Narrative:

I believe that that this was a possible set-up by the local rsw ATC facility to 'violate' aircrews in order to get a STAR into rsw changed. I; the captain; was flying pilot and the first officer was the PNF. We were descending into rsw via the shfty one RNAV arrival; effective sept/08. The known landing runway was runway 24 and this was selected in the FMC on our B737-300. The FMC showed (and so does the published shfty one RNAV arrival) that the aircraft should fly a 220 degree heading (vector) after crossing moemo intersection at 10000 ft/250 KTS. Prior to contacting rsw approach control; the first officer obtained via radio frequency 124.65 ATIS information 'Q' (ACARS ATIS information is not available at rsw). Prior to crossing moemo intersection and level at 10000 ft/250 KTS; the first officer checked in with approach control and ATIS information 'Q.' we were immediately informed by the controller that the ATIS information was 'right.' to first officer stated (on the radio to the controller) that only seconds before he had been listening to ATIS information 'Q.' the controller then proceeded to 'read' ATIS information 'right' but only the weather portion (which was severe clear VMC). The controller failed to 'read' the entire ATIS; but at the time we did not realize this. At moemo intersection; the aircraft (using LNAV navigation) turned to the FMC programmed 220 degree heading. After approximately 30 seconds of flying the FMC directed 220 degrees heading; the approach controller stated 'air carrier X; abcd; say heading.' the first officer responded '220 degrees.' the next words from the controller were for us to call phone number; when we got on the ground because we had made a navigational/heading deviation. We were not requested to change our heading at this time concluding that there must not have been a reduction of aircraft separation. As we recall; the controller was not talking with any other aircraft on his frequency. We had the TCAS on 10 NM scope as we recall; there were no other aircraft within 10 NM horizontally or 7000 ft vertically of our aircraft. The controller's tone of voice was of great concern to us as it was very condescending. I had to ask the controller after the phone number read back for the heading that he would like us to fly. He responded with 'heading 190 degrees.' the controller then stated that the ATIS instructed us to 'visual approaches to runway 24; depart la belle VOR (lbv) on a 190 degree heading and expect radar vectors to runway 24.' (the la belle VOR is 11.9 NM sse of moemo intersection.) the first officer then stated that he did not 'hear' that as part of ATIS information 'Q.' note: since the la belle VOR is not a fix that an aircraft would fly over if landing runway 24 as stated/published on the shfty one arrival; (it is a fly over point if landing on runway 6); then any reference to la belle VOR (lbv) was deemed by us to be not applicable. Ie the published shfty one arrival has moemo intersection as the last 'fix' when landing on runway 24. Once the controller had us on radar vectors; an uneventful visual approach and landing was made at rsw. At the gate in rsw; I proceeded to call the requested phone number. The controller answered the phone. I identified myself as the captain of air carrier X; abcd. He became very confused with my flight number/call sign because he said he was expecting a call from different flight number. The controller finally found my 'strip' and proceeded to read me the 'riot act' reference our failure to comply with a navigational clearance/directive that was given on the aural ATIS. I stated that we never 'heard/comprehended' the change to the published arrival on the ATIS. He also chastised me for not having read rsw written NOTAM 12/011. I stated that I had the written NOTAMS right in from of me and that NOTAM 12/011 did not exist on my paperwork. He became very agitated and insisted