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Attributes | |
ACN | 812010 |
Time | |
Date | 200811 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lga.airport |
State Reference | NY |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Dawn |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : lgat.tracon |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-700 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 812010 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 812011 |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : clearance non adherence : published procedure other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance controller : issued advisory |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Airspace Structure Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Cleared via runway 13; lga 2 maspeth climb. Maspeth climb calls for climbing right turn to heading 180 degrees; at lga 4.1 DME; right turn to 340 degrees. During preflight; we talked about our clearance; including the maspeth climb. During the gate brief I; as the PF; briefed the turns on the maspeth climb. After takeoff at 400 ft; I called for 'heading set 180 degrees;' the PNF set a right turn to 180 degrees. I responded 'heading select 180 degrees' and turned to follow the flight director. At lga 4.1 DME; I called for 'heading set 340 degrees;' the PNF turned the heading selector on the MCP to the left to heading 340 degrees. I verified the heading and responded 'heading select 340 degrees.' I turned the aircraft to follow the flight director to the left (the departure procedure calls for a right turn to 340 degrees). Passing through about 120 degrees; I noticed the mistake that I had made and started to reverse my direction of turn just as the departure controller said 'aircraft X; what heading are you turning to?' the PNF responded 340 degrees. The departure controller said 'aircraft X; it's a right turn to heading 340 degrees...continue your left turn to 320 degrees.' I rolled the aircraft back to the left to fly the 320 degree heading. Because I had already rolled the aircraft to the right; the departure controller; who was now watching us like a hawk; noticed the right turn and again said 'aircraft X; it looks like you're in a right turn.' we explained that we were indeed turning left and rolling through a 105 degree heading. We established ourselves on the 320 degree heading. Climbing through 8000 ft the departure controller gave us a phone number to call about a possible pilot deviation. After landing; we called lga departure and talked with the supervisor; who happened to be the controller that was working our flight leaving lga. He counseled me on the importance of following departure rtes exactly as published and the hazards of deviating from the published departure procedures. The controller also advised me that no other action would be taken. The event occurred because both the PF and the PNF made mistakes. All standard procedures and calls were followed. The correct heading was called for; the correct verification was made after the heading was selected. However; there were 3 mistakes made despite all standard procedures were followed. The first error was me; as the PF; because of the unusually large change in heading associated with the departure procedure; should have specified which direction I wanted the turn initiated. The second mistake was the PNF turning the heading bug in the wrong direction; resulting in a turn in the wrong direction. The third mistake was again made by me -- I verified the correct heading was selected; but I did not notice that the turn was selected in the wrong direction. I believe that this whole event could have been avoided by better communication between pilots. Also; I think that as a procedure it may be a good idea to include the direction of the turn when commanding a heading change. I did have the departure chart out and had referenced it during the gate brief and after we got our clearance; however; it was sitting at my side on top of my flight bag. It should have been on my yoke clip in my direct view.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 FLIGHT CREW DEPARTING LGA ON LGA2 MASPETH CLIMB MAKE A RIGHT TURN TO 180 DEGREES THEN A LEFT TURN TO 340 DEGREES. TWO RIGHT TURNS ARE REQUIRED BY THE SID.
