Narrative:

We were not pressed for time; the checklists were performed; the engines were both started after the push was completed because there was no traffic and the taxi was going to be short. I remember pushing recall after the first engine; because we had the correct lights and the captain canceled the caution as I began to start the second engine. He called for the flaps to be set and the before taxi checklist. All was normal; and complete. We were cleared to runway 1R via taxiway a. He taxied slowly because the flight attendants had not called the cabin secure yet. We did the before takeoff to the line just after clearing the ramp area. As we approached the hold short the flight attendants called secure; and the tower cleared us into position and hold on runway 1R (there was traffic landing on one of the 28 runways). I visually cleared the final for our runway as the captain called for the before takeoff from the line. While doing the flow I answered a call from tower who said to be ready to go because of traffic for runway 28L. I read the checklist normally as there was no rush at this time. To the best of my recollection at that time all was as it should be. The captain asked if I was aware of the power up line for the runway that we were using. I answered yes I was. Once cleared for takeoff I advanced the throttles and called for him to set the power. He called power set and at the same time the master caution came on. I looked at my side and saw the engine caution. We slowed; I called the abort to the tower. The tower asked us to clear to the right; and asked if we needed help. We complied with the taxi instruction and said no to the help. As we cleared the runway I scanned the cockpit to find anything wrong; it was then that I saw the probe heat switches off. The captain turned them on and the fault cleared. He retried the master caution; and it was clear. He spoke to the passenger and the flight attendants to assure them that all was ok. We sat and discussed how they may have been turned off. I sat for a moment and remembered the probes being on after the engine starts. It was then that I said that I think I remember turning them off during the before takeoff from the line checklist as we were taxiing to the runway takeoff position. I said that my hand went from the lights then up and flipped the switches off; it then moved down to check the master caution. I probably touched the caution at about the same time as the probe heat caution came on. I guess it was a muscle memory movement that came from the after landing flow. I have no other reason beyond that as to why the switches had been turned off. The only reason that I can offer as to why the caution that was generated by the probes being turned off was missed is that the timing of this caution alert and test was probably so close that I did not notice the difference between them; it is difficult for me to say. All appeared normal. The captain called maintenance and spoke to them about the event. He said; there was no problem; he asked about the abort speed. As the speed was low there was no problem with brake heating and he said that we were good to go. I then told the tower that we were ready; per captain's instructions. They asked us what the nature of the abort had been and cleared us to the runway. We re-ran the entire before takeoff checklist again. We were then cleared for takeoff and the flight continued uneventfully.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW IS ALERTED DURING TKOF THAT PROBE HEAT SWITCHES ARE OFF AND REJECT TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM.

Narrative: WE WERE NOT PRESSED FOR TIME; THE CHKLISTS WERE PERFORMED; THE ENGS WERE BOTH STARTED AFTER THE PUSH WAS COMPLETED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO TFC AND THE TAXI WAS GOING TO BE SHORT. I REMEMBER PUSHING RECALL AFTER THE FIRST ENG; BECAUSE WE HAD THE CORRECT LIGHTS AND THE CAPT CANCELED THE CAUTION AS I BEGAN TO START THE SECOND ENG. HE CALLED FOR THE FLAPS TO BE SET AND THE BEFORE TAXI CHKLIST. ALL WAS NORMAL; AND COMPLETE. WE WERE CLRED TO RWY 1R VIA TXWY A. HE TAXIED SLOWLY BECAUSE THE FLT ATTENDANTS HAD NOT CALLED THE CABIN SECURE YET. WE DID THE BEFORE TKOF TO THE LINE JUST AFTER CLRING THE RAMP AREA. AS WE APCHED THE HOLD SHORT THE FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED SECURE; AND THE TWR CLRED US INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 1R (THERE WAS TFC LNDG ON ONE OF THE 28 RWYS). I VISUALLY CLRED THE FINAL FOR OUR RWY AS THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE BEFORE TKOF FROM THE LINE. WHILE DOING THE FLOW I ANSWERED A CALL FROM TWR WHO SAID TO BE READY TO GO BECAUSE OF TFC FOR RWY 28L. I READ THE CHKLIST NORMALLY AS THERE WAS NO RUSH AT THIS TIME. TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION AT THAT TIME ALL WAS AS IT SHOULD BE. THE CAPT ASKED IF I WAS AWARE OF THE PWR UP LINE FOR THE RWY THAT WE WERE USING. I ANSWERED YES I WAS. ONCE CLRED FOR TKOF I ADVANCED THE THROTTLES AND CALLED FOR HIM TO SET THE PWR. HE CALLED PWR SET AND AT THE SAME TIME THE MASTER CAUTION CAME ON. I LOOKED AT MY SIDE AND SAW THE ENG CAUTION. WE SLOWED; I CALLED THE ABORT TO THE TWR. THE TWR ASKED US TO CLR TO THE R; AND ASKED IF WE NEEDED HELP. WE COMPLIED WITH THE TAXI INSTRUCTION AND SAID NO TO THE HELP. AS WE CLRED THE RWY I SCANNED THE COCKPIT TO FIND ANYTHING WRONG; IT WAS THEN THAT I SAW THE PROBE HEAT SWITCHES OFF. THE CAPT TURNED THEM ON AND THE FAULT CLRED. HE RETRIED THE MASTER CAUTION; AND IT WAS CLR. HE SPOKE TO THE PAX AND THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO ASSURE THEM THAT ALL WAS OK. WE SAT AND DISCUSSED HOW THEY MAY HAVE BEEN TURNED OFF. I SAT FOR A MOMENT AND REMEMBERED THE PROBES BEING ON AFTER THE ENG STARTS. IT WAS THEN THAT I SAID THAT I THINK I REMEMBER TURNING THEM OFF DURING THE BEFORE TKOF FROM THE LINE CHKLIST AS WE WERE TAXIING TO THE RWY TKOF POS. I SAID THAT MY HAND WENT FROM THE LIGHTS THEN UP AND FLIPPED THE SWITCHES OFF; IT THEN MOVED DOWN TO CHK THE MASTER CAUTION. I PROBABLY TOUCHED THE CAUTION AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME AS THE PROBE HEAT CAUTION CAME ON. I GUESS IT WAS A MUSCLE MEMORY MOVEMENT THAT CAME FROM THE AFTER LNDG FLOW. I HAVE NO OTHER REASON BEYOND THAT AS TO WHY THE SWITCHES HAD BEEN TURNED OFF. THE ONLY REASON THAT I CAN OFFER AS TO WHY THE CAUTION THAT WAS GENERATED BY THE PROBES BEING TURNED OFF WAS MISSED IS THAT THE TIMING OF THIS CAUTION ALERT AND TEST WAS PROBABLY SO CLOSE THAT I DID NOT NOTICE THE DIFFERENCE BTWN THEM; IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SAY. ALL APPEARED NORMAL. THE CAPT CALLED MAINT AND SPOKE TO THEM ABOUT THE EVENT. HE SAID; THERE WAS NO PROB; HE ASKED ABOUT THE ABORT SPD. AS THE SPD WAS LOW THERE WAS NO PROB WITH BRAKE HEATING AND HE SAID THAT WE WERE GOOD TO GO. I THEN TOLD THE TWR THAT WE WERE READY; PER CAPT'S INSTRUCTIONS. THEY ASKED US WHAT THE NATURE OF THE ABORT HAD BEEN AND CLRED US TO THE RWY. WE RE-RAN THE ENTIRE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AGAIN. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR TKOF AND THE FLT CONTINUED UNEVENTFULLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.