Narrative:

The flight was uneventful until we got into the approach for runway at ZZZ. The approach was properly briefed and navigation computers and radios were properly configured prior to beginning the approach. At around 3;000 ft MSL; the captain disengaged the autopilot. The before landing checklist was completed at around 1;800 ft AGL. At approximately 500 ft AGL; we began to receive a 'too low gear' aural caution message. I looked at the EICAS display and saw that we had all 3 green landing gear indicators illuminated. At approximately 300 ft AGL; I suggested that we go around. The captain agreed. He toggled the 'go around' buttons and pushed the thrust levers all the way forward; and called out 'set maximum thrust; flaps 9 degrees.' I told tower we were going around; we have a gear malfunction. Tower gave us a climb vector that was a few degrees to the right of the runway heading and told us; 'climb and maintain 3;000 ft and don't hit the md-80 in front of you.' I acknowledged the tower instructions. The captain set the assigned course heading into the heading selector on the FGC while I set in 3;000 ft into the altitude selector on the FGC. I then called out; '3;000 ft set sir.' the captain acknowledged my callout and said; '3;000 ft.' I looked out in front of us and saw an md-80 a couple of miles in front of us that had just taken off. I pointed the traffic out to the captain and asked him if he saw it. He said he did. I don't remember if I gave him a 2;000 ft for 3;000 ft altitude callout. We were given a handoff from tower to approach control. As I punched in the new frequency; I noticed that we were coming up on 2;800 ft MSL and the captain was still hand flying the airplane. We were climbing at around 2;500-3;000 FPM. I noticed that we had still had flaps and gear down. A few seconds later; I heard a voice yelling into the radio; 'maintain 3;000 ft!' I saw that we were at 3;500 ft. The captain already began to stop our climb. I then told ATC; '3;000 ft we're getting her back down sir.' the captain put the aircraft at 3;000 ft and turned the autopilot on. We then retracted the gear and flaps and continued with the rest of our checklists. After a discussion about the landing gear and egpws; we decided to cycle the gear and if we got a transition indication as the gear was moving and we got 3 green; then we would ignore the egpws if it went off again when we landed. The gear cycled up and down normally with transition indications during movement. We were vectored back onto runway and landed without further incident. Task saturation and non use of autopilot on the go around to assist in leveling off at assigned/selected altitude. The use of the autopilot after aircraft is in established climb on the go-around is a tremendous tool to reduce the workload.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: E145 flight crew received a GPWS 'TOO LOW GEAR' EICAS warning despite three green gear light indications. During subsequent hand flown go-around task saturation results in an altitude deviation and likely traffic conflict.

Narrative: The flight was uneventful until we got into the approach for runway at ZZZ. The approach was properly briefed and navigation computers and radios were properly configured prior to beginning the approach. At around 3;000 FT MSL; the Captain disengaged the autopilot. The before landing checklist was completed at around 1;800 FT AGL. At approximately 500 FT AGL; we began to receive a 'Too Low Gear' aural caution message. I looked at the EICAS display and saw that we had all 3 green landing gear indicators illuminated. At approximately 300 FT AGL; I suggested that we go around. The Captain agreed. He toggled the 'go around' buttons and pushed the thrust levers all the way forward; and called out 'Set maximum thrust; flaps 9 degrees.' I told Tower we were going around; we have a gear malfunction. Tower gave us a climb vector that was a few degrees to the right of the runway heading and told us; 'climb and maintain 3;000 FT and don't hit the MD-80 in front of you.' I acknowledged the Tower instructions. The Captain set the assigned course heading into the heading selector on the FGC while I set in 3;000 FT into the altitude selector on the FGC. I then called out; '3;000 FT set Sir.' The Captain acknowledged my callout and said; '3;000 FT.' I looked out in front of us and saw an MD-80 a couple of miles in front of us that had just taken off. I pointed the traffic out to the Captain and asked him if he saw it. He said he did. I don't remember if I gave him a 2;000 FT for 3;000 FT altitude callout. We were given a handoff from Tower to Approach Control. As I punched in the new frequency; I noticed that we were coming up on 2;800 FT MSL and the Captain was still hand flying the airplane. We were climbing at around 2;500-3;000 FPM. I noticed that we had still had flaps and gear down. A few seconds later; I heard a voice yelling into the radio; 'Maintain 3;000 FT!' I saw that we were at 3;500 FT. The Captain already began to stop our climb. I then told ATC; '3;000 FT we're getting her back down Sir.' The Captain put the aircraft at 3;000 FT and turned the autopilot on. We then retracted the gear and flaps and continued with the rest of our checklists. After a discussion about the landing gear and EGPWS; we decided to cycle the gear and if we got a transition indication as the gear was moving and we got 3 green; then we would ignore the EGPWS if it went off again when we landed. The gear cycled up and down normally with transition indications during movement. We were vectored back onto runway and landed without further incident. Task saturation and non use of autopilot on the go around to assist in leveling off at assigned/selected altitude. The use of the autopilot after aircraft is in established climb on the go-around is a tremendous tool to reduce the workload.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.