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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 823483 |
Time | |
Date | 200902 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff Initial Approach |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Function | Single Pilot Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Commercial Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Flight Instructor |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3.6 Flight Crew Total 408.9 Flight Crew Type 344 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Track / Heading All Types Ground Incursion Runway |
Narrative:
How the problem arose: it was late in the day. I took off from my home airfield at about XA45Z; flew over the practice area and in southeast direction for about 30 minutes before deciding to return to the airfield and do pattern work; and I allowed myself to become spatially disoriented and proceeded to conduct 2 touch-and-go landings; and 1 full stop landing to the wrong airfield; i.e.; a practice field used by the navy. I attribute my disorientation to not being able to tune the onboard GPS receiver to the appropriate airport and decision to rely solely on pilotage and dead reckoning without reference to my sectional chart. After realizing I was in the wrong place; I proceeded to leave the area and return directly to my departure airfield; landing at approximately XB58Z. Contributing factors: this was my first solo flight in about 19 years. It was a different aircraft than the one in which I did my BFR and it had a different instrument panel layout. I didn't verify my position during the outbound leg of my flight. I didn't pay attention to my 'gut' feeling that something wasn't quite right when I overflew the airfield and the visual cues were different. And finally; I was overly focused on improving my landing techniques which had gotten 'rusty.' the runway was aligned and numbered the same as my departure runway (runway 5/23). The runways are about 9 NM apart; 8;000 ft and 5;500 ft in length. How it was discovered: after my full stop landing; I became keenly aware that there were none of the familiar buildings along the runway; there was a wind tee instead of a windsock; and; as I taxied back to depart; I saw the carrier landing system lights on the approach end of runway 23. Human performance considerations -- perceptions; judgments; decisions: I perceived the runway to be the correct runway based on the runway numbers to the exclusion of any other visual cues. I misjudged my abilities to recognize the surrounding area after only 2 previous flights and under the tutelage of a flight instructor who was having me demonstrate basic maneuvers in the aircraft; i.e.; straight and level flight; slow flight; stalls; takeoffs and landings; I failed to confirm that the runway was my intended runway even after my radio calls announcing my position went unanswered; i.e.; someone questioning my location when I wasn't in the correct pattern; and; I misjudged how focused my attention span was even though I constantly scanned for other traffic which were reporting entering the pattern and landing at my destination airfield. The best decision I made was in checking duats for weather and NOTAMS for the vicinity where I was flying. There was no indication of military activity. It was also a sunday evening -- lucky for me. I should've contacted the FSS for NOTAMS. Factors affecting the quality of human performance: surface winds were reported to be from 290 degrees at 15 KTS with higher gusts. I was mildly concerned about the effect of these winds on my takeoffs and landings. Other than that; I was not rushed to complete the flight; i.e.; there was no sense of urgency. I had another month to satisfy the currency requirements of the 'school.' I will admit to looking forward to flying by myself again. Actions or inactions: I attempted to conduct my flight as I had planned; some familiarization work using the GPS navigation system and pattern work. When I could operate the GPS; I decided to return to the airport and work in the pattern. I had my sectional chart; enroute charts; and approach plates with me. I didn't refer to any of those items until after I had erred and conducted my pattern/landings and takeoffs at the wrong airfield. I announced entering the pattern; downwind; base; and final and touch-and-go/full stop for the runway on the RF monitored at my departure airfield. I even tried to radio for guidance on my location when I was rolling out after my full stop landing. Once airborne; I immediately recognized the flashing beacon at my d
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A C172 pilot practiced landings at a military training field which he confused with another airport 8 miles away. The pilot had not flown solo in years and did not use the navigation tools available to maintain situational awareness.
Narrative: How the problem arose: It was late in the day. I took off from my home airfield at about XA45Z; flew over the practice area and in southeast direction for about 30 minutes before deciding to return to the airfield and do pattern work; and I allowed myself to become spatially disoriented and proceeded to conduct 2 touch-and-go landings; and 1 full stop landing to the wrong airfield; i.e.; a practice field used by the Navy. I attribute my disorientation to not being able to tune the onboard GPS receiver to the appropriate airport and decision to rely solely on pilotage and dead reckoning without reference to my sectional chart. After realizing I was in the wrong place; I proceeded to leave the area and return directly to my departure airfield; landing at approximately XB58Z. Contributing factors: This was my first solo flight in about 19 years. It was a different aircraft than the one in which I did my BFR and it had a different instrument panel layout. I didn't verify my position during the outbound leg of my flight. I didn't pay attention to my 'gut' feeling that something wasn't quite right when I overflew the airfield and the visual cues were different. And finally; I was overly focused on improving my landing techniques which had gotten 'rusty.' The runway was aligned and numbered the same as my departure runway (Runway 5/23). The runways are about 9 NM apart; 8;000 FT and 5;500 FT in length. How it was discovered: After my full stop landing; I became keenly aware that there were none of the familiar buildings along the runway; there was a wind tee instead of a windsock; and; as I taxied back to depart; I saw the carrier landing system lights on the approach end of Runway 23. Human Performance Considerations -- Perceptions; Judgments; Decisions: I perceived the runway to be the correct runway based on the runway numbers to the exclusion of any other visual cues. I misjudged my abilities to recognize the surrounding area after only 2 previous flights and under the tutelage of a flight instructor who was having me demonstrate basic maneuvers in the aircraft; i.e.; straight and level flight; slow flight; stalls; takeoffs and landings; I failed to confirm that the runway was my intended runway even after my radio calls announcing my position went unanswered; i.e.; someone questioning my location when I wasn't in the correct pattern; and; I misjudged how focused my attention span was even though I constantly scanned for other traffic which were reporting entering the pattern and landing at my destination airfield. The best decision I made was in checking DUATS for weather and NOTAMS for the vicinity where I was flying. There was no indication of military activity. It was also a Sunday evening -- lucky for me. I should've contacted the FSS for NOTAMS. Factors affecting the quality of human performance: Surface winds were reported to be from 290 degrees at 15 KTS with higher gusts. I was mildly concerned about the effect of these winds on my takeoffs and landings. Other than that; I was not rushed to complete the flight; i.e.; there was no sense of urgency. I had another month to satisfy the currency requirements of the 'school.' I will admit to looking forward to flying by myself again. Actions or inactions: I attempted to conduct my flight as I had planned; some familiarization work using the GPS navigation system and pattern work. When I could operate the GPS; I decided to return to the airport and work in the pattern. I had my sectional chart; enroute charts; and approach plates with me. I didn't refer to any of those items until after I had erred and conducted my pattern/landings and takeoffs at the wrong airfield. I announced entering the pattern; downwind; base; and final and touch-and-go/full stop for the runway on the RF monitored at my departure airfield. I even tried to radio for guidance on my location when I was rolling out after my full stop landing. Once airborne; I immediately recognized the flashing beacon at my d
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.