Narrative:

I was flying as #1 of a 2-SHIP cross country return mission with a stopover at ZZZ for fuel. The WX brief received at departure indicated forecast WX at ZZZ for our arrival to be 5 mi in mist with ceiling broken at 900 ft. The ATIS indicated the WX had improved to broken at 2200 ft; 3 mi visibility; with runway 17 in use. Based on this ATIS; I set up the navaids for the ILS to runway 17 and reviewed the approach with my back-seater; who was also an experienced pilot. Approaching the field; I received vectors to avoid thunderstorms and was told to expect an ILS to runway 35. Based on this; I retuned the navaids and rebriefed the new approach. I intercepted the final approach course about 2 NM outside of the FAF with a 35 degree intercept angle and began the approach from a position above the GS. Shortly after beginning the descent; instruments in both cockpits began to show erratic indications; alternating from full-scale deflection above to full-scale deflection below GS; occasionally pausing near the middle. I elected to disregard the GS and continue to localizer minimums. Having made this decision; I established a moderate descent of about 4-5 degrees and shifted my visual scan to the outside; expecting to break out at 2200 ft. I actually broke out at about 600 ft (just above localizer minimums); and inside of the vdp. Actual observed WX was 600-700 ft overcast; with 3-5 mi in mist; wet runway. Rather than attempt to duck under and salvage a bad approach; I elected to go around. I told tower then I was going missed approach and requested radar vectors for another ILS attempt while positioning the aircraft over the runway at about 500 ft AGL. I was also concerned about stopping distance for my wingman; who was heavier than normal; and had to land past a raised cable almost 2000 ft down a wet runway. After a delay; tower said call sign say again. I repeated that I was going missed approach and requesting radar vectors. After this; tower asked me if I could take a turn in the tower pattern. I wasn't sure what they meant; since the WX was obviously less than VFR; and probably less than circling minimums (650 ft) and assumed they were intending to give me short vectors within tower airspace. I responded that I could; and asked which direction they wanted me to turn. They did not respond; and after a few seconds; I prompted them with call sign. At this time; a new controller came on a different transmitter (obviously a supervisor) and directed me to contact departure; gave me the frequency and told me to expect radar vectors. He then repeated the frequency; and as I entered the new frequency; tower attempted to pass climb out instructions to me; but all I heard was climb and maintain. I began the missed approach by establishing an intercept to the radial outbound; but did not note the final altitude for the missed approach; which was 3000 ft. I was very concerned about the possibility of towers in the vicinity (I was not familiar with the local area); and I maintained a gradual climb while attempting to contact departure control and clearing my flight path with the radar. I called departure 3 times before making contact (the radio had been very bad all day). The first call was unanswered; the second call received 2 people calling at once. I broke out of the overcast deck at 4200 ft and leveled off while I reviewed the approach plate to determine emergency safe and missed