that 12/011 was on the NOTAMS. I also stated that ATIS information 'Q' or 'right' did not instruct an inbound aircraft on the shfty one arrival to fly from moemo intersection to la belle VOR (lbv)-only depart lbv on a 190 degree heading; ie; the verbiage as stated on the ATIS had no proper clearance off the published shfty one arrival at moemo intersection when landing on runway 24. The controller insisted that I heard/comprehended the ATIS incorrectly and then I stated that I did not hear it incorrectly. Again he became very agitated and he asked his fellow controller to read him the ATIS. Through the phone; I could hear the fellow controller read the ATIS and to his dismay I was correct regarding the verbiage on the ATIS and he was not. This again agitated him. The controller stated that his 'hands were tied' and that he had to proceed with bringing deviation enforcement against me. He asked for my name; address; and certificated number with I provided. During our 15 plus minute phone conversation; it was very one sided/monopolized by the controller. He was not interested in virtually anything that I had to say. He even got off onto a tangent about general aviation pilots who get into their airplanes just like they get into their cars -- they just jump in and go and are not very proficient/professional in the procedures; etc when in rsw airspace. (I wondered how this pertained to me as a professional airline pilot.) he then stated that the shfty one arrival could not be changed until aug/09 and if this was atlanta; the arrival would be changed as soon as possible. He told me to call X who is the FAA regional liaison in order to 'back door' this needed change to the shfty one arrival. He also told me that earlier that day; another aircraft flight/aircrew also did not comply with the ATIS's instructions but that there were two flights that did. In my 33 plus years of professional flying; I have listened to and/or read over 20000 ATIS's and I have never; ever had an ATIS direct or instruct an aircraft to fly a navigational clearance or directive. After the phone conversation with the controller was over; I called my dispatcher and the occ duty manager. They confirmed that rsw NOTAM 12/011 was not on the published NOTAMS for my flight and they thought that this ATIS directed change to the published arrival was an inappropriate way to communicate a clearance to an aircraft. As I reflect on this event; I believe that this controller/ATC facility wanted us to make that 220 degree turn at moemo intersection so we could be 'violated' which would be the facility's best way to get the arrival changed because it would probably not garner enough/proper attention and take too long if it was pursued through normal channels. There are multiple procedures/barriers that could have been used to preclude my aircraft from making that 220 degree turn at moemo intersection. Note: the controller was not 'busy' at the time. 1) the controller could have told us to fly to la belle VOR and depart on a 190 degree heading. 2) the controller could have read us the entire ATIS information 'right' instead of only the weather (severe clear) when we checked in on frequency. 3) since a previous flight had also not followed the ATIS's instructions; one would think that a controller would absolutely not let us make that 220 degree turn at moemo intersection based on the ATIS. In closing; as I reflect on this event and after having spoken with my chief pilot and my union violation committee chairman; I resent the fact that this all could have been avoided and that it was possibly a set-up by the rsw ATC facility in order to 'back door' a change to an arrival into rsw.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 CREW REPORTS A CONTROLLER WARNED THEM BECAUSE THEY DID NOT FOLLOW A NOTAM AND ATIS INSTRUCTION ARRIVALS ON THE RSW SHFTY ONE RNAV. THE CREW DID NOT RECEIVE ANY MODIFICATIONS TO THE RNAV.