Narrative: CLRED VIA RWY 13; LGA 2 MASPETH CLB. MASPETH CLB CALLS FOR CLBING R TURN TO HDG 180 DEGS; AT LGA 4.1 DME; R TURN TO 340 DEGS. DURING PREFLT; WE TALKED ABOUT OUR CLRNC; INCLUDING THE MASPETH CLB. DURING THE GATE BRIEF I; AS THE PF; BRIEFED THE TURNS ON THE MASPETH CLB. AFTER TKOF AT 400 FT; I CALLED FOR 'HDG SET 180 DEGS;' THE PNF SET A R TURN TO 180 DEGS. I RESPONDED 'HDG SELECT 180 DEGS' AND TURNED TO FOLLOW THE FLT DIRECTOR. AT LGA 4.1 DME; I CALLED FOR 'HDG SET 340 DEGS;' THE PNF TURNED THE HDG SELECTOR ON THE MCP TO THE L TO HDG 340 DEGS. I VERIFIED THE HDG AND RESPONDED 'HDG SELECT 340 DEGS.' I TURNED THE ACFT TO FOLLOW THE FLT DIRECTOR TO THE L (THE DEP PROC CALLS FOR A R TURN TO 340 DEGS). PASSING THROUGH ABOUT 120 DEGS; I NOTICED THE MISTAKE THAT I HAD MADE AND STARTED TO REVERSE MY DIRECTION OF TURN JUST AS THE DEP CTLR SAID 'ACFT X; WHAT HDG ARE YOU TURNING TO?' THE PNF RESPONDED 340 DEGS. THE DEP CTLR SAID 'ACFT X; IT'S A R TURN TO HDG 340 DEGS...CONTINUE YOUR L TURN TO 320 DEGS.' I ROLLED THE ACFT BACK TO THE L TO FLY THE 320 DEG HDG. BECAUSE I HAD ALREADY ROLLED THE ACFT TO THE R; THE DEP CTLR; WHO WAS NOW WATCHING US LIKE A HAWK; NOTICED THE R TURN AND AGAIN SAID 'ACFT X; IT LOOKS LIKE YOU'RE IN A R TURN.' WE EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE INDEED TURNING L AND ROLLING THROUGH A 105 DEG HDG. WE ESTABLISHED OURSELVES ON THE 320 DEG HDG. CLBING THROUGH 8000 FT THE DEP CTLR GAVE US A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL ABOUT A POSSIBLE PLTDEV. AFTER LNDG; WE CALLED LGA DEP AND TALKED WITH THE SUPVR; WHO HAPPENED TO BE THE CTLR THAT WAS WORKING OUR FLT LEAVING LGA. HE COUNSELED ME ON THE IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOWING DEP RTES EXACTLY AS PUBLISHED AND THE HAZARDS OF DEVIATING FROM THE PUBLISHED DEP PROCS. THE CTLR ALSO ADVISED ME THAT NO OTHER ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN. THE EVENT OCCURRED BECAUSE BOTH THE PF AND THE PNF MADE MISTAKES. ALL STANDARD PROCS AND CALLS WERE FOLLOWED. THE CORRECT HDG WAS CALLED FOR; THE CORRECT VERIFICATION WAS MADE AFTER THE HDG WAS SELECTED. HOWEVER; THERE WERE 3 MISTAKES MADE DESPITE ALL STANDARD PROCS WERE FOLLOWED. THE FIRST ERROR WAS ME; AS THE PF; BECAUSE OF THE UNUSUALLY LARGE CHANGE IN HDG ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEP PROC; SHOULD HAVE SPECIFIED WHICH DIRECTION I WANTED THE TURN INITIATED. THE SECOND MISTAKE WAS THE PNF TURNING THE HDG BUG IN THE WRONG DIRECTION; RESULTING IN A TURN IN THE WRONG DIRECTION. THE THIRD MISTAKE WAS AGAIN MADE BY ME -- I VERIFIED THE CORRECT HDG WAS SELECTED; BUT I DID NOT NOTICE THAT THE TURN WAS SELECTED IN THE WRONG DIRECTION. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WHOLE EVENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY BETTER COM BTWN PLTS. ALSO; I THINK THAT AS A PROC IT MAY BE A GOOD IDEA TO INCLUDE THE DIRECTION OF THE TURN WHEN COMMANDING A HDG CHANGE. I DID HAVE THE DEP CHART OUT AND HAD REFERENCED IT DURING THE GATE BRIEF AND AFTER WE GOT OUR CLRNC; HOWEVER; IT WAS SITTING AT MY SIDE ON TOP OF MY FLT BAG. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON MY YOKE CLIP IN MY DIRECT VIEW.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.