Narrative:

Scheduled departure from gate at ZZZ was XA00. Baggage handlers finished loading bags in the cargo pits at XA59. At XB00 someone on the ground cord told me to release the brakes. I assumed that he was the tug driver; but he wasn't using standard phraseology in accordance with flight manual SOP's. I had to ask him if his predep checks were complete; and after his acknowledgement; and once verified by him; I released the brakes. Immediately thereafter; I heard him unplug his headset. Approximately 30 seconds later; the 'real' tug driver plugged into headset. I asked him who the previous individual was; which he relied was a supervisor. Because of the supervisor's single-minded concern for an on-time departure; he jeopardized the safety of the air crew; passenger; and ramp personnel. Not only was he unqualified to assume pushback duties; he left the tug controls unmanned for at least 30 seconds (with aircraft brakes released). After the actual tug driver checked in; he stated that the supervisor most likely did what he did because the tug driver was not scheduled to come on shift until XB00. This blatant disregard for safety and procedures by the supervisor is unacceptable.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 FLIGHT CREW WAS GIVEN A BRAKE RELEASE CALL FROM A NON-QUALIFIED SUPERVISOR BECAUSE QUALIFIED PERSONNEL DID NOT COME ON DUTY UNTIL EXACTLY DEPARTURE TIME.

Narrative: SCHEDULED DEP FROM GATE AT ZZZ WAS XA00. BAGGAGE HANDLERS FINISHED LOADING BAGS IN THE CARGO PITS AT XA59. AT XB00 SOMEONE ON THE GND CORD TOLD ME TO RELEASE THE BRAKES. I ASSUMED THAT HE WAS THE TUG DRIVER; BUT HE WASN'T USING STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY IN ACCORDANCE WITH FLT MANUAL SOP'S. I HAD TO ASK HIM IF HIS PREDEP CHKS WERE COMPLETE; AND AFTER HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT; AND ONCE VERIFIED BY HIM; I RELEASED THE BRAKES. IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER; I HEARD HIM UNPLUG HIS HEADSET. APPROX 30 SECONDS LATER; THE 'REAL' TUG DRIVER PLUGGED INTO HEADSET. I ASKED HIM WHO THE PREVIOUS INDIVIDUAL WAS; WHICH HE RELIED WAS A SUPVR. BECAUSE OF THE SUPVR'S SINGLE-MINDED CONCERN FOR AN ON-TIME DEP; HE JEOPARDIZED THE SAFETY OF THE AIR CREW; PAX; AND RAMP PERSONNEL. NOT ONLY WAS HE UNQUALIFIED TO ASSUME PUSHBACK DUTIES; HE LEFT THE TUG CTLS UNMANNED FOR AT LEAST 30 SECONDS (WITH ACFT BRAKES RELEASED). AFTER THE ACTUAL TUG DRIVER CHKED IN; HE STATED THAT THE SUPVR MOST LIKELY DID WHAT HE DID BECAUSE THE TUG DRIVER WAS NOT SCHEDULED TO COME ON SHIFT UNTIL XB00. THIS BLATANT DISREGARD FOR SAFETY AND PROCS BY THE SUPVR IS UNACCEPTABLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.