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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 809040 |
Time | |
Date | 200810 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : cpr.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-700 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 125 |
Person 1 | |
Function | maintenance : technician |
Qualification | technician : airframe technician : powerplant |
ASRS Report | 809040 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | oversight : supervisor |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other other : 2 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : manuals contributing factor : briefing performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : training performance deficiency : logbook entry |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Maintenance Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Narrative:
During troubleshooting of speed brake; do not arm light; several maintenance actions were being performed to isolate maintenance problem. Per the fim troubleshooting steps; the stall management yaw damper #1 and stall management yaw damper #2 were swapped; therefore; downgrading aircraft from CAT III to CAT I status because of removing stall management yaw damper #1 computer. I was not aware that stall management yaw damper #1 was CAT III sensitive; so aircraft was never recertified. I discovered this the following day when I was troubleshooting another aircraft with same problem and the technical foreman reminded me to recertify aircraft if I remove stall management yaw damper #1 computer. To prevent in future; explore possibility of placarding CAT III sensitive components.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A LINE MECHANIC SWAPS THE #1 STALL MANAGEMENT YAW DAMPER (SMYD) COMPUTER WITH SYMD #2; PER THE FAULT ISOLATION MANUAL (FIM) TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDURES; BUT DOES NOT DOWNGRADE THE B737-700 TO A CAT-1 STATUS.
Narrative: DURING TROUBLESHOOTING OF SPD BRAKE; DO NOT ARM LIGHT; SEVERAL MAINT ACTIONS WERE BEING PERFORMED TO ISOLATE MAINT PROB. PER THE FIM TROUBLESHOOTING STEPS; THE STALL MGMNT YAW DAMPER #1 AND STALL MGMNT YAW DAMPER #2 WERE SWAPPED; THEREFORE; DOWNGRADING ACFT FROM CAT III TO CAT I STATUS BECAUSE OF REMOVING STALL MGMNT YAW DAMPER #1 COMPUTER. I WAS NOT AWARE THAT STALL MGMNT YAW DAMPER #1 WAS CAT III SENSITIVE; SO ACFT WAS NEVER RECERTIFIED. I DISCOVERED THIS THE FOLLOWING DAY WHEN I WAS TROUBLESHOOTING ANOTHER ACFT WITH SAME PROB AND THE TECHNICAL FOREMAN REMINDED ME TO RECERTIFY ACFT IF I REMOVE STALL MGMNT YAW DAMPER #1 COMPUTER. TO PREVENT IN FUTURE; EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF PLACARDING CAT III SENSITIVE COMPONENTS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.