Narrative:

I was working the santan radar sector during a moderate departure push when aircraft X on a stanfield 2 departure checked in and I issued a climb to FL210; when I should have done nothing more than simply radar identify the aircraft due to arrival traffic on the arlin arrival; another CRJ9. I experienced a lapse in memory and believed that the 2 aircraft would have separation since aircraft X was going to level at 7;000 ft on the SID and fly underneath the arriving CRJ9. I called traffic to aircraft X initially reference the arrival when the 2 aircraft were 8 miles apart and mistakenly told aircraft X that the arrival was restriction above them (aircraft X). Aircraft X had the other CRJ9 in sight at this point. After exercising several other control instructions; I was asked by the handoff specialist; 'what's going on with these two?' while physically pointing to aircraft X and the CRJ9 on the arrival. After realizing that separation was lost or going to be lost imminently; I instructed aircraft X to turn right heading 270 degrees immediately. The initial investigation has revealed that the minimum separation was 2.49 miles horizontally; 600 ft vertically. During my training on santan; I developed a personal system of pre-marking my strips with the altitude I would climb the aircraft to on initial call-up. When the aircraft would check in; I would scan the strip and place a checkmark next to the pre-planned altitude as I was issuing it. In the past 3-4 months since working the sector on my own; I believe I have let up in my diligence of sticking to a personal system that I believe assisted me in ensuring separation. There were 3 minor distractions occurring at the time of this incident; a VFR overflight northwestbound at 10;500 ft that was a potential conflict for preceding stanfield departures; and a mobie departure on which a tower run down strip did not print; so the santan handoff specialist was coordinating with the local controller at the time I mistakenly issued aircraft X a climb to FL210. The last distraction was caused by my own arrogance when the handoff specialist made a comment that I should have climbed a preceding eastbound jet on the maxxo 1 departure reference an arlin arrival that I was just not comfortable with climbing reference the arlin's indicated ground speed of 310 KTS and the proximity of the maxxo 1 departure. I should not have let the handoff specialist's comment cause my pride and arrogance to swell up. Working departures out of sky harbor; I have found it is easy to get into a habit of automatically climbing everyone to FL210. Short of having eastbound departures fly 20 miles west on west flow; I don't think there is anything that can be done to eliminate the need to 'tunnel' departure aircraft underneath arrivals in this one specific flow/sector combination. I believe that I should have consistently followed my personally-developed system of pre-planning and pre-marking strips with the initial altitude to climb to and placement of a checkmark next to the pre-planned altitude upon my issuing it to the aircraft in order to ensure separation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: P50 controller described operational error at 8500 when he/she issued unrestricted climb to a departure conflicting with arrival traffic.

Narrative: I was working the Santan Radar sector during a moderate departure push when Aircraft X on a Stanfield 2 departure checked in and I issued a climb to FL210; when I should have done nothing more than simply radar identify the aircraft due to arrival traffic on the ARLIN arrival; another CRJ9. I experienced a lapse in memory and believed that the 2 aircraft would have separation since Aircraft X was going to level at 7;000 FT on the SID and fly underneath the arriving CRJ9. I called traffic to Aircraft X initially reference the arrival when the 2 aircraft were 8 miles apart and mistakenly told Aircraft X that the arrival was restriction above them (Aircraft X). Aircraft X had the other CRJ9 in sight at this point. After exercising several other control instructions; I was asked by the Handoff Specialist; 'What's going on with these two?' while physically pointing to Aircraft X and the CRJ9 on the arrival. After realizing that separation was lost or going to be lost imminently; I instructed Aircraft X to turn right heading 270 degrees immediately. The initial investigation has revealed that the minimum separation was 2.49 miles horizontally; 600 FT vertically. During my training on Santan; I developed a personal system of pre-marking my strips with the altitude I would climb the aircraft to on initial call-up. When the aircraft would check in; I would scan the strip and place a checkmark next to the pre-planned altitude as I was issuing it. In the past 3-4 months since working the sector on my own; I believe I have let up in my diligence of sticking to a personal system that I believe assisted me in ensuring separation. There were 3 minor distractions occurring at the time of this incident; a VFR overflight northwestbound at 10;500 FT that was a potential conflict for preceding Stanfield departures; and a MOBIE departure on which a Tower run down strip did not print; so the Santan Handoff Specialist was coordinating with the Local Controller at the time I mistakenly issued Aircraft X a climb to FL210. The last distraction was caused by my own arrogance when the Handoff Specialist made a comment that I should have climbed a preceding eastbound jet on the MAXXO 1 departure reference an ARLIN arrival that I was just not comfortable with climbing reference the ARLIN's indicated ground speed of 310 KTS and the proximity of the MAXXO 1 departure. I should not have let the Handoff Specialist's comment cause my pride and arrogance to swell up. Working departures out of Sky Harbor; I have found it is easy to get into a habit of automatically climbing everyone to FL210. Short of having eastbound departures fly 20 miles west on west flow; I don't think there is anything that can be done to eliminate the need to 'tunnel' departure aircraft underneath arrivals in this one specific flow/sector combination. I believe that I should have consistently followed my personally-developed system of pre-planning and pre-marking strips with the initial altitude to climb to and placement of a checkmark next to the pre-planned altitude upon my issuing it to the aircraft in order to ensure separation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.