Narrative:

The jet bridge at gate appeared to be properly positioned; so captain lined up and proceeded in to the gate. The gate area was clear but there were no personnel on the ramp and the arriving agent was not on jet bridge. The automated gate arrival system was in use. Captain became concerned about the length of the bridge behind his window and the left engine position. He then stopped the airplane. I thought that all operations were normal and did not see the issue. From my perspective in the right seat I cannot determine whether the bridge is set for a B757; or some other jet. This was a setup for a serious accident. This is not a new problem for this gate or this automated system. Below here are some points I would like to highlight for you as contributing factors. 1) the arrival time was updated along our route and at the changeover. We were within 5 minutes of updated arrival time. 2) jet bridge was not stowed for a B757 arrival and pilots have no definite way to know this. No gate personnel were available to view the arrival and call a stop if needed. Current gate procedures do not require anything different. 3) first officer was in a non-observable position at the time. Captain was the last final check to this and prevented the incident. This is not a new problem as there have been several other reports about this problem; too. Some have come from this particular gate; also. I think that an airport chart note; a message in the field report; a crew bulletin appended to the flight plan are all low cost effective warnings and cautions for pilots operating into this gate. The simple procedure that we have now 'if it does not look right; stop the jet' will not work in this case because everything did look right and we almost trashed a multi-million dollar engine in the process. This is not to minimize the loss of life and injury if a ground evacuation had taken place.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that he could not see the jetbridge; and improperly assumed that it was properly parked. The captain just happened to look out his side window and slammed the brakes on to stop the aircraft's left engine about 6 ft from the jetbridge. The reporter was caught by surprise. The second issue was that the flight attendants had disarmed the doors and if a collision with major damage had occurred they would not have been prepared to deploy the slides for passenger evacuation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 FO DESCRIBES THE CAPT SLAMMING BRAKES ON TO AVOID A COLLISION WITH AN IMPROPERLY PARKED JETWAY AS THE ACFT APCHED A GATE WITH AUTO PARKING LIGHTS.

Narrative: THE JET BRIDGE AT GATE APPEARED TO BE PROPERLY POSITIONED; SO CAPT LINED UP AND PROCEEDED IN TO THE GATE. THE GATE AREA WAS CLEAR BUT THERE WERE NO PERSONNEL ON THE RAMP AND THE ARRIVING AGENT WAS NOT ON JET BRIDGE. THE AUTOMATED GATE ARRIVAL SYSTEM WAS IN USE. CAPT BECAME CONCERNED ABOUT THE LENGTH OF THE BRIDGE BEHIND HIS WINDOW AND THE LEFT ENG POSITION. HE THEN STOPPED THE AIRPLANE. I THOUGHT THAT ALL OPS WERE NORMAL AND DID NOT SEE THE ISSUE. FROM MY PERSPECTIVE IN THE RIGHT SEAT I CANNOT DETERMINE WHETHER THE BRIDGE IS SET FOR A B757; OR SOME OTHER JET. THIS WAS A SETUP FOR A SERIOUS ACCIDENT. THIS IS NOT A NEW PROB FOR THIS GATE OR THIS AUTOMATED SYSTEM. BELOW HERE ARE SOME POINTS I WOULD LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT FOR YOU AS CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. 1) THE ARRIVAL TIME WAS UPDATED ALONG OUR RTE AND AT THE CHANGEOVER. WE WERE WITHIN 5 MINUTES OF UPDATED ARRIVAL TIME. 2) JET BRIDGE WAS NOT STOWED FOR A B757 ARRIVAL AND PLTS HAVE NO DEFINITE WAY TO KNOW THIS. NO GATE PERSONNEL WERE AVAILABLE TO VIEW THE ARRIVAL AND CALL A STOP IF NEEDED. CURRENT GATE PROCS DO NOT REQUIRE ANYTHING DIFFERENT. 3) FO WAS IN A NON-OBSERVABLE POSITION AT THE TIME. CAPT WAS THE LAST FINAL CHK TO THIS AND PREVENTED THE INCIDENT. THIS IS NOT A NEW PROB AS THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL OTHER REPORTS ABOUT THIS PROB; TOO. SOME HAVE COME FROM THIS PARTICULAR GATE; ALSO. I THINK THAT AN ARPT CHART NOTE; A MESSAGE IN THE FIELD REPORT; A CREW BULLETIN APPENDED TO THE FLT PLAN ARE ALL LOW COST EFFECTIVE WARNINGS AND CAUTIONS FOR PLTS OPERATING INTO THIS GATE. THE SIMPLE PROC THAT WE HAVE NOW 'IF IT DOES NOT LOOK RIGHT; STOP THE JET' WILL NOT WORK IN THIS CASE BECAUSE EVERYTHING DID LOOK RIGHT AND WE ALMOST TRASHED A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR ENG IN THE PROCESS. THIS IS NOT TO MINIMIZE THE LOSS OF LIFE AND INJURY IF A GND EVACUATION HAD TAKEN PLACE.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER STATED THAT HE COULD NOT SEE THE JETBRIDGE; AND IMPROPERLY ASSUMED THAT IT WAS PROPERLY PARKED. THE CAPT JUST HAPPENED TO LOOK OUT HIS SIDE WINDOW AND SLAMMED THE BRAKES ON TO STOP THE ACFT'S LEFT ENG ABOUT 6 FT FROM THE JETBRIDGE. THE REPORTER WAS CAUGHT BY SURPRISE. THE SECOND ISSUE WAS THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS HAD DISARMED THE DOORS AND IF A COLLISION WITH MAJOR DAMAGE HAD OCCURRED THEY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO DEPLOY THE SLIDES FOR PAX EVACUATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.