Narrative:

Start and taxi, normal. First officer was to execute takeoff; lineup on centerline of runway, good lineup on center. First officer increased power to 80% N2, called 80%. First officer called rolling and advanced power toward takeoff EPR. As power was advanced beyond 80% N2, I realized the aircraft had started a yaw to the left, and had started progressing towards the edge of the runway. As soon as it became apparent that we were headed off the runway, I immediately attempted to steer back to centerline, but had no steering with nosewheel steering, or rudder pedals. At this time I called for an abort, immediately went to idle with the throttles, and also attempted to brake the aircraft to a stop. There was no braking ability at this point. As I reduced power, the aircraft started to yaw to the right. This was apparently caused by my not having closed the throttle on the #1 engine. By the time I realized that the #1 throttle was still forward of 2, 3, and 4, the aircraft was exiting the runway on the right side. As I closed the throttle, the aircraft left the runway, then started a skid in the mud, finally coming to rest facing the runway. After the aircraft had come to a stop in the infield between runways 16L and 16R at sea, I was able to power the aircraft out of the mud and back onto the runway west/O any damage. I then taxied the aircraft back to parking, did a walk around to inspect for damage, and the only damage that was found on the aircraft was a broken cable guide bracket for the nosewheel steering cables. None of the airframe or landing gear was damaged. I also might add that there was some obvious mud ingestion on the #3 engine, and possibly some in the #2. Our company mechanics performed an extensive inspection of the aircraft subsequent to the incident, and no further damage was found. They did have to remove and clean all wheels and brakes, and replace the #5 tire due to some cuts. The engines were all flushed, and bore-scoped to check for internal damage. Again, no damage apparent. Later on that evening, another crew was flown to sea to ferry the aircraft to wilmington, oh (iln) for further inspection and testing. I was informed that at iln, some taxi and engine spool tests were run, and it was determined at that time that there was a definite spool time difference between the numbers 1 and 4 engines. The #1 engine was consistently slower to accelerate than the #4, especially with engine anti-ice selected on. (Please note, though not included in my report, the engine anti-ice had been selected on for takeoff at sea). This, I believe, could have contributed to the directional control problems that I experienced at sea. Supplemental information from acn 81935: the aircraft was loaded with an aft C.G, but still within limits.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW LOSS OF ACFT CONTROL AT THE START OF TKOF ROLL CAUSED A TKOF ABORT THAT RESULTED IN RWY EXCURSION.

Narrative: START AND TAXI, NORMAL. F/O WAS TO EXECUTE TKOF; LINEUP ON CENTERLINE OF RWY, GOOD LINEUP ON CENTER. F/O INCREASED PWR TO 80% N2, CALLED 80%. F/O CALLED ROLLING AND ADVANCED PWR TOWARD TKOF EPR. AS PWR WAS ADVANCED BEYOND 80% N2, I REALIZED THE ACFT HAD STARTED A YAW TO THE L, AND HAD STARTED PROGRESSING TOWARDS THE EDGE OF THE RWY. AS SOON AS IT BECAME APPARENT THAT WE WERE HEADED OFF THE RWY, I IMMEDIATELY ATTEMPTED TO STEER BACK TO CENTERLINE, BUT HAD NO STEERING WITH NOSEWHEEL STEERING, OR RUDDER PEDALS. AT THIS TIME I CALLED FOR AN ABORT, IMMEDIATELY WENT TO IDLE WITH THE THROTTLES, AND ALSO ATTEMPTED TO BRAKE THE ACFT TO A STOP. THERE WAS NO BRAKING ABILITY AT THIS POINT. AS I REDUCED PWR, THE ACFT STARTED TO YAW TO THE R. THIS WAS APPARENTLY CAUSED BY MY NOT HAVING CLOSED THE THROTTLE ON THE #1 ENG. BY THE TIME I REALIZED THAT THE #1 THROTTLE WAS STILL FORWARD OF 2, 3, AND 4, THE ACFT WAS EXITING THE RWY ON THE R SIDE. AS I CLOSED THE THROTTLE, THE ACFT LEFT THE RWY, THEN STARTED A SKID IN THE MUD, FINALLY COMING TO REST FACING THE RWY. AFTER THE ACFT HAD COME TO A STOP IN THE INFIELD BETWEEN RWYS 16L AND 16R AT SEA, I WAS ABLE TO PWR THE ACFT OUT OF THE MUD AND BACK ONTO THE RWY W/O ANY DAMAGE. I THEN TAXIED THE ACFT BACK TO PARKING, DID A WALK AROUND TO INSPECT FOR DAMAGE, AND THE ONLY DAMAGE THAT WAS FOUND ON THE ACFT WAS A BROKEN CABLE GUIDE BRACKET FOR THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING CABLES. NONE OF THE AIRFRAME OR LNDG GEAR WAS DAMAGED. I ALSO MIGHT ADD THAT THERE WAS SOME OBVIOUS MUD INGESTION ON THE #3 ENG, AND POSSIBLY SOME IN THE #2. OUR COMPANY MECHANICS PERFORMED AN EXTENSIVE INSPECTION OF THE ACFT SUBSEQUENT TO THE INCIDENT, AND NO FURTHER DAMAGE WAS FOUND. THEY DID HAVE TO REMOVE AND CLEAN ALL WHEELS AND BRAKES, AND REPLACE THE #5 TIRE DUE TO SOME CUTS. THE ENGS WERE ALL FLUSHED, AND BORE-SCOPED TO CHK FOR INTERNAL DAMAGE. AGAIN, NO DAMAGE APPARENT. LATER ON THAT EVENING, ANOTHER CREW WAS FLOWN TO SEA TO FERRY THE ACFT TO WILMINGTON, OH (ILN) FOR FURTHER INSPECTION AND TESTING. I WAS INFORMED THAT AT ILN, SOME TAXI AND ENG SPOOL TESTS WERE RUN, AND IT WAS DETERMINED AT THAT TIME THAT THERE WAS A DEFINITE SPOOL TIME DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE NUMBERS 1 AND 4 ENGS. THE #1 ENG WAS CONSISTENTLY SLOWER TO ACCELERATE THAN THE #4, ESPECIALLY WITH ENG ANTI-ICE SELECTED ON. (PLEASE NOTE, THOUGH NOT INCLUDED IN MY RPT, THE ENG ANTI-ICE HAD BEEN SELECTED ON FOR TKOF AT SEA). THIS, I BELIEVE, COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE DIRECTIONAL CONTROL PROBS THAT I EXPERIENCED AT SEA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 81935: THE ACFT WAS LOADED WITH AN AFT C.G, BUT STILL WITHIN LIMITS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.