Narrative:

Tower told us that the previous rj to land had acquired the runway at 300 feet AGL and broke out at minimums (200 feet AGL). Pilot flying got behind the descent resulting in a need to intercept the GS from above. At the marker I called out that he was over a dot high. He must have decided that he had gotten behind the automation; because he took the aircraft off autopilot. He began chasing the needles and did not arrest his rate of descent sufficiently upon intercepting the GS so that he went low; which I called out. We acquired the runway; maneuvered back to centerline; and continued the approach. The egpws 'GS' aural alert sounded after we acquired the runway. The emotions of fear; shame and anger made it clear to me that I had let things go too far. During the approach; I made deviation callouts to cue corrections on the part of the pilot flying. After the event; did a lot of self-critique regarding personal attitudes towards experienced copilots and hesitancy about calling for a go-around. This was a classic '2 senior pilot CRM' situation. We had established a rapport as 2 carrier-qualified naval aviators. He was previously a captain who had been displaced to the right seat. He had experience on the MD80 and had about 700 more hours in the erj than I do so I was even more confident in him than myself that he would be able to handle an approach to minimums. He responded positively to my deviation callouts so I let him continue. The captain is responsible for safety of the flight and must not be afraid of hurting someone's feelings by calling for a go-around. Also; one should establish firm thresholds for calling a go-around beyond the stabilized approach criteria. We have all seen momentary excursions which were promptly corrected and resulted in acceptable approaches. Such experiences can lead us to a 'give him a chance to fix it' state of mind. On this approach; I saw trouble brewing when his response to being above the GS in IMC was to kick off the autopilot and make a play. If I had called a missed approach right then the event would not have occurred.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ Captain discusses a breakdown in CRM and command responsibility during an unstabilized approach flown by the First Officer.

Narrative: Tower told us that the previous RJ to land had acquired the runway at 300 feet AGL and broke out at minimums (200 feet AGL). Pilot Flying got behind the descent resulting in a need to intercept the GS from above. At the marker I called out that he was over a dot high. He must have decided that he had gotten behind the automation; because he took the aircraft off autopilot. He began chasing the needles and did not arrest his rate of descent sufficiently upon intercepting the GS so that he went low; which I called out. We acquired the runway; maneuvered back to centerline; and continued the approach. The EGPWS 'GS' aural alert sounded after we acquired the runway. The emotions of fear; shame and anger made it clear to me that I had let things go too far. During the approach; I made deviation callouts to cue corrections on the part of the Pilot Flying. After the event; did a lot of self-critique regarding personal attitudes towards experienced copilots and hesitancy about calling for a go-around. This was a classic '2 Senior Pilot CRM' situation. We had established a rapport as 2 carrier-qualified Naval aviators. He was previously a Captain who had been displaced to the right seat. He had experience on the MD80 and had about 700 more hours in the ERJ than I do so I was even more confident in him than myself that he would be able to handle an approach to minimums. He responded positively to my deviation callouts so I let him continue. The Captain is responsible for safety of the flight and must not be afraid of hurting someone's feelings by calling for a go-around. Also; one should establish firm thresholds for calling a go-around beyond the stabilized approach criteria. We have all seen momentary excursions which were promptly corrected and resulted in acceptable approaches. Such experiences can lead us to a 'give him a chance to fix it' state of mind. On this approach; I saw trouble brewing when his response to being above the GS in IMC was to kick off the autopilot and make a play. If I had called a missed approach right then the event would not have occurred.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.