Rj flight crew reports getting too low during visual segment of RNAV runway 17 approach at vld. It i...

Narrative:

This event occurred while on short final approach to runway 17 at valdosta regional airport (vld). I was PF. We had been cleared direct cuvga and cleared for the RNAV (GPS) runway 17 approach. As we were IMC and it was quite bumpy; I slowed and configured the airplane a few mi early and commenced the approach. Once past cuvga; we descended to 1800 ft and immediately lowered the gear; went flaps 30 degrees; then 45 degrees and were on speed and configured correctly as we approached 0.3 NM prior to zurar; the FAF. At 0.3 NM prior to zurar; I rolled in 800 FPM on the vertical speed wheel (as we had previously briefed); and began a stabilized descent to an MDA of 830 ft; as per canpa procedures. At approximately 1100 ft MSL (900 ft AGL) we broke out of the clouds. At this point I briefly looked up and mentally noted that we had neither the runway nor the airport environment in sight. We continued on down to the MDA (830 ft) and as the aircraft announced 'minimums' I simultaneously looked up and asked the captain if he had the runway. He hesitated for about 2 seconds and then replied 'yes; it's right there' as he pointed to where it was. Although it was a bit hazy (3 NM visibility; which is about how far we were from the runway); I concurred that that was indeed the runway and continued the descent toward the runway. Approximately 5 seconds later; the tower controller announced 'altitude alert; air carrier X; check altitude.' the captain announced that we were in the clear and that we were leveling off. At this point I was a bit surprised that we had received such an alert and remember specifically noting that the snowflake was exactly centered and that we were at a comfortable distance above any of the surrounding terrain. The captain suggested that we level off for a bit to which I concurred and configured pitch and power accordingly. It was at this point that the PAPI came into view (it was not initially due to the hazy conditions); and showed 4 red. As we could clearly see the runway and the terrain between us and the runway; I elected to continue the approach and kept the aircraft level until we received 2 white and 2 red on the PAPI. The rest of the approach and landing occurred uneventfully. After landing; the captain noted that neither the REIL nor the runway lights were turned on; even though conditions were below VFR WX minimums. The tower controller asked us for a PIREP to which the captain replied we broke out at 900 ft and had a bit of difficulty seeing the runway since the lights weren't turned on. It is important to note that at no time during this approach did we receive any type of aural terrain warning from the GPWS. In retrospect; this event occurred primarily because we reached the MDA sooner than we should have. Afterwards; I remembered that somewhere near the FAF at about 1800 ft MSL; we had a quartering headwind of over 40 KTS. Although the wind on the ground was only 10 KTS gusting to 17 KTS; we should have taken into account how the 40 KTS would affect our ground speed and thus our planned descent rate. Had we done this; our descent rate should have been only 500-600 FPM; which would have put us at the MDA (830 ft) at a point which was closer to the runway; thus making it easier for us to see the runway once we reached that point. Additionally; had the runway lights and REIL been turned on; and had the PAPI been turned up brighter; we might have idented the runway and PAPI sooner and thus could have leveled the aircraft prior to the tower controller's altitude alert. Additionally; because it was hazy; the perceived slope to the runway was distorted; causing us to think that we were on the correct glidepath; when in fact we were low. Although I did not specifically follow the snowflake after having reached the MDA; I do think that the fact that we were on the snowflake when we received the altitude alert made the situation all the more confusing; as we were getting conflicting pieces of information. This type of situation could be prevented if we had correctly calculated the appropriate descent rate for this canpa approach.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RJ FLIGHT CREW REPORTS GETTING TOO LOW DURING VISUAL SEGMENT OF RNAV RUNWAY 17 APPROACH AT VLD. IT IS NOTED AFTER LANDING THAT NEITHER THE RUNWAY LIGHTS NOR THE REIL'S ARE TURNED ON.

