Narrative:

Instructed to cross fredi at 10000' MSL. After descent was initiated decision was made to use flight spoilers to achieve maximum rate of descent due to late realization of apparent change in wind. Approximately 5500 FPM required to make restriction. Although restriction was met, right.O.D. Was excessive and apparently msp ARTCC's altitude readout did not keep up with our descent. Consequently, the controller was forced to inquire as to our actual altitude as we proceeded inside the fix. He was advised that it was indeed 10000' and we were told to contact msp TRACON. Our airline utilizes at least 4 different cockpit displays in its medium large transport aircraft. All have the DME readout in different locations. In the aircraft we flew this day DME information replaced course information normally displayed in the same place in other cockpit types. Confusion associated with this incongruity caused delay in the flying pilot's realization that his initial rate of descent would be inadequate to make the assigned crossing restriction. Consequently, a more extreme right.O.D. Was required; more than what would have been needed if the situation could have been detected, interpreted earlier. Cockpit's information system must be standardized by regulation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW PRESENTS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW FLEET INCONSISTENCY SLOWS UP DECISIONS AND COMPUTATIONS NECESSARY FOR COMPLIANCE WITH ATC CLRNC.

Narrative: INSTRUCTED TO CROSS FREDI AT 10000' MSL. AFTER DSCNT WAS INITIATED DECISION WAS MADE TO USE FLT SPOILERS TO ACHIEVE MAX RATE OF DSCNT DUE TO LATE REALIZATION OF APPARENT CHANGE IN WIND. APPROX 5500 FPM REQUIRED TO MAKE RESTRICTION. ALTHOUGH RESTRICTION WAS MET, R.O.D. WAS EXCESSIVE AND APPARENTLY MSP ARTCC'S ALT READOUT DID NOT KEEP UP WITH OUR DSCNT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE CTLR WAS FORCED TO INQUIRE AS TO OUR ACTUAL ALT AS WE PROCEEDED INSIDE THE FIX. HE WAS ADVISED THAT IT WAS INDEED 10000' AND WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT MSP TRACON. OUR AIRLINE UTILIZES AT LEAST 4 DIFFERENT COCKPIT DISPLAYS IN ITS MLG ACFT. ALL HAVE THE DME READOUT IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS. IN THE ACFT WE FLEW THIS DAY DME INFO REPLACED COURSE INFO NORMALLY DISPLAYED IN THE SAME PLACE IN OTHER COCKPIT TYPES. CONFUSION ASSOCIATED WITH THIS INCONGRUITY CAUSED DELAY IN THE FLYING PLT'S REALIZATION THAT HIS INITIAL RATE OF DSCNT WOULD BE INADEQUATE TO MAKE THE ASSIGNED XING RESTRICTION. CONSEQUENTLY, A MORE EXTREME R.O.D. WAS REQUIRED; MORE THAN WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN NEEDED IF THE SITUATION COULD HAVE BEEN DETECTED, INTERPRETED EARLIER. COCKPIT'S INFO SYS MUST BE STANDARDIZED BY REG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.