Narrative:

The aircraft was at ZZZ; scheduled to depart in the morning for a return to ZZZ1. The ZZZ2 taf; ZZZ2 flight attendant; and prognostic charts indicated icing conditions in the ZZZ1 area at the proposed arrival time. The crew decided in the evening prior that the icing conditions would make it illegal to return in the EA50. At approximately XA30 the crew received another WX briefing. There was an airmet covering a very wide area; beginning just north of ZZZ3 and extending to the canadian border for light to moderate mixed icing from 12000 ft down to the surface. There were several PIREPS indicating moderate icing in clouds and precipitation. The ZZZ2 taf and ZZZ2 flight attendant indicated ceilings in 3000-4000 foot range; and surface temperatures were already below 00C. The crew once again decided that the flight would need to be delayed. At approximately XC00 local; the crew both began receiving numerous phone calls from two dispatchers; the chief pilot; and the assistant chief pilot. The chief pilot and assistant chief pilot both expressed feelings that the crew had made an incorrect WX decision and strongly advised that they should reconsider. The crew was told that there was minimal danger associated with the current conditions and that the flight could safely proceed to ZZZ1. The crew replied that the presence of the forecasts; PIREPS; and airmets all indicated that the flight could not be made legally. There was debate over the definition of 'known icing conditions' and the legality of the flight. The crew felt heavily pressured to proceed. They finally decided they might be able to stay out of the icing conditions if they remained below the clouds. They flew from ZZZ to ZZZ3. WX was clear. The aircraft was topped off in ZZZ3 and the crew once again checked the WX. Ceilings along the route ranged from 6000 ft to 4000 ft. Snow was moving toward the ZZZ3 area. The aircraft departed ZZZ3 at XH00 local. Between abc.VOR and ABC2.VOR the aircraft began entering the cloud bases. The crew requested 5000 ft; and was given a descent. Shortly thereafter; the aircraft once again entered the clouds. The crew then requested; and was assigned; a descent to 4000 ft. Light rime icing began accumulating on the wing surfaces. At 4000 ft the aircraft was in and out of the clouds; and ATC could not provide a descent to 3000 ft. The crew monitored the situation; and activated the de-icing boots to remove the ice. The flight was eventually descended to 3000 ft; and again the aircraft was in and out of the clouds; with ice accumulating. The boots were activated again. The crew shot the ILS into ZZZ1 and landed uneventfully; where snow was falling. While the crew never felt they were in much; if any; danger; they did realize that they were operating illegally when they were unable to remain clear of icing conditions. Their decision-making was influenced by their superiors and they decided to make a flight that they shouldn't have. There was no timetable involved and the WX the next morning was clear from ZZZ to ZZZ1. The crew exercised poor decision making skills due to pressure to please their employer. In the future; they will be more adamant about their go/no-go decisions. It is easy to be influenced into making a decision that one might not otherwise make when the input of a superior (and more experienced pilot) is telling you something different than your own judgment. This experience along with more research into FAA definitions of 'known icing' will aid the crew in ensuring this situation never happens again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EA50 CREW IS PRESSURED INTO FLYING IN KNOWN ICING CONDITIONS IN ORDER TO GET THE ACFT TO ITS BASE.

