Narrative:

Near high speed takeoff abort to avoid intersecting landing traffic. Air carrier X was forced to abort the takeoff roll at just below 80 KTS on runway 28 to avoid conflicting with the aircraft landing on the intersecting runway 33L. After a normal pushback and initial taxi; we were cleared to runway 28 via taxiway C. It was fully dark; but clear and visibility was good. Normal cockpit flows and procedures occurred. A minor traffic issue arose as we arrived in the 28 holding block concurrent with a B737 traveling east on taxiway U. When no sequencing input was received from the ground controller; we elected to yield to the decidedly faster moving traffic. This was a minor surprise due; in great part; to prevalent; severe darkness. A 'heads up' from the tower would have been appreciated. In sequence; we were cleared to 'position and hold' on runway 28. All checklists were complete as we crossed the hold short; but a distraction did occur when the flight attendant call chime rang one time as we reached the runway centerline. Past experience has shown that this occurs when there is a passenger/cabin issue that should be addressed before starting the takeoff roll. In this case it was a non-critical cabin-to-cabin conversation; but it took the first officer a few moments to discern this fact and re-stow the intercom handset. This distraction was exacerbated by the generally poor quality of the intercom chime audio (hard to hear) and the lack of a dedicated cabin-to-cockpit intercom alerting system. In all; this distraction mentally removed the first officer from the takeoff environment for about 15 seconds. As this was occurring; tower cleared us for takeoff on runway 28 with an advisory that traffic was 'on a 2 mi final for runway 33L.' all the landing lights were illuminated and the parking brake released. A short delay of 10 seconds or less ensued while I confirmed with the first officer that both he and the cabin were ready. With his concurrence; the power was advanced and autothrottles engaged. On the previous leg; this airplane had shown a strong tendency for the engines to spool-up unevenly; so my attention was initially focused on steady power application and maintaining runway centerline. Accelerating through about 75 KIAS; the tower 'canceled' our takeoff clearance due to concerns that there would be insufficient separation with the landing traffic. As the rejected takeoff mode of the autobrake system had not yet armed; we were able do a smooth reject with normal control inputs and stop at the intersection of runway 4/22. As we taxied back to the takeoff position via runway 4/22 and taxiway U; I queried the tower as to why they did not use the phrase 'immediate' when the separation was obviously close. Their response was that they wished to 'save that phrasing for when they really needed it.' in the ensuing discussion; the first officer allowed that he had not actually heard the entire takeoff clearance. The ability of a crew departing on runway 28 to assess the proximity of arrs on runway 33L is limited due to the fairly acute intersection angle; threshold offsets and the trees and terrain that block the view. In retrospect; I do not believe that our delay before initiating the roll was even slightly excessive. If the phrase 'immediate' had been used however; I would have declined the clearance simply because the first officer was not; at that moment; fully ready. If no delay can be accepted; please say 'immediate' -- it is an important trigger phrase that can cut through other distrs. Additionally; if it could be reiterated to the cabin crews to avoid the non-essential intercom chimes while taxiing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 DEPARTURE FROM RUNWAY 28 AT BWI WAS INSTRUCTED TO CANCEL TAKEOFF CLEARANCE BECAUSE OF SPACING WITH TRAFFIC LANDING ON RUNWAY 33L; REPORTER ALLEGING AN IMMEDIATE TAKEOFF CLEARANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED.