approach altitudes. Several seconds after my 3RD radio call I finally established contact with departure and received vectors. Tower had indicated that there were men and equipment working on the side of the runway during the first approach; so I asked my wingman if he had observed any problems with the GS during his approach from 2 mi trail; and he stated that it seemed normal to him. Not knowing what the problem was; I elected to fly a localizer approach while monitoring the GS indications. I monitored the GS on the subsequent approach; and it appeared to operate normally. I broke out of the WX at about 500 ft. I had several good lessons learned out of this experience. First; managing expectations and complacency. Due to the ATIS report; I expected a very early breakout and transition to a visual approach. This led me to allow complacency to creep in and I flew a sloppy approach with an attempt to capture the GS from above; which is never a good plan. Second; since I expected the WX to be better than it was; I never considered the possibility of a missed approach and I did not review the missed approach procedure before commencing the approach. Third; I let tower talk me into a change of game plan after I had declared missed approach; which caused me to misprioritize my attention on figuring out what they were trying to get me to do instead of determining the correct missed approach procedure. Communication difficulties; confusing GS indications; and concern about my wingman's landing situation all took attention from my primary responsibility of safely flying and navigating the airplane.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FIGHTER PILOT REPORTS MISSED APPROACH AFTER GS FAILURE WITH CEILING MUCH LOWER THAN REPORTED BY ATIS. MISSED APPROACH ALTITUDE IS EXCEEDED BY 1200 FEET.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING AS #1 OF A 2-SHIP XCOUNTRY RETURN MISSION WITH A STOPOVER AT ZZZ FOR FUEL. THE WX BRIEF RECEIVED AT DEP INDICATED FORECAST WX AT ZZZ FOR OUR ARR TO BE 5 MI IN MIST WITH CEILING BROKEN AT 900 FT. THE ATIS INDICATED THE WX HAD IMPROVED TO BROKEN AT 2200 FT; 3 MI VISIBILITY; WITH RWY 17 IN USE. BASED ON THIS ATIS; I SET UP THE NAVAIDS FOR THE ILS TO RWY 17 AND REVIEWED THE APCH WITH MY BACK-SEATER; WHO WAS ALSO AN EXPERIENCED PLT. APCHING THE FIELD; I RECEIVED VECTORS TO AVOID TSTMS AND WAS TOLD TO EXPECT AN ILS TO RWY 35. BASED ON THIS; I RETUNED THE NAVAIDS AND REBRIEFED THE NEW APCH. I INTERCEPTED THE FINAL APCH COURSE ABOUT 2 NM OUTSIDE OF THE FAF WITH A 35 DEG INTERCEPT ANGLE AND BEGAN THE APCH FROM A POS ABOVE THE GS. SHORTLY AFTER BEGINNING THE DSCNT; INSTS IN BOTH COCKPITS BEGAN TO SHOW ERRATIC INDICATIONS; ALTERNATING FROM FULL-SCALE DEFLECTION ABOVE TO FULL-SCALE DEFLECTION BELOW GS; OCCASIONALLY PAUSING NEAR THE MIDDLE. I ELECTED TO DISREGARD THE GS AND CONTINUE TO LOC MINIMUMS. HAVING MADE THIS DECISION; I ESTABLISHED A MODERATE DSCNT OF ABOUT 4-5 DEGS AND SHIFTED MY VISUAL SCAN TO THE OUTSIDE; EXPECTING TO BREAK OUT AT 2200 FT. I ACTUALLY BROKE OUT AT ABOUT 600 FT (JUST ABOVE LOC MINIMUMS); AND INSIDE OF THE VDP. ACTUAL OBSERVED WX WAS 600-700 FT OVCST; WITH 3-5 MI IN MIST; WET RWY. RATHER THAN ATTEMPT TO DUCK UNDER AND SALVAGE A BAD APCH; I ELECTED TO GO AROUND. I TOLD TWR THEN I WAS GOING MISSED APCH AND REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS FOR ANOTHER ILS ATTEMPT WHILE POSITIONING THE ACFT OVER THE RWY