Narrative:

Captain's leg; vectoring and approach flown mostly on autoplt/autothrottles. ILS and GS intercept were normal. As we approached the flare and touchdown; I believe the autoplt had been disconnected at or slightly below 400 ft. The autothrottles were not disconnected. The 30 degree flap reference speed was 141 KTS; the captain dialed 145 KTS in the bug speed window on the fmp; and the autothrottles maintained the speed better than most times. At around 100 ft AGL; the autothrottles were disconnected and the remainder of the landing was flown without any automation. At that point (100 ft); I noticed and called out the approach was going 'flat;' and called out 1/2 DOT high. Without much; if any; correction; we went to a full DOT high; and I called out; full DOT deflection. The captain corrected by a fairly firm pushover at or around 100 ft. The aural callouts of 50-30-20-10 came in rapid succession. His control reversal to offset the pushover below 100 ft came approximately between the 20-30 ft callouts. The aircraft touched down in the touchdown zone at approximately the 141 KT reference speed on the mains at a higher than normal flare angle. The automatic speed brakes cycled but did not fully deploy; and stay deployed. It almost felt as though we may have bounced and were flying again; but I don't think we did. The nose was up very high at this point and so; I am not sure if we did come off the ground again or not. My gut told me; at this point; that we got the tailskid. We parked at the hardstand and the passenger were offloaded by busses. The relief pilot and I discussed what we both felt and how to approach the captain. One of the flight attendants from the back asked me what that loud noise at landing was. I was not sure and told her so. We decided to view the tail and tailskid areas first and then make our decision. A quick look verified the tailskid had done its job and the pressure/plunger indicator was popped. It was not close. I approached the captain on the bus and told him; 'you got the tail' and 'are you gonna write it up?' his reaction was calm; unmoved; and; I felt; in denial as to the fact that he got the skid. The relief pilot approached him also; and the result was the same. Maintenance approached us all after the relief pilot and I also saw the skid. The captain did not inspect it and seemed not even curious at all despite our inspections. At that point; the 3 of us (me; the relief pilot; and maintenance) all suggested that the skid had to be written up and at that point he agreed. The write-up was made; although I did not see the captain make the write-up; and we boarded the bus and went to the hotel. The captain slept for most of the ride there. I feel that fatigue may be a major factor in his landing; his reaction; and the events of today.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 CONTACTED THE TAIL SKID UPON LANDING AT LFPG FOLLOWING AN UNSTABILIZED APPROACH.

Narrative: CAPT'S LEG; VECTORING AND APCH FLOWN MOSTLY ON AUTOPLT/AUTOTHROTTLES. ILS AND GS INTERCEPT WERE NORMAL. AS WE APCHED THE FLARE AND TOUCHDOWN; I BELIEVE THE AUTOPLT HAD BEEN DISCONNECTED AT OR SLIGHTLY BELOW 400 FT. THE AUTOTHROTTLES WERE NOT DISCONNECTED. THE 30 DEG FLAP REF SPD WAS 141 KTS; THE CAPT DIALED 145 KTS IN THE BUG SPD WINDOW ON THE FMP; AND THE AUTOTHROTTLES MAINTAINED THE SPD BETTER THAN MOST TIMES. AT AROUND 100 FT AGL; THE AUTOTHROTTLES WERE DISCONNECTED AND THE REMAINDER OF THE LNDG WAS FLOWN WITHOUT ANY AUTOMATION. AT THAT POINT (100 FT); I NOTICED AND CALLED OUT THE APCH WAS GOING 'FLAT;' AND CALLED OUT 1/2 DOT HIGH. WITHOUT MUCH; IF ANY; CORRECTION; WE WENT TO A FULL DOT HIGH; AND I CALLED OUT; FULL DOT DEFLECTION. THE CAPT CORRECTED BY A FAIRLY FIRM PUSHOVER AT OR AROUND 100 FT. THE AURAL CALLOUTS OF 50-30-20-10 CAME IN RAPID SUCCESSION. HIS CTL REVERSAL TO OFFSET THE PUSHOVER BELOW 100 FT CAME APPROX BTWN THE 20-30 FT CALLOUTS. THE ACFT TOUCHED DOWN IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE AT APPROX THE 141 KT REF SPD ON THE MAINS AT A HIGHER THAN NORMAL FLARE ANGLE. THE AUTO SPD BRAKES CYCLED BUT DID NOT FULLY DEPLOY; AND STAY DEPLOYED. IT ALMOST FELT AS THOUGH WE MAY HAVE BOUNCED AND WERE FLYING AGAIN; BUT I DON'T THINK WE DID. THE NOSE WAS UP VERY HIGH AT THIS POINT AND SO; I AM NOT SURE IF WE DID COME OFF THE GND AGAIN OR NOT. MY GUT TOLD ME; AT THIS POINT; THAT WE GOT THE TAILSKID. WE PARKED AT THE HARDSTAND AND THE PAX WERE OFFLOADED BY BUSSES. THE RELIEF PLT AND I DISCUSSED WHAT WE BOTH FELT AND HOW TO APCH THE CAPT. ONE OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS FROM THE BACK ASKED ME WHAT THAT LOUD NOISE AT LNDG WAS. I WAS NOT SURE AND TOLD HER SO. WE DECIDED TO VIEW THE TAIL AND TAILSKID AREAS FIRST AND THEN MAKE OUR DECISION. A QUICK LOOK VERIFIED THE TAILSKID HAD DONE ITS JOB AND THE PRESSURE/PLUNGER INDICATOR WAS POPPED. IT WAS NOT CLOSE. I APCHED THE CAPT ON THE BUS AND TOLD HIM; 'YOU GOT THE TAIL' AND 'ARE YOU GONNA WRITE IT UP?' HIS REACTION WAS CALM; UNMOVED; AND; I FELT; IN DENIAL AS TO THE FACT THAT HE GOT THE SKID. THE RELIEF PLT APCHED HIM ALSO; AND THE RESULT WAS THE SAME. MAINT APCHED US ALL AFTER THE RELIEF PLT AND I ALSO SAW THE SKID. THE CAPT DID NOT INSPECT IT AND SEEMED NOT EVEN CURIOUS AT ALL DESPITE OUR INSPECTIONS. AT THAT POINT; THE 3 OF US (ME; THE RELIEF PLT; AND MAINT) ALL SUGGESTED THAT THE SKID HAD TO BE WRITTEN UP AND AT THAT POINT HE AGREED. THE WRITE-UP WAS MADE; ALTHOUGH I DID NOT SEE THE CAPT MAKE THE WRITE-UP; AND WE BOARDED THE BUS AND WENT TO THE HOTEL. THE CAPT SLEPT FOR MOST OF THE RIDE THERE. I FEEL THAT FATIGUE MAY BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN HIS LNDG; HIS REACTION; AND THE EVENTS OF TODAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.