Narrative: THE ACFT WAS AT ZZZ; SCHEDULED TO DEPART IN THE MORNING FOR A RETURN TO ZZZ1. THE ZZZ2 TAF; ZZZ2 FA; AND PROGNOSTIC CHARTS INDICATED ICING CONDITIONS IN THE ZZZ1 AREA AT THE PROPOSED ARR TIME. THE CREW DECIDED IN THE EVENING PRIOR THAT THE ICING CONDITIONS WOULD MAKE IT ILLEGAL TO RETURN IN THE EA50. AT APPROX XA30 THE CREW RECEIVED ANOTHER WX BRIEFING. THERE WAS AN AIRMET COVERING A VERY WIDE AREA; BEGINNING JUST NORTH OF ZZZ3 AND EXTENDING TO THE CANADIAN BORDER FOR LIGHT TO MODERATE MIXED ICING FROM 12000 FT DOWN TO THE SURFACE. THERE WERE SEVERAL PIREPS INDICATING MODERATE ICING IN CLOUDS AND PRECIP. THE ZZZ2 TAF AND ZZZ2 FA INDICATED CEILINGS IN 3000-4000 FOOT RANGE; AND SURFACE TEMPERATURES WERE ALREADY BELOW 00C. THE CREW ONCE AGAIN DECIDED THAT THE FLT WOULD NEED TO BE DELAYED. AT APPROX XC00 LOCAL; THE CREW BOTH BEGAN RECEIVING NUMEROUS PHONE CALLS FROM TWO DISPATCHERS; THE CHIEF PLT; AND THE ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT. THE CHIEF PLT AND ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT BOTH EXPRESSED FEELINGS THAT THE CREW HAD MADE AN INCORRECT WX DECISION AND STRONGLY ADVISED THAT THEY SHOULD RECONSIDER. THE CREW WAS TOLD THAT THERE WAS MINIMAL DANGER ASSOCIATED WITH THE CURRENT CONDITIONS AND THAT THE FLT COULD SAFELY PROCEED TO ZZZ1. THE CREW REPLIED THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE FORECASTS; PIREPS; AND AIRMETS ALL INDICATED THAT THE FLT COULD NOT BE MADE LEGALLY. THERE WAS DEBATE OVER THE DEFINITION OF 'KNOWN ICING CONDITIONS' AND THE LEGALITY OF THE FLT. THE CREW FELT HEAVILY PRESSURED TO PROCEED. THEY FINALLY DECIDED THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO STAY OUT OF THE ICING CONDITIONS IF THEY REMAINED BELOW THE CLOUDS. THEY FLEW FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ3. WX WAS CLEAR. THE ACFT WAS TOPPED OFF IN ZZZ3 AND THE CREW ONCE AGAIN CHECKED THE WX. CEILINGS ALONG THE ROUTE RANGED FROM 6000 FT TO 4000 FT. SNOW WAS MOVING TOWARD THE ZZZ3 AREA. THE ACFT DEPARTED ZZZ3 AT XH00 LOCAL. BETWEEN ABC.VOR AND ABC2.VOR THE ACFT BEGAN ENTERING THE CLOUD BASES. THE CREW REQUESTED 5000 FT; AND WAS GIVEN A DSCNT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; THE ACFT ONCE AGAIN ENTERED THE CLOUDS. THE CREW THEN REQUESTED; AND WAS ASSIGNED; A DSCNT TO 4000 FT. LIGHT RIME ICING BEGAN ACCUMULATING ON THE WING SURFACES. AT 4000 FT THE ACFT WAS IN AND OUT OF THE CLOUDS; AND ATC COULD NOT PROVIDE A DSCNT TO 3000 FT. THE CREW MONITORED THE SITUATION; AND ACTIVATED THE DE-ICING BOOTS TO REMOVE THE ICE. THE FLT WAS EVENTUALLY DSNDED TO 3000 FT; AND AGAIN THE ACFT WAS IN AND OUT OF THE CLOUDS; WITH ICE ACCUMULATING. THE BOOTS WERE ACTIVATED AGAIN. THE CREW SHOT THE ILS INTO ZZZ1 AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY; WHERE SNOW WAS FALLING. WHILE THE CREW NEVER FELT THEY WERE IN MUCH; IF ANY; DANGER; THEY DID REALIZE THAT THEY WERE OPERATING ILLEGALLY WHEN THEY WERE UNABLE TO REMAIN CLEAR OF ICING CONDITIONS. THEIR DECISION-MAKING WAS INFLUENCED BY THEIR SUPERIORS AND THEY DECIDED TO MAKE A FLT THAT THEY SHOULDN'T HAVE. THERE WAS NO TIMETABLE INVOLVED AND THE WX THE NEXT MORNING WAS CLEAR FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1. THE CREW EXERCISED POOR DECISION MAKING SKILLS DUE TO PRESSURE TO PLEASE THEIR EMPLOYER. IN THE FUTURE; THEY WILL BE MORE ADAMANT ABOUT THEIR GO/NO-GO DECISIONS. IT IS EASY TO BE INFLUENCED INTO MAKING A DECISION THAT ONE MIGHT NOT OTHERWISE MAKE WHEN THE INPUT OF A SUPERIOR (AND MORE EXPERIENCED PLT) IS TELLING YOU SOMETHING DIFFERENT THAN YOUR OWN JUDGMENT. THIS EXPERIENCE ALONG WITH MORE RESEARCH INTO FAA DEFINITIONS OF 'KNOWN ICING' WILL AID THE CREW IN ENSURING THIS SITUATION NEVER HAPPENS AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.