Narrative: NEAR HIGH SPD TKOF ABORT TO AVOID INTERSECTING LNDG TFC. ACR X WAS FORCED TO ABORT THE TKOF ROLL AT JUST BELOW 80 KTS ON RWY 28 TO AVOID CONFLICTING WITH THE ACFT LNDG ON THE INTERSECTING RWY 33L. AFTER A NORMAL PUSHBACK AND INITIAL TAXI; WE WERE CLRED TO RWY 28 VIA TXWY C. IT WAS FULLY DARK; BUT CLR AND VISIBILITY WAS GOOD. NORMAL COCKPIT FLOWS AND PROCS OCCURRED. A MINOR TFC ISSUE AROSE AS WE ARRIVED IN THE 28 HOLDING BLOCK CONCURRENT WITH A B737 TRAVELING E ON TXWY U. WHEN NO SEQUENCING INPUT WAS RECEIVED FROM THE GND CTLR; WE ELECTED TO YIELD TO THE DECIDEDLY FASTER MOVING TFC. THIS WAS A MINOR SURPRISE DUE; IN GREAT PART; TO PREVALENT; SEVERE DARKNESS. A 'HEADS UP' FROM THE TWR WOULD HAVE BEEN APPRECIATED. IN SEQUENCE; WE WERE CLRED TO 'POS AND HOLD' ON RWY 28. ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETE AS WE CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT; BUT A DISTR DID OCCUR WHEN THE FLT ATTENDANT CALL CHIME RANG ONE TIME AS WE REACHED THE RWY CTRLINE. PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THIS OCCURS WHEN THERE IS A PAX/CABIN ISSUE THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BEFORE STARTING THE TKOF ROLL. IN THIS CASE IT WAS A NON-CRITICAL CABIN-TO-CABIN CONVERSATION; BUT IT TOOK THE FO A FEW MOMENTS TO DISCERN THIS FACT AND RE-STOW THE INTERCOM HANDSET. THIS DISTR WAS EXACERBATED BY THE GENERALLY POOR QUALITY OF THE INTERCOM CHIME AUDIO (HARD TO HEAR) AND THE LACK OF A DEDICATED CABIN-TO-COCKPIT INTERCOM ALERTING SYS. IN ALL; THIS DISTR MENTALLY REMOVED THE FO FROM THE TKOF ENVIRONMENT FOR ABOUT 15 SECONDS. AS THIS WAS OCCURRING; TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF ON RWY 28 WITH AN ADVISORY THAT TFC WAS 'ON A 2 MI FINAL FOR RWY 33L.' ALL THE LNDG LIGHTS WERE ILLUMINATED AND THE PARKING BRAKE RELEASED. A SHORT DELAY OF 10 SECONDS OR LESS ENSUED WHILE I CONFIRMED WITH THE FO THAT BOTH HE AND THE CABIN WERE READY. WITH HIS CONCURRENCE; THE PWR WAS ADVANCED AND AUTOTHROTTLES ENGAGED. ON THE PREVIOUS LEG; THIS AIRPLANE HAD SHOWN A STRONG TENDENCY FOR THE ENGS TO SPOOL-UP UNEVENLY; SO MY ATTN WAS INITIALLY FOCUSED ON STEADY PWR APPLICATION AND MAINTAINING RWY CTRLINE. ACCELERATING THROUGH ABOUT 75 KIAS; THE TWR 'CANCELED' OUR TKOF CLRNC DUE TO CONCERNS THAT THERE WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT SEPARATION WITH THE LNDG TFC. AS THE RTO MODE OF THE AUTOBRAKE SYS HAD NOT YET ARMED; WE WERE ABLE DO A SMOOTH REJECT WITH NORMAL CTL INPUTS AND STOP AT THE INTXN OF RWY 4/22. AS WE TAXIED BACK TO THE TKOF POS VIA RWY 4/22 AND TXWY U; I QUERIED THE TWR AS TO WHY THEY DID NOT USE THE PHRASE 'IMMEDIATE' WHEN THE SEPARATION WAS OBVIOUSLY CLOSE. THEIR RESPONSE WAS THAT THEY WISHED TO 'SAVE THAT PHRASING FOR WHEN THEY REALLY NEEDED IT.' IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION; THE FO ALLOWED THAT HE HAD NOT ACTUALLY HEARD THE ENTIRE TKOF CLRNC. THE ABILITY OF A CREW DEPARTING ON RWY 28 TO ASSESS THE PROX OF ARRS ON RWY 33L IS LIMITED DUE TO THE FAIRLY ACUTE INTXN ANGLE; THRESHOLD OFFSETS AND THE TREES AND TERRAIN THAT BLOCK THE VIEW. IN RETROSPECT; I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT OUR DELAY BEFORE INITIATING THE ROLL WAS EVEN SLIGHTLY EXCESSIVE. IF THE PHRASE 'IMMEDIATE' HAD BEEN USED HOWEVER; I WOULD HAVE DECLINED THE CLRNC SIMPLY BECAUSE THE FO WAS NOT; AT THAT MOMENT; FULLY READY. IF NO DELAY CAN BE ACCEPTED; PLEASE SAY 'IMMEDIATE' -- IT IS AN IMPORTANT TRIGGER PHRASE THAT CAN CUT THROUGH OTHER DISTRS. ADDITIONALLY; IF IT COULD BE REITERATED TO THE CABIN CREWS TO AVOID THE NON-ESSENTIAL INTERCOM CHIMES WHILE TAXIING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.