Narrative:

We departed the gate in ZZZ. We were advised of an estimated departure clearance (edc) time of XA02Z. The pushback was without incident. The right engine was started and appropriate checklists were completed. The decision was made to taxi single engine for fuel conservation as a result of our edc time. As I began the taxi out; I remembered that single engine taxi is not permitted when anti-ice is used or will be used for takeoff. As a result; I immediately stopped the aircraft and instructed the first officer to start the left engine. During the start sequence; a bleed misconfign master caution message appeared. I instructed the first officer to abort the start. No limitations were exceeded during the start sequence and all procedures for abnormal engine starts were complied with. At that time; the aircraft was stopped on taxiway M; short of taxiway a. After correcting the bleed misconfign situation; I once again instructed the first officer to start the left engine. During the start sequence; tower called and frantically stated that there is fire coming from the left engine. I ordered the first officer to abort the start. We had no abnormal indications in the cockpit. At that time I advised the flight attendant of the situation and asked him if he saw any evidence of smoke or fire. He said that he did not and I told him to call us should that change. The first officer then called the ground controller asking if fire was still observed. The ground controller said only that rescue vehicles are on their way; again sounding very frantic. At that same time the flight attendant called and said that there was smoke in the cabin. The first officer tried to confirm the smoke through the peep hole with no success as it was too dark. At that time I ordered the flight attendant to commence an evacuate/evacuation out of the main cabin door. The aircraft was secured and the passenger were exited through the main cabin door into the grass area adjacent to the taxiway. As it turns out; maintenance determined that there was no fire within the engine; and the emergency response crew determined that there was no evidence of smoke; fire; or excessive heat in the cabin. I believe that the ground controller's frantic tone contributed to making a stressful situation worse. I also think that perhaps the flight attendant may have had a heightened sense of awareness due to the stressful situation and that he was so concerned with looking for smoke that he created an illusion of smoke; perhaps from a shadow or other source. I think that in the end; if those involved would have remained calm it would have changed the situation immensely. The frantic tone of the controller and the fact that emergency vehicles were called out prior to an emergency declaration along with the incorrect report of smoke in the cabin contributed to perhaps a hasty evacuate/evacuation command on my part.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL600 FLT CREW EVACUATED THEIR AIRCRAFT IN RESPONSE TO AN ALERT FROM THE GROUND CONTROLLER THAT THEY HAD AN ENGINE FIRE.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED THE GATE IN ZZZ. WE WERE ADVISED OF AN ESTIMATED DEP CLRNC (EDC) TIME OF XA02Z. THE PUSHBACK WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE R ENG WAS STARTED AND APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED. THE DECISION WAS MADE TO TAXI SINGLE ENG FOR FUEL CONSERVATION AS A RESULT OF OUR EDC TIME. AS I BEGAN THE TAXI OUT; I REMEMBERED THAT SINGLE ENG TAXI IS NOT PERMITTED WHEN ANTI-ICE IS USED OR WILL BE USED FOR TKOF. AS A RESULT; I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THE ACFT AND INSTRUCTED THE FO TO START THE L ENG. DURING THE START SEQUENCE; A BLEED MISCONFIGN MASTER CAUTION MESSAGE APPEARED. I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO ABORT THE START. NO LIMITATIONS WERE EXCEEDED DURING THE START SEQUENCE AND ALL PROCS FOR ABNORMAL ENG STARTS WERE COMPLIED WITH. AT THAT TIME; THE ACFT WAS STOPPED ON TXWY M; SHORT OF TXWY A. AFTER CORRECTING THE BLEED MISCONFIGN SITUATION; I ONCE AGAIN INSTRUCTED THE FO TO START THE L ENG. DURING THE START SEQUENCE; TWR CALLED AND FRANTICALLY STATED THAT THERE IS FIRE COMING FROM THE L ENG. I ORDERED THE FO TO ABORT THE START. WE HAD NO ABNORMAL INDICATIONS IN THE COCKPIT. AT THAT TIME I ADVISED THE FLT ATTENDANT OF THE SITUATION AND ASKED HIM IF HE SAW ANY EVIDENCE OF SMOKE OR FIRE. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT AND I TOLD HIM TO CALL US SHOULD THAT CHANGE. THE FO THEN CALLED THE GND CTLR ASKING IF FIRE WAS STILL OBSERVED. THE GND CTLR SAID ONLY THAT RESCUE VEHICLES ARE ON THEIR WAY; AGAIN SOUNDING VERY FRANTIC. AT THAT SAME TIME THE FLT ATTENDANT CALLED AND SAID THAT THERE WAS SMOKE IN THE CABIN. THE FO TRIED TO CONFIRM THE SMOKE THROUGH THE PEEP HOLE WITH NO SUCCESS AS IT WAS TOO DARK. AT THAT TIME I ORDERED THE FLT ATTENDANT TO COMMENCE AN EVAC OUT OF THE MAIN CABIN DOOR. THE ACFT WAS SECURED AND THE PAX WERE EXITED THROUGH THE MAIN CABIN DOOR INTO THE GRASS AREA ADJACENT TO THE TXWY. AS IT TURNS OUT; MAINT DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NO FIRE WITHIN THE ENG; AND THE EMER RESPONSE CREW DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SMOKE; FIRE; OR EXCESSIVE HEAT IN THE CABIN. I BELIEVE THAT THE GND CTLR'S FRANTIC TONE CONTRIBUTED TO MAKING A STRESSFUL SITUATION WORSE. I ALSO THINK THAT PERHAPS THE FLT ATTENDANT MAY HAVE HAD A HEIGHTENED SENSE OF AWARENESS DUE TO THE STRESSFUL SITUATION AND THAT HE WAS SO CONCERNED WITH LOOKING FOR SMOKE THAT HE CREATED AN ILLUSION OF SMOKE; PERHAPS FROM A SHADOW OR OTHER SOURCE. I THINK THAT IN THE END; IF THOSE INVOLVED WOULD HAVE REMAINED CALM IT WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE SITUATION IMMENSELY. THE FRANTIC TONE OF THE CTLR AND THE FACT THAT EMER VEHICLES WERE CALLED OUT PRIOR TO AN EMER DECLARATION ALONG WITH THE INCORRECT RPT OF SMOKE IN THE CABIN CONTRIBUTED TO PERHAPS A HASTY EVAC COMMAND ON MY PART.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.