Narrative:

I was the pilot flying and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. Flight X was scheduled to depart ZZZ at XA41; but was held at the gate by a ground stop program and ground delay program as ZZZ1 was experiencing low ceilings and visibilities. With concurrence from dispatch and ZZZ operations; we pushed from the gate at XC12 to wait out the delay programs on the ramp; ready to take advantage of our close proximity to ZZZ1 to be first in line. At approximately XC22; ZZZ ground control informed us that we were released to ZZZ1. A normal #1 (left) engine start and taxi to runway X was accomplished; immediately followed by a normal #2 (right) engine start. All normal checklists and flows were completed. We arrived at the hold short line and were immediately given clearance for takeoff. I instructed the pilot monitoring to inform the tower that we still had another 2 minutes of warm-up time on our right engine and we could not accept the takeoff clearance. Tower told us to cancel takeoff clearance and continued to hold short of runway X. At XC30 we were ready for departure and given clearance to take off on runway X. A normal takeoff; cleanup; and climbout were accomplished. During our climb we were given clearances to proceed direct to ZZZ2 and to climb to FL230. It was during this phase of flight with the autopilot and autothrottles engaged; at approximately XD37 and climbing through 17;400 ft at 320 KTS our aircraft experienced an extremely 'loud bang;' 'shudder' and a momentary 'right wing down.' we received an immediate call from the cabin that 'something' had happened. The pilot monitoring and I immediately looked at the primary engine instruments and concurred that indeed 'something' did happen to the right engine; as all engine indications relative to the left engine were lower. Initial indications were a loss of thrust from the right engine; reduced EPR; N1 approximately 20%; egt approximately 200 degrees C; N2 approximately 30%; ff was still indicating and no caution lights or warning lights from the secondary engine instruments were evident. During this time I completed the first steps of the engine failure/shutdown checklist and started the APU. With a perceived crippled aircraft; category III weather at our destination and the close proximity to our departure airport with VMC weather; I declared an emergency with ZZZ1 center; requested a leveloff at FL180 and a turn-back. In our turn-back to ZZZ; I verified that an engine shutdown was necessary when I moved the right engine throttle slightly forward only to see the ff and egt increase with no response from N1 and N2. I instructed the pilot monitoring to continue with the engine failure/shutdown checklist; we verified that we were shutting down the right engine and the pilot monitoring proceeded to secure fuel with the fuel lever. Considering that the right engine has suffered a catastrophic internal failure; but with no indication of fire; I directed the pilot monitoring to proceed with the engine fire or severe damage checklist to back up securing the engine fuel; oil; and hydraulic systems with the engine fire handle without discharging the fire agent. We continued our turn back to ZZZ given multiple descent and turn clearances to lose altitude as we were cleared for the ILS at ZZZ. As time permitted; we informed our flight attendant crew of our situation and our return to ZZZ. As the aircraft was flying well and with all appropriate checklists complete; I made a quick PA to our passengers informing them that the aircraft was flying fine and that we were returning to ZZZ. Upon landing at XC54 with emergency equipment standing by and still no indications of an engine fire in the cockpit or from the tower; I taxied the aircraft clear of runway X to the intersection of taxiway a and taxiway east where emergency crews began to look us over. They indicated that the engine appeared to be nominal with 'oil and smoke' stains on the cowling. With clearance from ground contro

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD88 Captain reports catastrophic engine failure climbing through 17000 feet with diversion to departure airport.

Narrative: I was the Pilot Flying and the First Officer was the Pilot Monitoring. Flight X was scheduled to depart ZZZ at XA41; but was held at the gate by a Ground Stop Program and Ground Delay Program as ZZZ1 was experiencing low ceilings and visibilities. With concurrence from Dispatch and ZZZ operations; we pushed from the gate at XC12 to wait out the delay programs on the ramp; ready to take advantage of our close proximity to ZZZ1 to be first in line. At approximately XC22; ZZZ Ground Control informed us that we were released to ZZZ1. A normal #1 (left) engine start and taxi to Runway X was accomplished; immediately followed by a normal #2 (right) engine start. All normal checklists and flows were completed. We arrived at the Hold Short Line and were immediately given clearance for takeoff. I instructed the Pilot Monitoring to inform the Tower that we still had another 2 minutes of warm-up time on our right engine and we could not accept the takeoff clearance. Tower told us to cancel takeoff clearance and continued to hold short of Runway X. At XC30 we were ready for departure and given clearance to take off on Runway X. A normal takeoff; cleanup; and climbout were accomplished. During our climb we were given clearances to proceed direct to ZZZ2 and to climb to FL230. It was during this phase of flight with the autopilot and autothrottles engaged; at approximately XD37 and climbing through 17;400 FT at 320 KTS our aircraft experienced an extremely 'loud bang;' 'shudder' and a momentary 'right wing down.' We received an immediate call from the cabin that 'something' had happened. The Pilot Monitoring and I immediately looked at the primary engine instruments and concurred that indeed 'something' did happen to the right engine; as all engine indications relative to the left engine were lower. Initial indications were a loss of thrust from the right engine; reduced EPR; N1 approximately 20%; EGT approximately 200 degrees C; N2 approximately 30%; FF was still indicating and no caution lights or warning lights from the secondary engine instruments were evident. During this time I completed the first steps of the Engine Failure/Shutdown checklist and started the APU. With a perceived crippled aircraft; Category III weather at our destination and the close proximity to our departure airport with VMC weather; I declared an emergency with ZZZ1 Center; requested a leveloff at FL180 and a turn-back. In our turn-back to ZZZ; I verified that an engine shutdown was necessary when I moved the right engine throttle slightly forward only to see the FF and EGT increase with no response from N1 and N2. I instructed the Pilot Monitoring to continue with the Engine Failure/Shutdown checklist; we verified that we were shutting down the right engine and the Pilot Monitoring proceeded to secure fuel with the fuel lever. Considering that the right engine has suffered a catastrophic internal failure; but with no indication of fire; I directed the Pilot Monitoring to proceed with the Engine Fire or Severe Damage checklist to back up securing the engine fuel; oil; and hydraulic systems with the engine fire handle without discharging the fire agent. We continued our turn back to ZZZ given multiple descent and turn clearances to lose altitude as we were cleared for the ILS at ZZZ. As time permitted; we informed our Flight Attendant crew of our situation and our return to ZZZ. As the aircraft was flying well and with all appropriate checklists complete; I made a quick PA to our passengers informing them that the aircraft was flying fine and that we were returning to ZZZ. Upon landing at XC54 with emergency equipment standing by and still no indications of an engine fire in the cockpit or from the Tower; I taxied the aircraft clear of Runway X to the intersection of Taxiway A and Taxiway E where emergency crews began to look us over. They indicated that the engine appeared to be nominal with 'oil and smoke' stains on the cowling. With clearance from Ground Contro

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.