Narrative:

The event involved an experimental lsa pwred parachute. At the end of a day of practice ground operations and 2 very short flts; without any intention of any further operations; the canopy of the pwred parachute was packed into a large stowage bag and secured in the rear passenger seat. To record the day's time of engine operation; the operator wanted to check the aircraft time as indicated on an led display prior to placing the rig in an enclosed trailer that is utilized for storage and transportation of the aircraft. The aircraft engine needs to be running to energize the led display. The engine does not have an electrical start system but instead has a recoil rope pull start. With the parachute canopy secured in the aft passenger seat; the pull start to the engine did not appear to be readily accessible from the pilot seat. Thus; the operator elected to pull the recoil starter while standing on the ground at a position to the side of the aircraft. When the engine started; the engine began to accelerate above idle RPM. The operator did not know why the engine was accelerating because he had checked the throttle closed previously. Instead of attempting to troubleshoot the reason for the engine's acceleration; the operator elected to attempt to shut the engine down with the 2 magneto switches of the dual ignition system that are located at the front of the front pilot's seat. The operator was only able to successfully turn 1 of the 2 magneto switches to the 'off' position and thus the engine continued to run on the remaining ignition system. Fortunately; the operator takes care to always check that nobody is in front of; or behind; the ppg before starting it. Due to the thrust of the engine; the operator was unable to restrain the aircraft from moving forward. The aircraft rolled forward for several seconds and impacted the rear of a parked truck that was parked adjacent to the sod covered area. Nobody was inside the truck. Nobody was injured. The operator suspects that the engine accelerated upon start due to the rear throttle of a dual control throttle system being inadvertently and unintentionally advanced as the parachute; in the parachute stowage bag; was placed and secured in the aft passenger seat. Ironically; the operator has emphatically made a point of telling others to insure that the throttle is closed prior to attempting to start the engine. A check of the throttle being closed is on the operator's pre-start checklist. As a result of this event; in the future; the operator will make a point to check the throttle fully closed immediately before starting the engine. Furthermore; even for operations checks where there is no intention to conduct a flight; the operator will not start the engine unless he is seated in the pilot's seat with full access to all of the controls.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OPERATOR OF EXPERIMENTAL LSA IS UNABLE TO RESTRAIN THE CRAFT FROM MOVING AFTER STARTING THE ENGINE WITH NO PILOT ABOARD. COLLISION WITH A PARKED TRUCK RESULTS.

Narrative: THE EVENT INVOLVED AN EXPERIMENTAL LSA PWRED PARACHUTE. AT THE END OF A DAY OF PRACTICE GND OPS AND 2 VERY SHORT FLTS; WITHOUT ANY INTENTION OF ANY FURTHER OPS; THE CANOPY OF THE PWRED PARACHUTE WAS PACKED INTO A LARGE STOWAGE BAG AND SECURED IN THE REAR PAX SEAT. TO RECORD THE DAY'S TIME OF ENG OP; THE OPERATOR WANTED TO CHK THE ACFT TIME AS INDICATED ON AN LED DISPLAY PRIOR TO PLACING THE RIG IN AN ENCLOSED TRAILER THAT IS UTILIZED FOR STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE ACFT. THE ACFT ENG NEEDS TO BE RUNNING TO ENERGIZE THE LED DISPLAY. THE ENG DOES NOT HAVE AN ELECTRICAL START SYSTEM BUT INSTEAD HAS A RECOIL ROPE PULL START. WITH THE PARACHUTE CANOPY SECURED IN THE AFT PAX SEAT; THE PULL START TO THE ENG DID NOT APPEAR TO BE READILY ACCESSIBLE FROM THE PLT SEAT. THUS; THE OPERATOR ELECTED TO PULL THE RECOIL STARTER WHILE STANDING ON THE GND AT A POSITION TO THE SIDE OF THE ACFT. WHEN THE ENG STARTED; THE ENG BEGAN TO ACCELERATE ABOVE IDLE RPM. THE OPERATOR DID NOT KNOW WHY THE ENG WAS ACCELERATING BECAUSE HE HAD CHKED THE THROTTLE CLOSED PREVIOUSLY. INSTEAD OF ATTEMPTING TO TROUBLESHOOT THE REASON FOR THE ENG'S ACCELERATION; THE OPERATOR ELECTED TO ATTEMPT TO SHUT THE ENG DOWN WITH THE 2 MAGNETO SWITCHES OF THE DUAL IGNITION SYSTEM THAT ARE LOCATED AT THE FRONT OF THE FRONT PLT'S SEAT. THE OPERATOR WAS ONLY ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY TURN 1 OF THE 2 MAGNETO SWITCHES TO THE 'OFF' POSITION AND THUS THE ENG CONTINUED TO RUN ON THE REMAINING IGNITION SYSTEM. FORTUNATELY; THE OPERATOR TAKES CARE TO ALWAYS CHK THAT NOBODY IS IN FRONT OF; OR BEHIND; THE PPG BEFORE STARTING IT. DUE TO THE THRUST OF THE ENG; THE OPERATOR WAS UNABLE TO RESTRAIN THE ACFT FROM MOVING FORWARD. THE ACFT ROLLED FORWARD FOR SEVERAL SECONDS AND IMPACTED THE REAR OF A PARKED TRUCK THAT WAS PARKED ADJACENT TO THE SOD COVERED AREA. NOBODY WAS INSIDE THE TRUCK. NOBODY WAS INJURED. THE OPERATOR SUSPECTS THAT THE ENG ACCELERATED UPON START DUE TO THE REAR THROTTLE OF A DUAL CTL THROTTLE SYSTEM BEING INADVERTENTLY AND UNINTENTIONALLY ADVANCED AS THE PARACHUTE; IN THE PARACHUTE STOWAGE BAG; WAS PLACED AND SECURED IN THE AFT PAX SEAT. IRONICALLY; THE OPERATOR HAS EMPHATICALLY MADE A POINT OF TELLING OTHERS TO INSURE THAT THE THROTTLE IS CLOSED PRIOR TO ATTEMPTING TO START THE ENG. A CHK OF THE THROTTLE BEING CLOSED IS ON THE OPERATOR'S PRE-START CHKLIST. AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT; IN THE FUTURE; THE OPERATOR WILL MAKE A POINT TO CHK THE THROTTLE FULLY CLOSED IMMEDIATELY BEFORE STARTING THE ENG. FURTHERMORE; EVEN FOR OPS CHKS WHERE THERE IS NO INTENTION TO CONDUCT A FLT; THE OPERATOR WILL NOT START THE ENG UNLESS HE IS SEATED IN THE PLT'S SEAT WITH FULL ACCESS TO ALL OF THE CTLS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.