Narrative:

While setting up cockpit for departure #1 engine oil quantity noted as fluctuating between 60% and 80%. Maintenance request sent and verbal notification passed to line maintenance. Several mins later a mechanic popped his head into the cockpit and stated (without any inquiry) that he was deferring the #1 engine oil quantity indicator. I responded with: 'I can't take the airplane in that condition.' he replied: 'well; that's what I'm going to do;' and left. There was no discussion about the cause or reason for the mechanical deficiency from the mechanic and I was given no opportunity to make general inquiries to him. Following the 'refusal' procedures; I called dispatch and explained that I would not be able to accept the aircraft. He asked me to standby and then patched in a maintenance controller. The controller explained the MEL card requirement to physically check the engine oil quantity at each station with the deferral of the oil quantity indicator; and that should satisfy my need to know the oil state. I explained that it would not; which he questioned and asked me to restate my refusal of the aircraft. I did. The refusal seemed to redirect the previously mentioned line mechanic to the efforts of troubleshooting the indicator problems. Within mins; he reported to me that he had cleaned the indictor contacts on the engine mount; and then he went on to inform me that the #1 engine took 6 1/2 quarts of oil in order to reach the 'full' mark. 10 mins earlier; the aircraft had been signed off with an oil quantity indicator deferred and no physical oil level check.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CAPT REPORTS MALFUNCTIONING ENGINE OIL QUANTITY GAGE TO LINE MAINTENANCE. MAINTENANCE ATTEMPTS TO DEFER REPAIR WITHOUT TROUBLE SHOOTING AND WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH MEL. ACFT IS REFUSED.

Narrative: WHILE SETTING UP COCKPIT FOR DEP #1 ENG OIL QUANTITY NOTED AS FLUCTUATING BTWN 60% AND 80%. MAINT REQUEST SENT AND VERBAL NOTIFICATION PASSED TO LINE MAINT. SEVERAL MINS LATER A MECH POPPED HIS HEAD INTO THE COCKPIT AND STATED (WITHOUT ANY INQUIRY) THAT HE WAS DEFERRING THE #1 ENG OIL QUANTITY INDICATOR. I RESPONDED WITH: 'I CAN'T TAKE THE AIRPLANE IN THAT CONDITION.' HE REPLIED: 'WELL; THAT'S WHAT I'M GOING TO DO;' AND LEFT. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION ABOUT THE CAUSE OR REASON FOR THE MECHANICAL DEFICIENCY FROM THE MECH AND I WAS GIVEN NO OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE GENERAL INQUIRIES TO HIM. FOLLOWING THE 'REFUSAL' PROCS; I CALLED DISPATCH AND EXPLAINED THAT I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE ACFT. HE ASKED ME TO STANDBY AND THEN PATCHED IN A MAINT CTLR. THE CTLR EXPLAINED THE MEL CARD REQUIREMENT TO PHYSICALLY CHK THE ENG OIL QUANTITY AT EACH STATION WITH THE DEFERRAL OF THE OIL QUANTITY INDICATOR; AND THAT SHOULD SATISFY MY NEED TO KNOW THE OIL STATE. I EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD NOT; WHICH HE QUESTIONED AND ASKED ME TO RESTATE MY REFUSAL OF THE ACFT. I DID. THE REFUSAL SEEMED TO REDIRECT THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED LINE MECH TO THE EFFORTS OF TROUBLESHOOTING THE INDICATOR PROBS. WITHIN MINS; HE RPTED TO ME THAT HE HAD CLEANED THE INDICTOR CONTACTS ON THE ENG MOUNT; AND THEN HE WENT ON TO INFORM ME THAT THE #1 ENG TOOK 6 1/2 QUARTS OF OIL IN ORDER TO REACH THE 'FULL' MARK. 10 MINS EARLIER; THE ACFT HAD BEEN SIGNED OFF WITH AN OIL QUANTITY INDICATOR DEFERRED AND NO PHYSICAL OIL LEVEL CHK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.