Narrative:

While climbing through 13000 ft and in IFR conditions; the engine fire/T-handle lights illuminated for the #2 (right) engine with no other warning lights on or lit up. I; the PNF; retrieved the checklist; examined the engine instruments for any indication as to what may be the cause of the warning light and also visually checked the condition of the right engine from where I was sitting in the copilot's seat. The engine instruments showed no signs of any malfunction nor did the visual check; so I went to the specific page in the checklist for the engine fire lights. The checklist calls for an immediate shutdown and feathering of the affected engine and propeller. After discussing the situation and the checklist procedure with the PF; we both concluded that it was a false indication and we would not shut down and feather the engine; but only after I got up and went back into the cabin to visually inspect the engine nacelle and the surrounding wing area for any sign of fire or structural degradation. I checked the nacelle from the cabin and noticed no signs of fire or distress and returned to the cockpit. When I returned the PF told me the engine light had flickered momentarily; gone out; and then illuminated again. At this time we were leveling at 17000 ft and increasing airspeed. Again; we discussed the fact that we felt it was a false indication and that we were both comfortable with not shutting down the engine. While increasing airspeed; the light again flickered; went out; came back on; and then eventually went out for the remainder of the 50 min flight. While looking through the checklist we noticed there is no procedure to check for a false indication; and no way to verify if it truly is a false indication. After landing; we notified our maintenance crew and they did a postflt inspection and found no indication of a fire or hot bleed air leak. The following day; the maintenance crew ran through the preflight checks and found the #2 engine fire light to stay on after pressing the fire light test button while the #1 engine fire light extinguished after releasing the button as it is supposed to do. They then test ran the engine and found the engine fire light to again illuminate and not extinguish after pressing the fire test button. A visual inspection was completed after engine shutdown and it was determined there had been no engine fire and that it had indeed been a false indication. Tests were conducted on the engine fire loop detection circuit of the #2 engine and a section of the fire loop was found to have a 'ground' which would cause the engine fire detection light to illuminate in the cockpit. The faulty section of the #2 fire detection loop was replaced; the engine run and the fire detection circuit tested and all tested ok. Our major concern; as the flight crew; was the fact that we chose not to follow the checklist and determined on our own that it was a false indication. We had it verified by our maintenance crew; but making a wrong decision could have proved fatal. We feel there should be a procedure to determine whether the fire indication is indeed correct.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GULFSTREAM I FLT CREW RECEIVES ENGINE FIRE WARNING DURING CLIMB AND CONTINUES TO DESTINATION AFTER DETERMINING THE WARNING MUST BE FALSE.

Narrative: WHILE CLBING THROUGH 13000 FT AND IN IFR CONDITIONS; THE ENG FIRE/T-HANDLE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED FOR THE #2 (R) ENG WITH NO OTHER WARNING LIGHTS ON OR LIT UP. I; THE PNF; RETRIEVED THE CHKLIST; EXAMINED THE ENG INSTS FOR ANY INDICATION AS TO WHAT MAY BE THE CAUSE OF THE WARNING LIGHT AND ALSO VISUALLY CHKED THE CONDITION OF THE R ENG FROM WHERE I WAS SITTING IN THE COPLT'S SEAT. THE ENG INSTS SHOWED NO SIGNS OF ANY MALFUNCTION NOR DID THE VISUAL CHK; SO I WENT TO THE SPECIFIC PAGE IN THE CHKLIST FOR THE ENG FIRE LIGHTS. THE CHKLIST CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE SHUTDOWN AND FEATHERING OF THE AFFECTED ENG AND PROP. AFTER DISCUSSING THE SITUATION AND THE CHKLIST PROC WITH THE PF; WE BOTH CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS A FALSE INDICATION AND WE WOULD NOT SHUT DOWN AND FEATHER THE ENG; BUT ONLY AFTER I GOT UP AND WENT BACK INTO THE CABIN TO VISUALLY INSPECT THE ENG NACELLE AND THE SURROUNDING WING AREA FOR ANY SIGN OF FIRE OR STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION. I CHKED THE NACELLE FROM THE CABIN AND NOTICED NO SIGNS OF FIRE OR DISTRESS AND RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT. WHEN I RETURNED THE PF TOLD ME THE ENG LIGHT HAD FLICKERED MOMENTARILY; GONE OUT; AND THEN ILLUMINATED AGAIN. AT THIS TIME WE WERE LEVELING AT 17000 FT AND INCREASING AIRSPD. AGAIN; WE DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT WE FELT IT WAS A FALSE INDICATION AND THAT WE WERE BOTH COMFORTABLE WITH NOT SHUTTING DOWN THE ENG. WHILE INCREASING AIRSPD; THE LIGHT AGAIN FLICKERED; WENT OUT; CAME BACK ON; AND THEN EVENTUALLY WENT OUT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE 50 MIN FLT. WHILE LOOKING THROUGH THE CHKLIST WE NOTICED THERE IS NO PROC TO CHK FOR A FALSE INDICATION; AND NO WAY TO VERIFY IF IT TRULY IS A FALSE INDICATION. AFTER LNDG; WE NOTIFIED OUR MAINT CREW AND THEY DID A POSTFLT INSPECTION AND FOUND NO INDICATION OF A FIRE OR HOT BLEED AIR LEAK. THE FOLLOWING DAY; THE MAINT CREW RAN THROUGH THE PREFLT CHKS AND FOUND THE #2 ENG FIRE LIGHT TO STAY ON AFTER PRESSING THE FIRE LIGHT TEST BUTTON WHILE THE #1 ENG FIRE LIGHT EXTINGUISHED AFTER RELEASING THE BUTTON AS IT IS SUPPOSED TO DO. THEY THEN TEST RAN THE ENG AND FOUND THE ENG FIRE LIGHT TO AGAIN ILLUMINATE AND NOT EXTINGUISH AFTER PRESSING THE FIRE TEST BUTTON. A VISUAL INSPECTION WAS COMPLETED AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN AND IT WAS DETERMINED THERE HAD BEEN NO ENG FIRE AND THAT IT HAD INDEED BEEN A FALSE INDICATION. TESTS WERE CONDUCTED ON THE ENG FIRE LOOP DETECTION CIRCUIT OF THE #2 ENG AND A SECTION OF THE FIRE LOOP WAS FOUND TO HAVE A 'GND' WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE ENG FIRE DETECTION LIGHT TO ILLUMINATE IN THE COCKPIT. THE FAULTY SECTION OF THE #2 FIRE DETECTION LOOP WAS REPLACED; THE ENG RUN AND THE FIRE DETECTION CIRCUIT TESTED AND ALL TESTED OK. OUR MAJOR CONCERN; AS THE FLT CREW; WAS THE FACT THAT WE CHOSE NOT TO FOLLOW THE CHKLIST AND DETERMINED ON OUR OWN THAT IT WAS A FALSE INDICATION. WE HAD IT VERIFIED BY OUR MAINT CREW; BUT MAKING A WRONG DECISION COULD HAVE PROVED FATAL. WE FEEL THERE SHOULD BE A PROC TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE FIRE INDICATION IS INDEED CORRECT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.