Narrative:

We were assigned runway 1 for takeoff with ATIS winds 07011g19. Takeoff weight was 188.8. Cleared for takeoff runway 1; and taxiing into position; I advanced the outboards while completing the turn to line up. I glanced at the engines as I released brakes and thought I saw them spooling together. Almost immediately; the so called #4 slow to spool up and directional control deteriorated very rapidly. Seconds after initiating takeoff; I initiated a reject. The aircraft continued toward the edge of the runway for another second or two; until I regained control. Speed never exceeded 60 KTS. We exited at the next exit and rejoined the taxiway. After discussing the reason for the reject; we elected to attempt another takeoff while closely monitoring #4 acceleration. Second takeoff was normal; although nose down trim was required throughout climb out. (Numbers were rechked and were correct.) factors: 1) #4 was not completely spooled when brakes were released. (Cause) 2) #4 accelerated significantly slower than #1; #2 and #3. 3) maximum thrust was required for runway 1. 4) gusty right crosswind. I remember looking at the windsock and it was not full as I took the runway; but ATIS winds were 07011g19. 5) extremely light aircraft 188.8 takeoff weight. 6) the only load was 5 empty cans in the 5 aft position. This was almost exactly like the svt scenario we practiced; and that training probably kept us from a runway excursion. Positive points: so immediately recognized the spooling issue and called it out; making for an easier and quicker decision to reject. While I thought I called reject; no one heard me and the first officer immediately called it while completing the action items. Suggestions to prevent this happening again: while the other factors contributed to this; the primary cause was my not verifying all 4 engines equally spooled before releasing the brakes. In the future I plan on verbalizing 'all 4 spooled' after checking them; and before releasing the brakes and setting 'to thrust.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC8-73 FLIGHT CREW EXPERIENCES LOSS OF CONTROL AT START OF TAKEOFF ROLL WHEN #4 ENGINE FAILS TO SPOOL UP IN CONCERT WITH OTHERS. CONTROL IS REGAINED AND TAKEOFF IS SAFELY REJECTED.

Narrative: WE WERE ASSIGNED RWY 1 FOR TKOF WITH ATIS WINDS 07011G19. TKOF WT WAS 188.8. CLRED FOR TKOF RWY 1; AND TAXIING INTO POS; I ADVANCED THE OUTBOARDS WHILE COMPLETING THE TURN TO LINE UP. I GLANCED AT THE ENGS AS I RELEASED BRAKES AND THOUGHT I SAW THEM SPOOLING TOGETHER. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY; THE SO CALLED #4 SLOW TO SPOOL UP AND DIRECTIONAL CTL DETERIORATED VERY RAPIDLY. SECONDS AFTER INITIATING TKOF; I INITIATED A REJECT. THE ACFT CONTINUED TOWARD THE EDGE OF THE RWY FOR ANOTHER SECOND OR TWO; UNTIL I REGAINED CTL. SPD NEVER EXCEEDED 60 KTS. WE EXITED AT THE NEXT EXIT AND REJOINED THE TXWY. AFTER DISCUSSING THE REASON FOR THE REJECT; WE ELECTED TO ATTEMPT ANOTHER TKOF WHILE CLOSELY MONITORING #4 ACCELERATION. SECOND TKOF WAS NORMAL; ALTHOUGH NOSE DOWN TRIM WAS REQUIRED THROUGHOUT CLBOUT. (NUMBERS WERE RECHKED AND WERE CORRECT.) FACTORS: 1) #4 WAS NOT COMPLETELY SPOOLED WHEN BRAKES WERE RELEASED. (CAUSE) 2) #4 ACCELERATED SIGNIFICANTLY SLOWER THAN #1; #2 AND #3. 3) MAX THRUST WAS REQUIRED FOR RWY 1. 4) GUSTY R XWIND. I REMEMBER LOOKING AT THE WINDSOCK AND IT WAS NOT FULL AS I TOOK THE RWY; BUT ATIS WINDS WERE 07011G19. 5) EXTREMELY LIGHT ACFT 188.8 TKOF WT. 6) THE ONLY LOAD WAS 5 EMPTY CANS IN THE 5 AFT POS. THIS WAS ALMOST EXACTLY LIKE THE SVT SCENARIO WE PRACTICED; AND THAT TRAINING PROBABLY KEPT US FROM A RWY EXCURSION. POSITIVE POINTS: SO IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED THE SPOOLING ISSUE AND CALLED IT OUT; MAKING FOR AN EASIER AND QUICKER DECISION TO REJECT. WHILE I THOUGHT I CALLED REJECT; NO ONE HEARD ME AND THE FO IMMEDIATELY CALLED IT WHILE COMPLETING THE ACTION ITEMS. SUGGESTIONS TO PREVENT THIS HAPPENING AGAIN: WHILE THE OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS; THE PRIMARY CAUSE WAS MY NOT VERIFYING ALL 4 ENGS EQUALLY SPOOLED BEFORE RELEASING THE BRAKES. IN THE FUTURE I PLAN ON VERBALIZING 'ALL 4 SPOOLED' AFTER CHKING THEM; AND BEFORE RELEASING THE BRAKES AND SETTING 'TO THRUST.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.