AT ABOUT 500 FT AGL. I WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT STOPPING DISTANCE FOR MY WINGMAN; WHO WAS HEAVIER THAN NORMAL; AND HAD TO LAND PAST A RAISED CABLE ALMOST 2000 FT DOWN A WET RWY. AFTER A DELAY; TWR SAID CALL SIGN SAY AGAIN. I REPEATED THAT I WAS GOING MISSED APCH AND REQUESTING RADAR VECTORS. AFTER THIS; TWR ASKED ME IF I COULD TAKE A TURN IN THE TWR PATTERN. I WASN'T SURE WHAT THEY MEANT; SINCE THE WX WAS OBVIOUSLY LESS THAN VFR; AND PROBABLY LESS THAN CIRCLING MINIMUMS (650 FT) AND ASSUMED THEY WERE INTENDING TO GIVE ME SHORT VECTORS WITHIN TWR AIRSPACE. I RESPONDED THAT I COULD; AND ASKED WHICH DIRECTION THEY WANTED ME TO TURN. THEY DID NOT RESPOND; AND AFTER A FEW SECONDS; I PROMPTED THEM WITH CALL SIGN. AT THIS TIME; A NEW CTLR CAME ON A DIFFERENT XMITTER (OBVIOUSLY A SUPVR) AND DIRECTED ME TO CONTACT DEP; GAVE ME THE FREQ AND TOLD ME TO EXPECT RADAR VECTORS. HE THEN REPEATED THE FREQ; AND AS I ENTERED THE NEW FREQ; TWR ATTEMPTED TO PASS CLBOUT INSTRUCTIONS TO ME; BUT ALL I HEARD WAS CLB AND MAINTAIN. I BEGAN THE MISSED APCH BY ESTABLISHING AN INTERCEPT TO THE RADIAL OUTBOUND; BUT DID NOT NOTE THE FINAL ALT FOR THE MISSED APCH; WHICH WAS 3000 FT. I WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF TWRS IN THE VICINITY (I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE LCL AREA); AND I MAINTAINED A GRADUAL CLB WHILE ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT DEP CTL AND CLRING MY FLT PATH WITH THE RADAR. I CALLED DEP 3 TIMES BEFORE MAKING CONTACT (THE RADIO HAD BEEN VERY BAD ALL DAY). THE FIRST CALL WAS UNANSWERED; THE SECOND CALL RECEIVED 2 PEOPLE CALLING AT ONCE. I BROKE OUT OF THE OVCST DECK AT 4200 FT AND LEVELED OFF WHILE I REVIEWED THE APCH PLATE TO DETERMINE EMER SAFE AND MISSED APCH ALTS. SEVERAL SECONDS AFTER MY 3RD RADIO CALL I FINALLY ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH DEP AND RECEIVED VECTORS. TWR HAD INDICATED THAT THERE WERE MEN AND EQUIP WORKING ON THE SIDE OF THE RWY DURING THE FIRST APCH; SO I ASKED MY WINGMAN IF HE HAD OBSERVED ANY PROBS WITH THE GS DURING HIS APCH FROM 2 MI TRAIL; AND HE STATED THAT IT SEEMED NORMAL TO HIM. NOT KNOWING WHAT THE PROB WAS; I ELECTED TO FLY A LOC APCH WHILE MONITORING THE GS INDICATIONS. I MONITORED THE GS ON THE SUBSEQUENT APCH; AND IT APPEARED TO OPERATE NORMALLY. I BROKE OUT OF THE WX AT ABOUT 500 FT. I HAD SEVERAL GOOD LESSONS LEARNED OUT OF THIS EXPERIENCE. FIRST; MANAGING EXPECTATIONS AND COMPLACENCY. DUE TO THE ATIS RPT; I EXPECTED A VERY EARLY BREAKOUT AND TRANSITION TO A VISUAL APCH. THIS LED ME TO ALLOW COMPLACENCY TO CREEP IN AND I FLEW A SLOPPY APCH WITH AN ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE THE GS FROM ABOVE; WHICH IS NEVER A GOOD PLAN. SECOND; SINCE I EXPECTED THE WX TO BE BETTER THAN IT WAS; I NEVER CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF A MISSED APCH AND I DID NOT REVIEW THE MISSED APCH PROC BEFORE COMMENCING THE APCH. THIRD; I LET TWR TALK ME INTO A CHANGE OF GAME PLAN AFTER I HAD DECLARED MISSED APCH; WHICH CAUSED ME TO MISPRIORITIZE MY ATTN ON FIGURING OUT WHAT THEY WERE TRYING TO GET ME TO DO INSTEAD OF DETERMINING THE CORRECT MISSED APCH PROC. COM DIFFICULTIES; CONFUSING GS INDICATIONS; AND CONCERN ABOUT MY WINGMAN'S LNDG SITUATION ALL TOOK ATTN FROM MY PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF SAFELY FLYING AND NAVING THE AIRPLANE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.