Narrative: I BELIEVE THAT THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBLE SET-UP BY THE LOCAL RSW ATC FACILITY TO 'VIOLATE' AIRCREWS IN ORDER TO GET A STAR INTO RSW CHANGED. I; THE CAPTAIN; WAS FLYING PILOT AND THE FO WAS THE PNF. WE WERE DESCENDING INTO RSW VIA THE SHFTY ONE RNAV ARRIVAL; EFFECTIVE SEPT/08. THE KNOWN LANDING RUNWAY WAS RUNWAY 24 AND THIS WAS SELECTED IN THE FMC ON OUR B737-300. THE FMC SHOWED (AND SO DOES THE PUBLISHED SHFTY ONE RNAV ARRIVAL) THAT THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD FLY A 220 DEGREE HEADING (VECTOR) AFTER CROSSING MOEMO INTERSECTION AT 10000 FT/250 KTS. PRIOR TO CONTACTING RSW APPROACH CONTROL; THE FO OBTAINED VIA RADIO FREQUENCY 124.65 ATIS INFORMATION 'Q' (ACARS ATIS INFO IS NOT AVAILABLE AT RSW). PRIOR TO CROSSING MOEMO INTERSECTION AND LEVEL AT 10000 FT/250 KTS; THE FO CHECKED IN WITH APPROACH CONTROL AND ATIS INFO 'Q.' WE WERE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED BY THE CONTROLLER THAT THE ATIS INFO WAS 'R.' TO FO STATED (ON THE RADIO TO THE CTLR) THAT ONLY SECONDS BEFORE HE HAD BEEN LISTENING TO ATIS INFO 'Q.' THE CONTROLLER THEN PROCEEDED TO 'READ' ATIS INFO 'R' BUT ONLY THE WEATHER PORTION (WHICH WAS SEVERE CLEAR VMC). THE CONTROLLER FAILED TO 'READ' THE ENTIRE ATIS; BUT AT THE TIME WE DID NOT REALIZE THIS. AT MOEMO INTERSECTION; THE AIRCRAFT (USING LNAV NAV) TURNED TO THE FMC PROGRAMMED 220 DEGREE HEADING. AFTER APPROX 30 SECONDS OF FLYING THE FMC DIRECTED 220 DEGS HEADING; THE APPROACH CONTROLLER STATED 'ACR X; ABCD; SAY HEADING.' THE FO RESPONDED '220 DEGREES.' THE NEXT WORDS FROM THE CONTROLLER WERE FOR US TO CALL PHONE NUMBER; WHEN WE GOT ON THE GROUND BECAUSE WE HAD MADE A NAVIGATIONAL/HEADING DEVIATION. WE WERE NOT REQUESTED TO CHANGE OUR HEADING AT THIS TIME CONCLUDING THAT THERE MUST NOT HAVE BEEN A REDUCTION OF AIRCRAFT SEPARATION. AS WE RECALL; THE CONTROLLER WAS NOT TALKING WITH ANY OTHER AIRCRAFT ON HIS FREQUENCY. WE HAD THE TCAS ON 10 NM SCOPE AS WE RECALL; THERE WERE NO OTHER AIRCRAFT WITHIN 10 NM HORIZONTALLY OR 7000 FT VERTICALLY OF OUR AIRCRAFT. THE CONTROLLER'S TONE OF VOICE WAS OF GREAT CONCERN TO US AS IT WAS VERY CONDESCENDING. I HAD TO ASK THE CONTROLLER AFTER THE PHONE NUMBER READ BACK FOR THE HEADING THAT HE WOULD LIKE US TO FLY. HE RESPONDED WITH 'HEADING 190 DEGREES.' THE CONTROLLER THEN STATED THAT THE ATIS INSTRUCTED US TO 'VISUAL APPROACHES TO RUNWAY 24; DEPART LA BELLE VOR (LBV) ON A 190 DEGREE HEADING AND EXPECT RADAR VECTORS TO RUNWAY 24.' (THE LA BELLE VOR IS 11.9 NM SSE OF MOEMO INTERSECTION.) THE FO THEN STATED THAT HE DID NOT 'HEAR' THAT AS PART OF ATIS INFO 'Q.' NOTE: SINCE THE LA BELLE VOR IS NOT A FIX THAT AN AIRCRAFT WOULD FLY OVER IF LANDING RUNWAY 24 AS STATED/PUBLISHED ON THE SHFTY ONE ARRIVAL; (IT IS A FLY OVER POINT IF LANDING ON RUNWAY 6); THEN ANY REFERENCE TO LA BELLE VOR (LBV) WAS DEEMED BY US TO BE NOT APPLICABLE. IE THE PUBLISHED SHFTY ONE ARRIVAL HAS MOEMO INTERSECTION AS THE LAST 'FIX' WHEN LANDING ON RUNWAY 24. ONCE THE CONTROLLER HAD US ON RADAR VECTORS; AN UNEVENTFUL VISUAL APPROACH AND LANDING WAS MADE AT RSW. AT THE GATE IN RSW; I PROCEEDED TO CALL THE REQUESTED PHONE NUMBER. THE CONTROLLER ANSWERED THE PHONE. I IDENTIFIED MYSELF AS THE CAPT OF ACR X; ABCD. HE BECAME VERY CONFUSED WITH MY FLT NUMBER/CALL SIGN BECAUSE HE SAID HE WAS EXPECTING A CALL FROM DIFFERENT FLIGHT NUMBER. THE CONTROLLER FINALLY FOUND MY 'STRIP' AND PROCEEDED TO READ ME THE 'RIOT ACT' REFERENCE OUR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A NAVIGATIONAL CLEARANCE/DIRECTIVE THAT WAS GIVEN ON THE AURAL ATIS. I STATED THAT WE NEVER 'HEARD/COMPREHENDED' THE CHANGE TO THE PUBLISHED ARRIVAL ON THE ATIS. HE ALSO CHASTISED ME FOR NOT HAVING READ RSW WRITTEN NOTAM 12/011. I STATED THAT I HAD THE WRITTEN NOTAMS RIGHT IN FROM OF ME AND THAT NOTAM 12/011 DID NOT EXIST ON MY PAPERWORK. HE BECAME VERY AGITATED AND INSISTED THAT 12/011 WAS ON THE NOTAMS. I