Narrative:

To conserve fuel, one engine is started at the gate and the second engine at the runway. Our APU was inoperative. Not wanting to disturb the aircraft behind us, we waited until we were between runway 34R and 34L. At sea to runup the operating engine for a crossbleed start. The engine would not start. Further checking revealed that the ignition switch had not been on. While attempting another start, an aircraft called and said we had a possible tailpipe fire. The start attempt was stopped while continuing to crank to clear the engine of fuel. I headed back toward the ramp. The fire crew met me on the ramp and said there was no evidence of a fire. While the fire crew was there, another start was attempted and was successful. Since I knew the problem had been created by us and there was nothing wrong with the aircraft, I decided to takeoff and continue the trip. I probably left myself open to criticism by not returning to the gate and have maintenance look at the engine before attempting another start. If I had it to do over again, I probably would return to the gate. I think the factors here are two man crew, night time, cross bleed start at the end of the runway, attempting to save fuel to an extent not necessary. This kind of a situation is too busy and things get in too much of a hurry for a two man crew. After the problem had been corrected, everything pointed to the fact that nothing was wrong with the engine. So my judgement was why delay any further because I thought it was safe. However, I should have taken more time to consider all the aspects of one hundred percent safety. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: first officer very experienced on the aircraft, failed to shut off the fuel lever when he noticed the engine did not light up. As a result when he realized his error in not arming the igniters and turning them on, fuel had accumulated in the tail pipe which ignited causing the fire to shoot out the tail of the engine. As soon as the other aircraft reported the fire, the captain shut off the fuel lever and advised the first officer to continue motoring the engine to blow out the excess fuel. No egt limits were exceeded and after inspection by the fire crew the flight departed. Reporter does not like the two man crew concept, busy cockpit and in the future in a similar incident, will return to the gate for maintenance inspection of the engine. No problem on this flight and the company is taking no action.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW FAILED TO ARM IGNITERS RESULTING IN FUEL ACCUMULATION IN THE TAIL PIPE AND FIRE OUT THE TAIL CONE WHEN IGNITERS WERE TURNED ON.

Narrative: TO CONSERVE FUEL, ONE ENG IS STARTED AT THE GATE AND THE SECOND ENG AT THE RWY. OUR APU WAS INOP. NOT WANTING TO DISTURB THE ACFT BEHIND US, WE WAITED UNTIL WE WERE BETWEEN RWY 34R AND 34L. AT SEA TO RUNUP THE OPERATING ENG FOR A CROSSBLEED START. THE ENG WOULD NOT START. FURTHER CHKING REVEALED THAT THE IGNITION SWITCH HAD NOT BEEN ON. WHILE ATTEMPTING ANOTHER START, AN ACFT CALLED AND SAID WE HAD A POSSIBLE TAILPIPE FIRE. THE START ATTEMPT WAS STOPPED WHILE CONTINUING TO CRANK TO CLR THE ENG OF FUEL. I HEADED BACK TOWARD THE RAMP. THE FIRE CREW MET ME ON THE RAMP AND SAID THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF A FIRE. WHILE THE FIRE CREW WAS THERE, ANOTHER START WAS ATTEMPTED AND WAS SUCCESSFUL. SINCE I KNEW THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN CREATED BY US AND THERE WAS NOTHING WRONG WITH THE ACFT, I DECIDED TO TKOF AND CONTINUE THE TRIP. I PROBABLY LEFT MYSELF OPEN TO CRITICISM BY NOT RETURNING TO THE GATE AND HAVE MAINT LOOK AT THE ENG BEFORE ATTEMPTING ANOTHER START. IF I HAD IT TO DO OVER AGAIN, I PROBABLY WOULD RETURN TO THE GATE. I THINK THE FACTORS HERE ARE TWO MAN CREW, NIGHT TIME, CROSS BLEED START AT THE END OF THE RWY, ATTEMPTING TO SAVE FUEL TO AN EXTENT NOT NECESSARY. THIS KIND OF A SITUATION IS TOO BUSY AND THINGS GET IN TOO MUCH OF A HURRY FOR A TWO MAN CREW. AFTER THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN CORRECTED, EVERYTHING POINTED TO THE FACT THAT NOTHING WAS WRONG WITH THE ENG. SO MY JUDGEMENT WAS WHY DELAY ANY FURTHER BECAUSE I THOUGHT IT WAS SAFE. HOWEVER, I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN MORE TIME TO CONSIDER ALL THE ASPECTS OF ONE HUNDRED PERCENT SAFETY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: F/O VERY EXPERIENCED ON THE ACFT, FAILED TO SHUT OFF THE FUEL LEVER WHEN HE NOTICED THE ENG DID NOT LIGHT UP. AS A RESULT WHEN HE REALIZED HIS ERROR IN NOT ARMING THE IGNITERS AND TURNING THEM ON, FUEL HAD ACCUMULATED IN THE TAIL PIPE WHICH IGNITED CAUSING THE FIRE TO SHOOT OUT THE TAIL OF THE ENG. AS SOON AS THE OTHER ACFT RPTED THE FIRE, THE CAPT SHUT OFF THE FUEL LEVER AND ADVISED THE F/O TO CONTINUE MOTORING THE ENG TO BLOW OUT THE EXCESS FUEL. NO EGT LIMITS WERE EXCEEDED AND AFTER INSPECTION BY THE FIRE CREW THE FLT DEPARTED. RPTR DOES NOT LIKE THE TWO MAN CREW CONCEPT, BUSY COCKPIT AND IN THE FUTURE IN A SIMILAR INCIDENT, WILL RETURN TO THE GATE FOR MAINT INSPECTION OF THE ENG. NO PROB ON THIS FLT AND THE COMPANY IS TAKING NO ACTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.