase my climb rate. Almost immediately; the TCAS called 'climb; climb.' I was at 1400 ft MSL and knew I was going to deviate from the departure procedure to comply with the TCAS. We had just been handed off to ny departure control; and the sic immediately informed them of the required deviation of climbing into departure control's airspace. Above 1600 ft but below 1700 ft MSL; TCAS called 'clear of conflict.' we informed ATC that we could resume the required 1500 ft MSL; but they gave us a further climb and a heading. ATC asked if tower informed us of the traffic; and I replied it was a TCAS RA. ATC had no further comment. I never had visual contact with traffic. The departure from runway 24 at this airport is a very busy procedure in very busy airspace. Not only is the teb 5 departure critical; it is also a noise sensitive runway which can be of concern to many jet aircraft. Once airborne; you have traffic above and below your aircraft. With the teb 5 being so critical; it is hard to break from it under any circumstances. Pilots should be ready for the mental shock of breaking away from a heavily emphasized procedure to comply with the required calls of the TCAS system should they arise.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PREMIER 1 FLT CREW TCAS RA DEPARTING ON THE TEB 5 CAUSING CLB ABOVE 1500 FT INITIAL ALT RESTR.
Narrative: THE SITUATION DEVELOPED AFTER DEPARTING RWY 24 AT TEB. THE ASSIGNED DEP PROC WAS THE TEB 5 DEP; WHICH IS A CRITICAL PROC THAT HAS BECOME SOMEWHAT INFAMOUS FOR DEVS. DUE TO ARRS INTO A LARGER ARPT TO THE S; INITIAL CLBS ARE RESTR TO 1500 FT MSL; A TURN TO THE W; AND A FURTHER CLB WITHIN 4.5 MILES OF THE TEB VOR. KNOWING THAT THIS DEP WAS CRITICAL; I BRIEFED IT TO THE SIC; AND HE BRIEFED IT BACK TO ME. WE PROGRAMMED THE PROC IN THE FMS; AND ARMED THE FLT DIRECTOR TO 'FLY' THE PROC. WE WERE NOT RUSHED AS A CREW BECAUSE WE HAD A DELAY OF OVER 30 MINS FOR WX ON OUR DEP RTE. WE ALSO ROUTINELY OPERATE OUT OF TEB. DURING OUR DELAY; I HEARD A SINGLE ENGINE CESSNA COMMUNICATING WITH THE TOWER ABOUT FLYING IN THE VICINITY FOR AERIAL PHOTO WORK. WHEN WE WERE CLRED FOR TAKEOFF; TOWER ADVISED US THAT A CESSNA WAS FLYING OVER AN INTERCHANGE ON A HWY. I CONCLUDED THAT THE INTERCHANGE WAS S OF THE ARPT IN THE VICINITY OF OUR DEP; BUT I ASSUMED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE AN IMMEDIATE CONFLICT OFF THE RWY. UPON OUR DEP; CLBING OUT OF APPROX 1000 FT MSL; THE TCAS CALLED 'TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC.' I BEGAN TO LOOK FOR THE TRAFFIC VISUALLY WHILE PAYING ATTENTION TO THE CRITICAL DEP PROC. AT APPROX 1300 FT MSL; THE TCAS CALLED 'MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED;' AND I SAW THAT I NEEDED TO INCREASE MY CLB RATE. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY; THE TCAS CALLED 'CLIMB; CLIMB.' I WAS AT 1400 FT MSL AND KNEW I WAS GOING TO DEVIATE FROM THE DEP PROC TO COMPLY WITH THE TCAS. WE HAD JUST BEEN HANDED OFF TO NY DEP CTL; AND THE SIC IMMEDIATELY INFORMED THEM OF THE REQUIRED DEVIATION OF CLBING INTO DEP CTL'S AIRSPACE. ABOVE 1600 FT BUT BELOW 1700 FT MSL; TCAS CALLED 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT.' WE INFORMED ATC THAT WE COULD RESUME THE REQUIRED 1500 FT MSL; BUT THEY GAVE US A FURTHER CLB AND A HEADING. ATC ASKED IF TOWER INFORMED US OF THE TRAFFIC; AND I REPLIED IT WAS A TCAS RA. ATC HAD NO FURTHER COMMENT. I NEVER HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH TRAFFIC. THE DEP FROM RWY 24 AT THIS ARPT IS A VERY BUSY PROC IN VERY BUSY AIRSPACE. NOT ONLY IS THE TEB 5 DEP CRITICAL; IT IS ALSO A NOISE SENSITIVE RWY WHICH CAN BE OF CONCERN TO MANY JET ACFT. ONCE AIRBORNE; YOU HAVE TRAFFIC ABOVE AND BELOW YOUR ACFT. WITH THE TEB 5 BEING SO CRITICAL; IT IS HARD TO BREAK FROM IT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. PLTS SHOULD BE READY FOR THE MENTAL SHOCK OF BREAKING AWAY FROM A HEAVILY EMPHASIZED PROC TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIRED CALLS OF THE TCAS SYSTEM SHOULD THEY ARISE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.