Narrative:

A C172 pulled onto and departed runway 34. A piper malibu was on a 1/4 miles final at approximately 200-300 ft AGL; according to an eyewitness who was positioned at runway 34 hold short line in a light sport aircraft. The eyewitness indicated the malibu had made traffic pattern radio calls; including for final runway 34. And; upon seeing the C172 taxi onto the runway; the malibu aborted approach and took evasive action via a climbing left turn out of the traffic pattern. Surface conditions were clear skies and light winds. The cessna was unresponsive to any subsequent radio calls. The operator of the light sport aircraft relayed the above information to a flight instructor who was aboard the cessna; upon his return to mev some 2 hours later. According to the flight instructor; the certificated private pilot; operator of the cessna; had not flown in a couple of months and hired the CFI to join him and his girlfriend on a sightseeing tour south of mev airport. During the taxi from tie-down to runway 34; the cessna operator indicated he needed to lower the volume in his headset. The CFI suggested he adjust the volume via his headset control but the operator said it was too difficult. So; the CFI adjusted the volume on the intercom unit. They monitored both CTAF (#1 communication) and AWOS (#2 communication) as they taxied to the run-up area. Unknown to the CFI; the operator at some point again adjusted his hearing by lowering volume on the #1 communication radio. After the pre-takeoff checklist was completed; the standard procedure is to make a 360 degree taxi turnout of the run-up area to visually clear for traffic on downwind; base or final approach. However; this procedure was bypassed; due to the proximity of the light sport aircraft to the cessna. The cessna; behind hold short for runway 34; looked at the final approach path. Both pilot and the CFI acknowledged they saw no one on final and the cessna operator broadcast they were taking runway 34 for immediate departure left downwind and then southbound. They had heard NORDO calls from traffic in the pattern for runway 34. The cessna departed the runway and climbed to 9;500 ft on a southbound heading. What had gone wrong? First; there was no 'sterile cockpit.' the CFI; operator and girlfriend were talking throughout the taxi/takeoff procedure. Then; unknown to all aboard the cessna; the communication radio volume had been turned down to the point that no one could hear aircraft broadcasting in the blind on mev CTAF. This meant neither operator nor CFI had situational awareness of any other aircraft in the pattern for runway 34. Next; the 360 degree clearing turn had been bypassed. A big mistake. It would have been possible for the cessna to make the turn and avoid the light sport aircraft with little effort. Had this procedure been followed; the operator and CFI aboard the cessna would certainly have seen the malibu. Finally; all pilots should question why they are not receiving radio broadcasts from other aircraft at non-towered airports. They should examine CTAF communication radio; intercom and headset volume settings and request a 'radio check' prior to takeoff. This was a fortunate outcome for all concerned but could have been avoided altogether; had the cessna operator and CFI followed 'common sense' practices for taxi and takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Pilot and CFI aboard C172 fail to utilize appropriate CTAF procedures due to mismanagement of their radio volumes. Uncontrolled traffic pattern separation issue results.

Narrative: A C172 pulled onto and departed Runway 34. A Piper Malibu was on a 1/4 miles final at approximately 200-300 FT AGL; according to an eyewitness who was positioned at Runway 34 hold short line in a Light Sport Aircraft. The eyewitness indicated the Malibu had made traffic pattern radio calls; including for final Runway 34. And; upon seeing the C172 taxi onto the runway; the Malibu aborted approach and took evasive action via a climbing left turn out of the traffic pattern. Surface conditions were clear skies and light winds. The Cessna was unresponsive to any subsequent radio calls. The operator of the Light Sport Aircraft relayed the above information to a flight instructor who was aboard the Cessna; upon his return to MEV some 2 hours later. According to the flight instructor; the certificated private pilot; operator of the Cessna; had not flown in a couple of months and hired the CFI to join him and his girlfriend on a sightseeing tour south of MEV Airport. During the taxi from tie-down to Runway 34; the Cessna operator indicated he needed to lower the volume in his headset. The CFI suggested he adjust the volume via his headset control but the operator said it was too difficult. So; the CFI adjusted the volume on the intercom unit. They monitored both CTAF (#1 Communication) and AWOS (#2 Communication) as they taxied to the run-up area. Unknown to the CFI; the operator at some point again adjusted his hearing by lowering volume on the #1 Communication radio. After the pre-takeoff checklist was completed; the standard procedure is to make a 360 degree taxi turnout of the run-up area to visually clear for traffic on downwind; base or final approach. However; this procedure was bypassed; due to the proximity of the Light Sport Aircraft to the Cessna. The Cessna; behind hold short for Runway 34; looked at the final approach path. Both Pilot and the CFI acknowledged they saw no one on final and the Cessna operator broadcast they were taking Runway 34 for immediate departure left downwind and then southbound. They had heard NORDO calls from traffic in the pattern for Runway 34. The Cessna departed the runway and climbed to 9;500 FT on a southbound heading. What had gone wrong? First; there was no 'sterile cockpit.' The CFI; operator and girlfriend were talking throughout the taxi/takeoff procedure. Then; unknown to all aboard the Cessna; the Communication radio volume had been turned down to the point that no one could hear aircraft broadcasting in the blind on MEV CTAF. This meant neither operator nor CFI had situational awareness of any other aircraft in the pattern for Runway 34. Next; the 360 degree clearing turn had been bypassed. A big mistake. It would have been possible for the Cessna to make the turn and avoid the Light Sport Aircraft with little effort. Had this procedure been followed; the operator and CFI aboard the Cessna would certainly have seen the Malibu. Finally; all pilots should question why they are not receiving radio broadcasts from other aircraft at non-Towered airports. They should examine CTAF Communication radio; intercom and headset volume settings and request a 'radio check' prior to takeoff. This was a fortunate outcome for all concerned but could have been avoided altogether; had the Cessna operator and CFI followed 'common sense' practices for taxi and takeoff.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.