Narrative: THIS EVENT OCCURRED WHILE ON SHORT FINAL APCH TO RWY 17 AT VALDOSTA REGIONAL ARPT (VLD). I WAS PF. WE HAD BEEN CLRED DIRECT CUVGA AND CLRED FOR THE RNAV (GPS) RWY 17 APCH. AS WE WERE IMC AND IT WAS QUITE BUMPY; I SLOWED AND CONFIGURED THE AIRPLANE A FEW MI EARLY AND COMMENCED THE APCH. ONCE PAST CUVGA; WE DSNDED TO 1800 FT AND IMMEDIATELY LOWERED THE GEAR; WENT FLAPS 30 DEGS; THEN 45 DEGS AND WERE ON SPD AND CONFIGURED CORRECTLY AS WE APCHED 0.3 NM PRIOR TO ZURAR; THE FAF. AT 0.3 NM PRIOR TO ZURAR; I ROLLED IN 800 FPM ON THE VERT SPD WHEEL (AS WE HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED); AND BEGAN A STABILIZED DSCNT TO AN MDA OF 830 FT; AS PER CANPA PROCS. AT APPROX 1100 FT MSL (900 FT AGL) WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS. AT THIS POINT I BRIEFLY LOOKED UP AND MENTALLY NOTED THAT WE HAD NEITHER THE RWY NOR THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT IN SIGHT. WE CONTINUED ON DOWN TO THE MDA (830 FT) AND AS THE ACFT ANNOUNCED 'MINIMUMS' I SIMULTANEOUSLY LOOKED UP AND ASKED THE CAPT IF HE HAD THE RWY. HE HESITATED FOR ABOUT 2 SECONDS AND THEN REPLIED 'YES; IT'S RIGHT THERE' AS HE POINTED TO WHERE IT WAS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS A BIT HAZY (3 NM VISIBILITY; WHICH IS ABOUT HOW FAR WE WERE FROM THE RWY); I CONCURRED THAT THAT WAS INDEED THE RWY AND CONTINUED THE DSCNT TOWARD THE RWY. APPROX 5 SECONDS LATER; THE TWR CTLR ANNOUNCED 'ALT ALERT; ACR X; CHK ALT.' THE CAPT ANNOUNCED THAT WE WERE IN THE CLR AND THAT WE WERE LEVELING OFF. AT THIS POINT I WAS A BIT SURPRISED THAT WE HAD RECEIVED SUCH AN ALERT AND REMEMBER SPECIFICALLY NOTING THAT THE SNOWFLAKE WAS EXACTLY CTRED AND THAT WE WERE AT A COMFORTABLE DISTANCE ABOVE ANY OF THE SURROUNDING TERRAIN. THE CAPT SUGGESTED THAT WE LEVEL OFF FOR A BIT TO WHICH I CONCURRED AND CONFIGURED PITCH AND PWR ACCORDINGLY. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT THE PAPI CAME INTO VIEW (IT WAS NOT INITIALLY DUE TO THE HAZY CONDITIONS); AND SHOWED 4 RED. AS WE COULD CLRLY SEE THE RWY AND THE TERRAIN BTWN US AND THE RWY; I ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE APCH AND KEPT THE ACFT LEVEL UNTIL WE RECEIVED 2 WHITE AND 2 RED ON THE PAPI. THE REST OF THE APCH AND LNDG OCCURRED UNEVENTFULLY. AFTER LNDG; THE CAPT NOTED THAT NEITHER THE REIL NOR THE RWY LIGHTS WERE TURNED ON; EVEN THOUGH CONDITIONS WERE BELOW VFR WX MINIMUMS. THE TWR CTLR ASKED US FOR A PIREP TO WHICH THE CAPT REPLIED WE BROKE OUT AT 900 FT AND HAD A BIT OF DIFFICULTY SEEING THE RWY SINCE THE LIGHTS WEREN'T TURNED ON. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT AT NO TIME DURING THIS APCH DID WE RECEIVE ANY TYPE OF AURAL TERRAIN WARNING FROM THE GPWS. IN RETROSPECT; THIS EVENT OCCURRED PRIMARILY BECAUSE WE REACHED THE MDA SOONER THAN WE SHOULD HAVE. AFTERWARDS; I REMEMBERED THAT SOMEWHERE NEAR THE FAF AT ABOUT 1800 FT MSL; WE HAD A QUARTERING HEADWIND OF OVER 40 KTS. ALTHOUGH THE WIND ON THE GND WAS ONLY 10 KTS GUSTING TO 17 KTS; WE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT HOW THE 40 KTS WOULD AFFECT OUR GND SPD AND THUS OUR PLANNED DSCNT RATE. HAD WE DONE THIS; OUR DSCNT RATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ONLY 500-600 FPM; WHICH WOULD HAVE PUT US AT THE MDA (830 FT) AT A POINT WHICH WAS CLOSER TO THE RWY; THUS MAKING IT EASIER FOR US TO SEE THE RWY ONCE WE REACHED THAT POINT. ADDITIONALLY; HAD THE RWY LIGHTS AND REIL BEEN TURNED ON; AND HAD THE PAPI BEEN TURNED UP BRIGHTER; WE MIGHT HAVE IDENTED THE RWY AND PAPI SOONER AND THUS COULD HAVE LEVELED THE ACFT PRIOR TO THE TWR CTLR'S ALT ALERT. ADDITIONALLY; BECAUSE IT WAS HAZY; THE PERCEIVED SLOPE TO THE RWY WAS DISTORTED; CAUSING US TO THINK THAT WE WERE ON THE CORRECT GLIDEPATH; WHEN IN FACT WE WERE LOW. ALTHOUGH I DID NOT SPECIFICALLY FOLLOW THE SNOWFLAKE AFTER HAVING REACHED THE MDA; I DO THINK THAT THE FACT THAT WE WERE ON THE SNOWFLAKE WHEN WE RECEIVED THE ALT ALERT MADE THE SITUATION ALL THE MORE CONFUSING; AS WE WERE GETTING CONFLICTING PIECES OF INFO. THIS TYPE OF SITUATION COULD BE PREVENTED IF WE HAD CORRECTLY CALCULATED THE APPROPRIATE DSCNT RATE FOR THIS CANPA APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	813957
Time
Date	200811
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : vld.airport
State Reference	GA
Environment
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : vld.tower
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Medium Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	other
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Route In Use	approach : instrument non precision
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : commercial
ASRS Report	813957
Person 2
Affiliation	other
Function	controller : local
Events
Anomaly	inflight encounter : weather inflight encounter : turbulence non adherence : published procedure other spatial deviation
Independent Detector	atc equipment : msaw other controllera
Resolutory Action	controller : issued alert flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action flight crew : became reoriented
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Weather Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance Airport Aircraft
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance

Rj flight crew reports getting too low during visual segment of RNAV runway 17 approach at vld. It is noted after landing that neither the runway lights nor the REIL's are turned on.