Narrative:

The new runway at seattle tacoma international airport; runway 34L/16R; is scheduled to open. In preparation for this event; the FAA has published the sea-tac runway safety bulletin. I believe the communications plan as described in this bulletin is critically flawed. At a time of historic numbers of runway incursions; the FAA plan purposefully deprives pilots of information that diminishes situational awareness and thereby constitutes a critical safety hazard. Specifically; the bulletin states: when you are between runways; you may be on a frequency that is different than the frequency being used by other arrival or departure aircraft using those runways. Furthermore; it highlights the potential safety hazard; requesting pilots to take an extra moment to visually look for traffic on final or on the runway prior to any crossing. As professional aviators; we are taught to use all tools available to enhance our situational awareness. As stated in the plan; pilots are to be deprived of information regarding other aircraft receiving taking off or landing clrncs on the adjoining runway. Many safety reports speak to the criticality of this exact information in averting collisions of catastrophic consequence. Remaining on tower frequency while holding short and during runway xings would provide this immeasurably important information and may very well be the critical piece of information to break the chain in an accident sequence. The bulletin also recommends: brief the likely frequency changes and taxi rtes prior to leaving the gate or prior to the beginning of final approach when arriving. Having just attended safety training this exact practice was illustrated as the causal factor in a runway incursion at reagan national airport in washington; dc. The NTSB has idented expectation bias as a strong contributing factor in runway incursions; accidents and incidents. Why would pilots want to start our flts with an accident waiting to happen. Briefing runway incursion hot spots and runway exit plans enhances safety; but briefing a taxi route that hasn't been issued is a set up for error. It is my hope that the FAA will review and revise the proposed communications plan and briefing recommendations for sea-tac to enhance; not deter; safe operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 FO BELIEVES SAFETY IS COMPROMISED BY THE USE OF TWO TOWER AND GROUND FREQUENCIES WITH THE NEW RWY AT SEA.

Narrative: THE NEW RWY AT SEATTLE TACOMA INTL ARPT; RWY 34L/16R; IS SCHEDULED TO OPEN. IN PREPARATION FOR THIS EVENT; THE FAA HAS PUBLISHED THE SEA-TAC RWY SAFETY BULLETIN. I BELIEVE THE COMS PLAN AS DESCRIBED IN THIS BULLETIN IS CRITICALLY FLAWED. AT A TIME OF HISTORIC NUMBERS OF RWY INCURSIONS; THE FAA PLAN PURPOSEFULLY DEPRIVES PLTS OF INFO THAT DIMINISHES SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND THEREBY CONSTITUTES A CRITICAL SAFETY HAZARD. SPECIFICALLY; THE BULLETIN STATES: WHEN YOU ARE BTWN RWYS; YOU MAY BE ON A FREQ THAT IS DIFFERENT THAN THE FREQ BEING USED BY OTHER ARR OR DEP ACFT USING THOSE RWYS. FURTHERMORE; IT HIGHLIGHTS THE POTENTIAL SAFETY HAZARD; REQUESTING PLTS TO TAKE AN EXTRA MOMENT TO VISUALLY LOOK FOR TFC ON FINAL OR ON THE RWY PRIOR TO ANY XING. AS PROFESSIONAL AVIATORS; WE ARE TAUGHT TO USE ALL TOOLS AVAILABLE TO ENHANCE OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. AS STATED IN THE PLAN; PLTS ARE TO BE DEPRIVED OF INFO REGARDING OTHER ACFT RECEIVING TAKING OFF OR LNDG CLRNCS ON THE ADJOINING RWY. MANY SAFETY RPTS SPEAK TO THE CRITICALITY OF THIS EXACT INFO IN AVERTING COLLISIONS OF CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCE. REMAINING ON TWR FREQ WHILE HOLDING SHORT AND DURING RWY XINGS WOULD PROVIDE THIS IMMEASURABLY IMPORTANT INFO AND MAY VERY WELL BE THE CRITICAL PIECE OF INFO TO BREAK THE CHAIN IN AN ACCIDENT SEQUENCE. THE BULLETIN ALSO RECOMMENDS: BRIEF THE LIKELY FREQ CHANGES AND TAXI RTES PRIOR TO LEAVING THE GATE OR PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF FINAL APCH WHEN ARRIVING. HAVING JUST ATTENDED SAFETY TRAINING THIS EXACT PRACTICE WAS ILLUSTRATED AS THE CAUSAL FACTOR IN A RWY INCURSION AT REAGAN NATL ARPT IN WASHINGTON; DC. THE NTSB HAS IDENTED EXPECTATION BIAS AS A STRONG CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN RWY INCURSIONS; ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS. WHY WOULD PLTS WANT TO START OUR FLTS WITH AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN. BRIEFING RWY INCURSION HOT SPOTS AND RWY EXIT PLANS ENHANCES SAFETY; BUT BRIEFING A TAXI RTE THAT HASN'T BEEN ISSUED IS A SET UP FOR ERROR. IT IS MY HOPE THAT THE FAA WILL REVIEW AND REVISE THE PROPOSED COMS PLAN AND BRIEFING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SEA-TAC TO ENHANCE; NOT DETER; SAFE OPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.