Narrative:

We departed ZZZ enroute to ZZZZ. We were several hours behind schedule. Myself and the flight attendant had already performed 2 legs prior to this one. The captain was waiting for us upon arrival to the aircraft to perform this leg. We introduced ourselves and prepared the aircraft for flight. We pushed back from the gate and taxied out. The weather in ZZZ was clear; however; very strong winds were present at the time. We departed runway 31L full length to perform the departure climb. Upon departure; we experienced windshear of about 10-15 KTS. It did not result in any warnings or cautions and the departure continued normally. Enroute to ZZZZ the captain was coughing and commented that he wasn't feeling 100%. Upon arrival into ZZZZ on approach to runway 23; ATC kept us slightly high on base. The captain used the flight spoilers to increase the descent rate to accommodate ATC instructions to descend and slow the aircraft. While continuing the descent; ATC gave us a turn onto final to intercept the localizer and cleared us for the approach. The captain continued the descent and was set to intercept the GS on profile. The autopilot was coupled and flying at the time. There was a very strong right crosswind and the autopilot was having a very difficult time tracking the localizer. The captain turned off the autopilot and flew the approach. We descended on profile and added full flaps completing the before landing checklist. Shortly after we received a caution message stating the flight spoilers were still out. Both myself and the captain had thought he had closed the flight spoiler lever but had in fact left it out 2 notches. The captain immediately corrected the problem and the approach was continued without any further issues. We both recounted the approach after completing the flight and realized how extremely task saturated we had been. The next day the captain called off sick for our next flight. He had in fact been coming down with some sort of sickness. The next morning; he accompanied us to the airport as he had to deadhead home. He was pale and in obvious pain leading me to believe that his health may have been a factor the previous night. Supplemental information from acn 817025: I flew sick and fatigued; and did not recognize it until after the fact. Clearly; I should have not been flying; but felt pressured to do so; as I did not want to be sent to the company doctor for calling in sick when the company was short-staffed. At departure time I had been awake for 16.5 hours. While descending to 4;000 ft; aircraft was configured at flaps 20 degrees and speed 210 KIAS (aircraft slowed to 200 KIAS to extend flaps). I used the flight spoilers to increase my descent rate and apparently did not stow them completely. We were told to change our expected approach from ILS 24R (which had already been set up and briefed) to ILS 23. We then set up the radios and I briefed the ILS 23. Upon completing this; we were cleared to 3;000 ft; and slowed to 180 KIAS. Upon being cleared for the approach; I believe armed approach on the fcp; and the autopilot captured the runway 23 localizer. GS never captured. I announced autopilot is coming off; disconnected the autopilot and began a manual descent to try to catch the GS. First officer pointed out the direction we should see the runway appear. By this time my head was full and I felt I was in a fog. I had tunnel vision and fixated on the GS. When I thought I had recaptured it; I re-engaged the autopilot in approach mode; but saw only localizer and pitch on the FMA. I disconnected the autopilot and was getting ready to call 'missed approach' when I caught sight of the PAPI for runway 23. I turned my attention outside; noticed we were low. Raised the nose (altitude and airspeed unknown); got another split second stick shaker; and added thrust. We still were low on the PAPI; so I added more thrust; got a 'flight spoiler' caution message; realized that I had the flight spoilers extended and immediately stowed the spoiler

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-200 crew reports the effect of a Captain flying sick; fatigued and losing situational awareness while flying in adverse weather conditions.

Narrative: We departed ZZZ enroute to ZZZZ. We were several hours behind schedule. Myself and the Flight Attendant had already performed 2 legs prior to this one. The Captain was waiting for us upon arrival to the aircraft to perform this leg. We introduced ourselves and prepared the aircraft for flight. We pushed back from the gate and taxied out. The weather in ZZZ was clear; however; very strong winds were present at the time. We departed Runway 31L full length to perform the departure climb. Upon departure; we experienced windshear of about 10-15 KTS. It did not result in any warnings or cautions and the departure continued normally. Enroute to ZZZZ the Captain was coughing and commented that he wasn't feeling 100%. Upon arrival into ZZZZ on approach to Runway 23; ATC kept us slightly high on base. The Captain used the flight spoilers to increase the descent rate to accommodate ATC instructions to descend and slow the aircraft. While continuing the descent; ATC gave us a turn onto final to intercept the LOC and cleared us for the approach. The Captain continued the descent and was set to intercept the GS on profile. The autopilot was coupled and flying at the time. There was a very strong right crosswind and the Autopilot was having a very difficult time tracking the LOC. The Captain turned off the autopilot and flew the approach. We descended on profile and added full flaps completing the Before Landing checklist. Shortly after we received a caution message stating the flight spoilers were still out. Both myself and the Captain had thought he had closed the flight spoiler lever but had in fact left it out 2 notches. The Captain immediately corrected the problem and the approach was continued without any further issues. We both recounted the approach after completing the flight and realized how extremely task saturated we had been. The next day the Captain called off sick for our next flight. He had in fact been coming down with some sort of sickness. The next morning; he accompanied us to the airport as he had to deadhead home. He was pale and in obvious pain leading me to believe that his health may have been a factor the previous night. Supplemental information from ACN 817025: I flew sick and fatigued; and did not recognize it until after the fact. Clearly; I should have not been flying; but felt pressured to do so; as I did not want to be sent to the company doctor for calling in sick when the company was short-staffed. At departure time I had been awake for 16.5 hours. While descending to 4;000 FT; aircraft was configured at flaps 20 degrees and speed 210 KIAS (aircraft slowed to 200 KIAS to extend flaps). I used the flight spoilers to increase my descent rate and apparently did not stow them completely. We were told to change our expected approach from ILS 24R (which had already been set up and briefed) to ILS 23. We then set up the radios and I briefed the ILS 23. Upon completing this; we were cleared to 3;000 FT; and slowed to 180 KIAS. Upon being cleared for the approach; I believe armed approach on the FCP; and the autopilot captured the Runway 23 LOC. GS never captured. I announced autopilot is coming off; disconnected the autopilot and began a manual descent to try to catch the GS. First Officer pointed out the direction we should see the runway appear. By this time my head was full and I felt I was in a fog. I had tunnel vision and fixated on the GS. When I thought I had recaptured it; I re-engaged the autopilot in Approach mode; but saw only LOC and Pitch on the FMA. I disconnected the autopilot and was getting ready to call 'missed approach' when I caught sight of the PAPI for Runway 23. I turned my attention outside; noticed we were low. Raised the nose (altitude and airspeed unknown); got another split second stick shaker; and added thrust. We still were low on the PAPI; so I added more thrust; got a 'Flight Spoiler' caution message; realized that I had the flight spoilers extended and immediately stowed the spoiler

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.