Narrative:

Our flight was on the ILS runway 1L at mke; cleared to land; following an rj. The rj landed and reported braking action poor. We were configured for the conditions with flaps 3 degrees selected and medium automatic brakes. We had briefed the approach accordingly and I felt it was safe to continue. The wind was very strong and I remember our ground speed on final at 108 KTS; but visibility was above CAT I minimums. I was prepared for the braking action. We then heard the county mobile vehicle talking to the tower about closing runway 1L. I thought they would let us complete the approach then close the runway for snow removal. Instead; we were instructed to 'go around; fly runway heading and maintain 4000 ft.' this we did. We were hoping that the snow removal would not take too long; and began to consider our options. Fuel was not an immediate factor; especially if we could get in to ord. We checked the ord WX; which was not much better than mke; and asked mke departure to check on our prospects of getting in there if need be. They informed us that flts were getting in. The plan was to commit to ord if mke became unavailable. If we stuck with ord; we would be unable to get to msp; our filed alternate. Dispatch advised us via ACARS that ord was understaffed and could not handle us. We looked at msp. It was VFR. Wanting to hold out as long as possible at mke; we calculated our fuel requirements. It was then that ATC advised us that mke would be closed for 45 more mins at best. We elected to divert to msp at that time and began the process. To say we were busy would be an understatement. I had xferred flying duties and ATC radio to the first officer; and was almost consumed with ACARS. For a time it was like texting while driving on I-10. We ended up with 5 pages of ACARS messages; where 1 radio conversation was all we would have needed. I was mostly out of the loop. We had been cleared to FL300 for the diversion to msp; and leveled near odi just as I finished with my tasks. ZAU asked us to verify our clearance to FL300; which I did. We then realized that the first officer; flying more or less solo; had not reset the altimeters to standard while climbing through FL180. The last setting they were on was mke; which was 29.29. We were 500 ft high. ATC did not appear concerned; and we were cleared to descend to FL300. The rest of the diversion was uneventful; save high N1 vibration on engine #2; which had contributed to our state of distraction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLIGHT CREW IS ISSUED GO-AROUND DUE TO RUNWAY CONDITIONS (SNOW). CREW ELECTS TO DIVERT TO ALTERNATE AND CAPTAIN IS OVERWHELMED WITH ACARS MESSAGES. FIRST OFFICER OVERSHOOTS FL300 DUE TO 29.92 NOT SET AND N1 VIBRATION IS NOTED.

Narrative: OUR FLT WAS ON THE ILS RWY 1L AT MKE; CLRED TO LAND; FOLLOWING AN RJ. THE RJ LANDED AND RPTED BRAKING ACTION POOR. WE WERE CONFIGURED FOR THE CONDITIONS WITH FLAPS 3 DEGS SELECTED AND MEDIUM AUTO BRAKES. WE HAD BRIEFED THE APCH ACCORDINGLY AND I FELT IT WAS SAFE TO CONTINUE. THE WIND WAS VERY STRONG AND I REMEMBER OUR GND SPD ON FINAL AT 108 KTS; BUT VISIBILITY WAS ABOVE CAT I MINIMUMS. I WAS PREPARED FOR THE BRAKING ACTION. WE THEN HEARD THE COUNTY MOBILE VEHICLE TALKING TO THE TWR ABOUT CLOSING RWY 1L. I THOUGHT THEY WOULD LET US COMPLETE THE APCH THEN CLOSE THE RWY FOR SNOW REMOVAL. INSTEAD; WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO 'GAR; FLY RWY HDG AND MAINTAIN 4000 FT.' THIS WE DID. WE WERE HOPING THAT THE SNOW REMOVAL WOULD NOT TAKE TOO LONG; AND BEGAN TO CONSIDER OUR OPTIONS. FUEL WAS NOT AN IMMEDIATE FACTOR; ESPECIALLY IF WE COULD GET IN TO ORD. WE CHKED THE ORD WX; WHICH WAS NOT MUCH BETTER THAN MKE; AND ASKED MKE DEP TO CHK ON OUR PROSPECTS OF GETTING IN THERE IF NEED BE. THEY INFORMED US THAT FLTS WERE GETTING IN. THE PLAN WAS TO COMMIT TO ORD IF MKE BECAME UNAVAILABLE. IF WE STUCK WITH ORD; WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO GET TO MSP; OUR FILED ALTERNATE. DISPATCH ADVISED US VIA ACARS THAT ORD WAS UNDERSTAFFED AND COULD NOT HANDLE US. WE LOOKED AT MSP. IT WAS VFR. WANTING TO HOLD OUT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AT MKE; WE CALCULATED OUR FUEL REQUIREMENTS. IT WAS THEN THAT ATC ADVISED US THAT MKE WOULD BE CLOSED FOR 45 MORE MINS AT BEST. WE ELECTED TO DIVERT TO MSP AT THAT TIME AND BEGAN THE PROCESS. TO SAY WE WERE BUSY WOULD BE AN UNDERSTATEMENT. I HAD XFERRED FLYING DUTIES AND ATC RADIO TO THE FO; AND WAS ALMOST CONSUMED WITH ACARS. FOR A TIME IT WAS LIKE TEXTING WHILE DRIVING ON I-10. WE ENDED UP WITH 5 PAGES OF ACARS MESSAGES; WHERE 1 RADIO CONVERSATION WAS ALL WE WOULD HAVE NEEDED. I WAS MOSTLY OUT OF THE LOOP. WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO FL300 FOR THE DIVERSION TO MSP; AND LEVELED NEAR ODI JUST AS I FINISHED WITH MY TASKS. ZAU ASKED US TO VERIFY OUR CLRNC TO FL300; WHICH I DID. WE THEN REALIZED THAT THE FO; FLYING MORE OR LESS SOLO; HAD NOT RESET THE ALTIMETERS TO STANDARD WHILE CLBING THROUGH FL180. THE LAST SETTING THEY WERE ON WAS MKE; WHICH WAS 29.29. WE WERE 500 FT HIGH. ATC DID NOT APPEAR CONCERNED; AND WE WERE CLRED TO DSND TO FL300. THE REST OF THE DIVERSION WAS UNEVENTFUL; SAVE HIGH N1 VIBRATION ON ENG #2; WHICH HAD CONTRIBUTED TO OUR STATE OF DISTR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.