A80 monitor controller described conflict event when aircraft executing missed approach flew through...

Attributes
ACN	813610
Time
Date	200811
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : a80.tracon
State Reference	GA
Altitude	msl single value : 1800
Environment
Flight Conditions	IMC
Weather Elements	Fog Rain
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : a80.tracon
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	DC-9 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	landing : missed approach
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Controlling Facilities	tracon : a80.tracon
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	climbout : takeoff
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : approach
Qualification	controller : radar
Experience	controller radar : 22 controller time certified in position1 : 3.8
ASRS Report	813610
Events
Anomaly	conflict : airborne critical inflight encounter : weather other spatial deviation
Independent Detector	other controllera
Resolutory Action	controller : issued new clearance
Miss Distance	horizontal : 1000 vertical : 200
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Weather ATC Human Performance Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Ambiguous

Narrative:

Aircraft X executed a missed approach to runway 9R at atl. A B757 was departing runway 9L; almost simultaneously. Strong wind from the south pushed aircraft X north; under; and behind the departure path of a B757. Air carrier X appeared to be less than 1 mi and 500 ft when the radar targets were observed. When aircraft X was turned to a 180 degree heading and climbed to 4000 ft; he flew back across the departure track of the B757. Local control 4 never issued traffic. Given the state of prm approachs in very low IFR WX conditions; the experience level at the world's busiest airport is comparatively low to what it needs to be. The exercise of good judgement in compromising and stressful situations is paramount to the integrity and safety of the NAS. The lack of exchanging traffic information and initiation of positive control actions on the part of the local controller in a more timely manner may have precluded aircraft X from flying through and behind the departure track of the B757 2 times! It must also be considered that the local controller was responding to direction from the supervisor; who may also have limited experience. If the supervisor told the controller what control actions to take; then the supervisor should assume all responsibility for this incident. The FAA needs to assume responsibility for putting the flying public at risk; due to the current staffing situation; that is minimal ATC experience. The local controller then released control for aircraft X back to the monitor controller. At that time the monitor controller did not have the ability to see aircraft X on radar or provide any control instructions using radar at their position. The monitor controller had to get up; taking their attention away from the prm monitor scope; to walk 15 ft to a radar scope to see aircraft X. They asked for help and got it from the supervisor; who aided a pointout and coordination with departure radar; because aircraft X who had headed south needed to divert to bna; which was north. Aircraft X was switched to departure and proceeded normally.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A80 MONITOR CONTROLLER DESCRIBED CONFLICT EVENT WHEN AIRCRAFT EXECUTING MISSED APPROACH FLEW THROUGH PATH OF A PARALLEL RUNWAY DEPARTURE TWICE; ALLEGING LOCAL CONTROLLER FAILED TO ISSUE APPROPRIATE TRAFFIC INFORMATION.

Narrative: ACFT X EXECUTED A MISSED APCH TO RWY 9R AT ATL. A B757 WAS DEPARTING RWY 9L; ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY. STRONG WIND FROM THE S PUSHED ACFT X N; UNDER; AND BEHIND THE DEP PATH OF A B757. ACR X APPEARED TO BE LESS THAN 1 MI AND 500 FT WHEN THE RADAR TARGETS WERE OBSERVED. WHEN ACFT X WAS TURNED TO A 180 DEG HDG AND CLBED TO 4000 FT; HE FLEW BACK ACROSS THE DEP TRACK OF THE B757. LOCAL CTL 4 NEVER ISSUED TFC. GIVEN THE STATE OF PRM APCHS IN VERY LOW IFR WX CONDITIONS; THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL AT THE WORLD'S BUSIEST ARPT IS COMPARATIVELY LOW TO WHAT IT NEEDS TO BE. THE EXERCISE OF GOOD JUDGEMENT IN COMPROMISING AND STRESSFUL SITUATIONS IS PARAMOUNT TO THE INTEGRITY AND SAFETY OF THE NAS. THE LACK OF EXCHANGING TFC INFO AND INITIATION OF POSITIVE CTL ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE LOCAL CTLR IN A MORE TIMELY MANNER MAY HAVE PRECLUDED ACFT X FROM FLYING THROUGH AND BEHIND THE DEP TRACK OF THE B757 2 TIMES! IT MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED THAT THE LOCAL CTLR WAS RESPONDING TO DIRECTION FROM THE SUPVR; WHO MAY ALSO HAVE LIMITED EXPERIENCE. IF THE SUPVR TOLD THE CTLR WHAT CTL ACTIONS TO TAKE; THEN THE SUPVR SHOULD ASSUME ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS INCIDENT. THE FAA NEEDS TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUTTING THE FLYING PUBLIC AT RISK; DUE TO THE CURRENT STAFFING SITUATION; THAT IS MINIMAL ATC EXPERIENCE. THE LOCAL CTLR THEN RELEASED CTL FOR ACFT X BACK TO THE MONITOR CTLR. AT THAT TIME THE MONITOR CTLR DID NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO SEE ACFT X ON RADAR OR PROVIDE ANY CTL INSTRUCTIONS USING RADAR AT THEIR POS. THE MONITOR CTLR HAD TO GET UP; TAKING THEIR ATTN AWAY FROM THE PRM MONITOR SCOPE; TO WALK 15 FT TO A RADAR SCOPE TO SEE ACFT X. THEY ASKED FOR HELP AND GOT IT FROM THE SUPVR; WHO AIDED A POINTOUT AND COORD WITH DEP RADAR; BECAUSE ACFT X WHO HAD HEADED S NEEDED TO DIVERT TO BNA; WHICH WAS N. ACFT X WAS SWITCHED TO DEP AND PROCEEDED NORMALLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A80 monitor controller described conflict event when aircraft executing missed approach flew through path of a parallel runway departure twice; alleging local controller failed to issue appropriate traffic information.