Narrative:

Upon arriving at the aircraft; we (myself and captain) were met by the incoming captain and first officer. They briefed us on the current MEL (73-31-xx) on the aircraft. They briefed us that during their flight into ZZZ they received the engine 1 fuel low pressure caution message 4 times. During this time all 4 of us discussed the MEL and the fact that there is no specific guidance in the MEL addressing whether the caution was normal during flight. The inbound crew left at this time and captain and myself continued to investigate the MEL. We determined that; with no specific guidance in the MEL addressing whether the above caution would normally be displayed in-flight; in the event the caution did display we would follow the applicable QRH procedure. At this time we reviewed that QRH (engine #1 fuel low pressure) and realized that if followed we would be required to divert. With the understanding that the message would most likely be displayed during flight; we saw no reason to take off only to divert. At this time we began to seek more information from outside sources. We agreed that if we could get an official written procedure telling us that we in fact should ignore the engine 1 fuel low pressure caution; we would go. Captain called maintenance control and relayed this request to him. Maintenance said he would discuss it with the embraer representative and get back to us. When he did; he said they found a page in a maintenance manual that stated the caution message was associated with the MEL. Note that this manual is not available to pilots; and in fact it took maintenance control over 2 hours to produce the reference. The manual page was faxed to us and we reviewed with an ZZZ line mechanic. We agreed that the page did prove the message was associated with the MEL; but it did nothing for guiding us to run or not run the QRH if received in-flight. Shortly thereafter; we were made aware there would be a conference call with maintenance control; pilot group safety representative; and us. During the call; maintenance correctly summarized our issue and proceeded to explain that it was indeed alright to ignore the caution in-flight. He referenced the preamble of the QRH; the intro to the MEL; and some part of another manual that I have never heard of nor have access to. His explanation was sufficient; but unrealistic. He convinced me it would be alright to take the aircraft in the current state; but it was such an involved process of proof; I doubt I could reproduce it. First officer made the comment that the average line pilot would probably not be able to come to the same conclusion with our limited resources. Ironically; during the 3 hours of discussion about this issue; the part that was deferred became available and was replaced within 20 mins. Took the flight with the new part installed. Supplemental information from acn 809716: updating the QRH and MEL's in a timely manner when safety of flight issues are impacted. This is the company's responsibility and duty to ensure the resources are made available to flight crews for the safe movement of an aircraft. We are limited by the tools the company provides to us to complete the required tasks. If such items are not available -- such as updated manuals -- the tasks cannot be safely completed by the pilot group.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB170 FLIGHT CREW REFUSES AIRCRAFT WITH MEL THAT CAUSES 'ENG 1 FUEL LO PRESS' WARNING; DUE TO LACK OF SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ALLOWING THIS MESSAGE TO BE IGNORED.

Narrative: UPON ARRIVING AT THE ACFT; WE (MYSELF AND CAPT) WERE MET BY THE INCOMING CAPT AND FO. THEY BRIEFED US ON THE CURRENT MEL (73-31-XX) ON THE ACFT. THEY BRIEFED US THAT DURING THEIR FLT INTO ZZZ THEY RECEIVED THE ENG 1 FUEL LOW PRESSURE CAUTION MESSAGE 4 TIMES. DURING THIS TIME ALL 4 OF US DISCUSSED THE MEL AND THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO SPECIFIC GUIDANCE IN THE MEL ADDRESSING WHETHER THE CAUTION WAS NORMAL DURING FLT. THE INBOUND CREW LEFT AT THIS TIME AND CAPT AND MYSELF CONTINUED TO INVESTIGATE THE MEL. WE DETERMINED THAT; WITH NO SPECIFIC GUIDANCE IN THE MEL ADDRESSING WHETHER THE ABOVE CAUTION WOULD NORMALLY BE DISPLAYED INFLT; IN THE EVENT THE CAUTION DID DISPLAY WE WOULD FOLLOW THE APPLICABLE QRH PROC. AT THIS TIME WE REVIEWED THAT QRH (ENG #1 FUEL LOW PRESSURE) AND REALIZED THAT IF FOLLOWED WE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DIVERT. WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE MESSAGE WOULD MOST LIKELY BE DISPLAYED DURING FLT; WE SAW NO REASON TO TAKE OFF ONLY TO DIVERT. AT THIS TIME WE BEGAN TO SEEK MORE INFO FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES. WE AGREED THAT IF WE COULD GET AN OFFICIAL WRITTEN PROC TELLING US THAT WE IN FACT SHOULD IGNORE THE ENG 1 FUEL LOW PRESSURE CAUTION; WE WOULD GO. CAPT CALLED MAINT CTL AND RELAYED THIS REQUEST TO HIM. MAINT SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS IT WITH THE EMBRAER REPRESENTATIVE AND GET BACK TO US. WHEN HE DID; HE SAID THEY FOUND A PAGE IN A MAINT MANUAL THAT STATED THE CAUTION MESSAGE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MEL. NOTE THAT THIS MANUAL IS NOT AVAILABLE TO PLTS; AND IN FACT IT TOOK MAINT CTL OVER 2 HRS TO PRODUCE THE REF. THE MANUAL PAGE WAS FAXED TO US AND WE REVIEWED WITH AN ZZZ LINE MECH. WE AGREED THAT THE PAGE DID PROVE THE MESSAGE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MEL; BUT IT DID NOTHING FOR GUIDING US TO RUN OR NOT RUN THE QRH IF RECEIVED INFLT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; WE WERE MADE AWARE THERE WOULD BE A CONFERENCE CALL WITH MAINT CTL; PLT GROUP SAFETY REPRESENTATIVE; AND US. DURING THE CALL; MAINT CORRECTLY SUMMARIZED OUR ISSUE AND PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN THAT IT WAS INDEED ALRIGHT TO IGNORE THE CAUTION INFLT. HE REFERENCED THE PREAMBLE OF THE QRH; THE INTRO TO THE MEL; AND SOME PART OF ANOTHER MANUAL THAT I HAVE NEVER HEARD OF NOR HAVE ACCESS TO. HIS EXPLANATION WAS SUFFICIENT; BUT UNREALISTIC. HE CONVINCED ME IT WOULD BE ALRIGHT TO TAKE THE ACFT IN THE CURRENT STATE; BUT IT WAS SUCH AN INVOLVED PROCESS OF PROOF; I DOUBT I COULD REPRODUCE IT. FO MADE THE COMMENT THAT THE AVERAGE LINE PLT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO COME TO THE SAME CONCLUSION WITH OUR LIMITED RESOURCES. IRONICALLY; DURING THE 3 HRS OF DISCUSSION ABOUT THIS ISSUE; THE PART THAT WAS DEFERRED BECAME AVAILABLE AND WAS REPLACED WITHIN 20 MINS. TOOK THE FLT WITH THE NEW PART INSTALLED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 809716: UPDATING THE QRH AND MEL'S IN A TIMELY MANNER WHEN SAFETY OF FLT ISSUES ARE IMPACTED. THIS IS THE COMPANY'S RESPONSIBILITY AND DUTY TO ENSURE THE RESOURCES ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO FLT CREWS FOR THE SAFE MOVEMENT OF AN ACFT. WE ARE LIMITED BY THE TOOLS THE COMPANY PROVIDES TO US TO COMPLETE THE REQUIRED TASKS. IF SUCH ITEMS ARE NOT AVAILABLE -- SUCH AS UPDATED MANUALS -- THE TASKS CANNOT BE SAFELY COMPLETED BY THE PLT GROUP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.