ALSO STATED THAT ATIS INFO 'Q' OR 'R' DID NOT INSTRUCT AN INBOUND AIRCRAFT ON THE SHFTY ONE ARRIVAL TO FLY FROM MOEMO INTERSECTION TO LA BELLE VOR (LBV)-ONLY DEPART LBV ON A 190 DEGREE HEADING; IE; THE VERBIAGE AS STATED ON THE ATIS HAD NO PROPER CLEARANCE OFF THE PUBLISHED SHFTY ONE ARRIVAL AT MOEMO INTERSECTION WHEN LANDING ON RUNWAY 24. THE CONTROLLER INSISTED THAT I HEARD/COMPREHENDED THE ATIS INCORRECTLY AND THEN I STATED THAT I DID NOT HEAR IT INCORRECTLY. AGAIN HE BECAME VERY AGITATED AND HE ASKED HIS FELLOW CONTROLLER TO READ HIM THE ATIS. THROUGH THE PHONE; I COULD HEAR THE FELLOW CONTROLLER READ THE ATIS AND TO HIS DISMAY I WAS CORRECT REGARDING THE VERBIAGE ON THE ATIS AND HE WAS NOT. THIS AGAIN AGITATED HIM. THE CONTROLLER STATED THAT HIS 'HANDS WERE TIED' AND THAT HE HAD TO PROCEED WITH BRINGING DEVIATION ENFORCEMENT AGAINST ME. HE ASKED FOR MY NAME; ADDRESS; AND CERTIFICATED NUMBER WITH I PROVIDED. DURING OUR 15 PLUS MINUTE PHONE CONVERSATION; IT WAS VERY ONE SIDED/MONOPOLIZED BY THE CONTROLLER. HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN VIRTUALLY ANYTHING THAT I HAD TO SAY. HE EVEN GOT OFF ONTO A TANGENT ABOUT GENERAL AVIATION PILOTS WHO GET INTO THEIR AIRPLANES JUST LIKE THEY GET INTO THEIR CARS -- THEY JUST JUMP IN AND GO AND ARE NOT VERY PROFICIENT/PROFESSIONAL IN THE PROCEDURES; ETC WHEN IN RSW AIRSPACE. (I WONDERED HOW THIS PERTAINED TO ME AS A PROFESSIONAL AIRLINE PILOT.) HE THEN STATED THAT THE SHFTY ONE ARRIVAL COULD NOT BE CHANGED UNTIL AUG/09 AND IF THIS WAS ATLANTA; THE ARRIVAL WOULD BE CHANGED ASAP. HE TOLD ME TO CALL X WHO IS THE FAA REGIONAL LIAISON IN ORDER TO 'BACK DOOR' THIS NEEDED CHANGE TO THE SHFTY ONE ARRIVAL. HE ALSO TOLD ME THAT EARLIER THAT DAY; ANOTHER AIRCRAFT FLT/AIRCREW ALSO DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE ATIS'S INSTRUCTIONS BUT THAT THERE WERE TWO FLIGHTS THAT DID. IN MY 33 PLUS YEARS OF PROFESSIONAL FLYING; I HAVE LISTENED TO AND/OR READ OVER 20000 ATIS'S AND I HAVE NEVER; EVER HAD AN ATIS DIRECT OR INSTRUCT AN AIRCRAFT TO FLY A NAVIGATIONAL CLEARANCE OR DIRECTIVE. AFTER THE PHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE CONTROLLER WAS OVER; I CALLED MY DISPATCHER AND THE OCC DUTY MANAGER. THEY CONFIRMED THAT RSW NOTAM 12/011 WAS NOT ON THE PUBLISHED NOTAMS FOR MY FLT AND THEY THOUGHT THAT THIS ATIS DIRECTED CHANGE TO THE PUBLISHED ARRIVAL WAS AN INAPPROPRIATE WAY TO COMMUNICATE A CLEARANCE TO AN AIRCRAFT. AS I REFLECT ON THIS EVENT; I BELIEVE THAT THIS CONTROLLER/ATC FACILITY WANTED US TO MAKE THAT 220 DEGREE TURN AT MOEMO INTERSECTION SO WE COULD BE 'VIOLATED' WHICH WOULD BE THE FACILITY'S BEST WAY TO GET THE ARRIVAL CHANGED BECAUSE IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT GARNER ENOUGH/PROPER ATTENTION AND TAKE TOO LONG IF IT WAS PURSUED THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS. THERE ARE MULTIPLE PROCEDURES/BARRIERS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN USED TO PRECLUDE MY AIRCRAFT FROM MAKING THAT 220 DEGREE TURN AT MOEMO INTERSECTION. NOTE: THE CONTROLLER WAS NOT 'BUSY' AT THE TIME. 1) THE CONTROLLER COULD HAVE TOLD US TO FLY TO LA BELLE VOR AND DEPART ON A 190 DEGREE HEADING. 2) THE CONTROLLER COULD HAVE READ US THE ENTIRE ATIS INFO 'R' INSTEAD OF ONLY THE WEATHER (SEVERE CLEAR) WHEN WE CHECKED IN ON FREQUENCY. 3) SINCE A PREVIOUS FLIGHT HAD ALSO NOT FOLLOWED THE ATIS'S INSTRUCTIONS; ONE WOULD THINK THAT A CONTROLLER WOULD ABSOLUTELY NOT LET US MAKE THAT 220 DEGREE TURN AT MOEMO INTERSECTION BASED ON THE ATIS. IN CLOSING; AS I REFLECT ON THIS EVENT AND AFTER HAVING SPOKEN WITH MY CHIEF PILOT AND MY UNION VIOLATION COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN; I RESENT THE FACT THAT THIS ALL COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED AND THAT IT WAS POSSIBLY A SET-UP BY THE RSW ATC FACILITY IN ORDER TO 'BACK DOOR' A CHANGE TO AN ARRIVAL INTO RSW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.