Narrative:

Our airplane was placarded under the wrong MEL option. We did not catch this until we were enroute. The airplane had flown 3 times since the placard and had just spent 2 days in the hangar. The proper MEL option required a maintenance check. Without that check; we were unsure how the system would perform and elected to divert to a major airport. We declared an emergency to land opposite traffic and have crash fire rescue standing by. Our flight was planned to a high altitude airport with a single; adequate-length runway. The destination airport field report with our release showed braking action mu values to the runway we planned to use were 27 (poor); 16 (nil); 13 (nil;) and to the opposite runway mu values of 21 (poor); 20 (nil); 21 (nil). (Shouldn't the approach end mu value of one runway be the same as the mu value for the departure end of the opposite runway?) called dispatch and was told the last NOTAM showed that braking action was good. This was sent to us and the values were 44 (good); 45 (good); 32 (fair) to the runway we planned to use; and 28 (poor); 28 (poor); 33 (fair) to the opposite runway. Makes you wonder; is this braking action good? We were focused on what the real field conditions were. We tried multiple times to call the station to get the real story. We assumed that the plane was correctly placarded. Enroute; we were running through landing data to make sure we were safe to land if braking action was reported as fair or better. Our autobrakes were placarded inoperative so we referred to the MEL to make sure we had not missed any penalties. Our autobrakes were placarded under MEL 32-7a; which reads 'may be inoperative provided: airplane is not dispatched to ZZZ and automatic brakes light is not illuminated with autobrakes switch 'off;' and; approach minimums do not requires its use.' our autobrakes light was on so we kept reading. MEL 32-7b states; 'may be inoperative with autobrakes light illuminated and the autobrakes switch 'off' provided: airplane is not dispatched to ZZZZ; and approach minimums do not require its use; and (M) autobrake solenoid valve is verified closed per procedures manual 32-7b.' we communicated with dispatch and had them ask maintenance what might happen if the autobrake solenoid valve is open. If the solenoid valve is open; it is possible to have no brakes or locked brakes. Dispatch agreed that a high altitude; limited crash fire rescue airport was not the place to test those possibilities so we decided to divert to a major airport with long runways. We pulled up that airport's ATIS and they were north flow with the winds 150 degrees at 5 KTS. We decided that the very long runway (runway into the wind) with crash fire rescue standing by was the runway of choice. We declared an emergency to land opposite traffic and have crash fire rescue standing by if the brakes malfunctioned. Touchdown on the very long runway was normal. We used reverse thrust until 60 KTS and then tried the brakes. They worked fine. We turned off about 6;000 ft down the runway and taxied to the gate. Maintenance checked the system and got us on the way to the higher altitude airport.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: While enroute; a Captain and First Officer realized their B757-200 was placarded under the wrong Minimum Equipment List (MEL) option 32-7a. MEL should have been 32-7b; 'Auto Brakes light Illuminated; Switch OFF;' requiring maintenance check. Aircraft diverted.

Narrative: Our airplane was placarded under the wrong MEL option. We did not catch this until we were enroute. The airplane had flown 3 times since the placard and had just spent 2 days in the hangar. The proper MEL option required a maintenance check. Without that check; we were unsure how the system would perform and elected to divert to a major airport. We declared an emergency to land opposite traffic and have Crash Fire Rescue standing by. Our flight was planned to a high altitude airport with a single; adequate-length runway. The destination airport field report with our release showed braking action Mu values to the runway we planned to use were 27 (poor); 16 (nil); 13 (nil;) and to the opposite runway Mu values of 21 (poor); 20 (nil); 21 (nil). (Shouldn't the approach end Mu value of one runway be the same as the Mu value for the departure end of the opposite runway?) Called Dispatch and was told the last NOTAM showed that braking action was good. This was sent to us and the values were 44 (good); 45 (good); 32 (fair) to the runway we planned to use; and 28 (poor); 28 (poor); 33 (fair) to the opposite runway. Makes you wonder; is this braking action good? We were focused on what the real field conditions were. We tried multiple times to call the station to get the real story. We assumed that the plane was correctly placarded. Enroute; we were running through landing data to make sure we were safe to land if braking action was reported as fair or better. Our autobrakes were placarded inoperative so we referred to the MEL to make sure we had not missed any penalties. Our autobrakes were placarded under MEL 32-7a; which reads 'May be inoperative provided: Airplane is not dispatched to ZZZ and Automatic Brakes light is not illuminated with autobrakes switch 'off;' and; Approach Minimums do not requires its use.' Our Autobrakes light was on so we kept reading. MEL 32-7b states; 'May be inoperative with Autobrakes light illuminated and the Autobrakes switch 'off' provided: Airplane is not dispatched to ZZZZ; and Approach Minimums do not require its use; and (M) Autobrake solenoid valve is verified closed per Procedures Manual 32-7b.' We communicated with Dispatch and had them ask Maintenance what might happen if the autobrake solenoid valve is open. If the solenoid valve is open; it is possible to have no brakes or locked brakes. Dispatch agreed that a high altitude; limited Crash Fire Rescue airport was not the place to test those possibilities so we decided to divert to a major airport with long runways. We pulled up that airport's ATIS and they were north flow with the winds 150 degrees at 5 KTS. We decided that the very long runway (runway into the wind) with Crash Fire Rescue standing by was the runway of choice. We declared an emergency to land opposite traffic and have Crash Fire Rescue standing by if the brakes malfunctioned. Touchdown on the very long runway was normal. We used reverse thrust until 60 KTS and then tried the brakes. They worked fine. We turned off about 6;000 FT down the runway and taxied to the gate. Maintenance checked the system and got us on the way to the higher altitude airport.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.