Narrative:

I am writing because of an unsafe procedure about to be implemented at ZAB. I work in the southwest specialty. Sector 46; an extremely complex and procedurally high workload demanding sector; is about to implement a descend via procedure on the kooly 1 arrival (as of dec/xa) into phx. Descend via procedures in isolation are a good procedure: there aren't any hearback/readback issues and the phraseology is comparatively simple. The problem with this procedure on sector 46 is the amount of workload the sector already incurs. The sector lies between phx and tus and works both tus and phx arrivals and departures; overflights; numerous vfrs including jump operations on the only airway in the sector and on the arrival; and multiple military moas. The sector incurs a lot of workload due to the unproceduralized operations in the sector: tus arrivals do not separate from phx departures without turns; tus departures and phx departures climb through each other; phx arrivals on the kooly and sunss arrivals do not coincide. There are more (space limits explanations). In addition; unlike most descend via sectors; 46 actually blends 3 streams in phx; the kooly arrival stream over itemm; the arrivals from vylla; and the tus departures into phx. Additionally; there are turboprops to contend with and satellite arrivals that go into TRACON's airspace at 9;000 ft (phx jets 15 11;000 ft; tps at 10;000 ft; a 3-way stack). Because of the massive amount of workload and operations on the sector; someone is going to forget or miss a traffic situation and we are going to have an operational error as a result. These issues (and other procedural issues involving the phx LOA) have been brought up to the airspace office; and the southwest operational manager to no avail. It's too bad the FAA does not understand the ramifications of a poor safety culture or they would suspend this operations until they can fully evaluate this procedure. At no time was this problem negotiated with the union; not necessary all the time; however; none of the 35 cpcs in the southwest area were consulted on the viability of this procedure and then were summarily; albeit unofficially; dismissed when stressing their displeasure. Unfortunately; the FAA believes that if nothing untoward happens; the procedure is a success. They do not realize that the absence of failure does not necessarily make a thing safe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZAB controller voiced concern regarding new arrival procedure that reportedly will increase an already high workload for sector controllers.

Narrative: I am writing because of an unsafe procedure about to be implemented at ZAB. I work in the Southwest Specialty. Sector 46; an extremely complex and procedurally high workload demanding sector; is about to implement a descend via procedure on the KOOLY 1 arrival (as of Dec/XA) into PHX. Descend via procedures in isolation are a good procedure: there aren't any hearback/readback issues and the phraseology is comparatively simple. The problem with this procedure on Sector 46 is the amount of workload the sector already incurs. The sector lies between PHX and TUS and works both TUS and PHX arrivals and departures; overflights; numerous VFRs including jump operations on the only airway in the sector AND on the arrival; and multiple military MOAs. The sector incurs a lot of workload due to the unproceduralized operations in the sector: TUS arrivals do not separate from PHX departures without turns; TUS departures and PHX departures climb through each other; PHX arrivals on the KOOLY and SUNSS arrivals do not coincide. There are more (space limits explanations). In addition; unlike most descend via sectors; 46 actually blends 3 streams in PHX; the KOOLY arrival stream over ITEMM; the arrivals from VYLLA; and the TUS departures into PHX. Additionally; there are turboprops to contend with AND satellite arrivals that go into TRACON's airspace at 9;000 FT (PHX jets 15 11;000 FT; TPs at 10;000 FT; a 3-way stack). Because of the massive amount of workload and operations on the sector; someone is going to forget or miss a traffic situation and we are going to have an Operational Error as a result. These issues (and other procedural issues involving the PHX LOA) have been brought up to the airspace office; and the southwest Operational Manager to no avail. It's too bad the FAA does not understand the ramifications of a poor safety culture or they would suspend this operations until they can fully evaluate this procedure. At no time was this problem negotiated with the union; not necessary all the time; however; none of the 35 CPCs in the southwest area were consulted on the viability of this procedure and then were summarily; albeit unofficially; dismissed when stressing their displeasure. Unfortunately; the FAA believes that if nothing untoward happens; the procedure is a success. They do not realize that the absence of failure does not necessarily make a thing safe.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.