Narrative:

The flight was a functional check flight on aircraft following maintenance. The crewmembers are both qualified flight test pilots. Part of the functional check flight profile requires checking the engine relight capability. Each engine requires a 5 minute cool-down and a 5 minute warm-up. A couple of minutes after perceiving a normal air start relight of the right engine; the engine experienced an egt overtemp. When the condition was noticed by me (pilot flying); I immediately reached over and selected the right engine fuel control switch to cutoff but failed to confirm before doing so. Almost at the same time; but very slightly after my response; the pilot not flying quickly grabbed the left fuel control switch and moved it to cutoff; also without confirming. I saw the mistake happening but wasn't quick enough to stop it. I believe that I caught his hand and the switch before it actually reached the 'cutoff' position and returned it to the 'run' position. The engine was never shut down. I noted that the egt 'may' have decreased 3-5 degrees during the event. The switch was out of the 'run' position for less than 0.5 seconds. How the problem arose: after being told by the pilot flying (pilot not flying performs the checks) that a normal restart on the right engine had been achieved; we began the 5 minute warm-up on the engine. At that time I also began setting up for the next check which involves slowing the aircraft down. Meanwhile the first officer was performing the APU fire handle shutdown check. During this period; the right engine egt continued to slowly increase from its normal stabilized egt of approximately 450 degrees without being noticed by the crew. The overtemp occurred approximately 1.5 minutes after the pilot not flying announced that it was a normal restart. Our check requires the relight attempt at the bottom of the air start envelope (250 KTS). Because I began slowing the aircraft after we thought we had a good restart; the slower airspeed exacerbated the condition leading to the overtemp. The real problem arose because of a rush to prevent damage to the overtemping right engine. Contributing factors: the functional check flight profile is a comprehensive check of all emergency and abnormal systems on the aircraft prior to returning it to revenue service. The check is quite extensive and it is easy to find oneself distracted with other events (ATC; etc.) in the midst of checking a system. In this case; the pilot not flying who was conducting the tests failed to notice the overtemp because he perceived the engine to have already attained a stabilized restart and didn't continue to monitor the relight. When he did notice the overtemp; he rushed to secure it but selected the wrong fuel control switch. The pilot flying understood the right engine to be relit; and didn't notice the slowly creeping egt increase because he had begun to configure (slow) the aircraft for the next check. It is imperative on 2 pilot crew airplanes to back up and to verify the actions of the other pilot. The pilot flying observed the pilot not flying's mistake and stopped it before it would have caused a disruption. During the functional check flight; it is even more critical to monitor the other pilot. Both of us failed to do that. Corrective actions: I will recommend that our flight test group review our functional check flight profiles to insure that we provide adequate time and airspace for all of the required checks. Changes will be recommended to reduce the possibility of rushing and allow for more time to accomplish checks. This in turn will enhance the ability of both pilots to monitor the other to prevent errors such as this. In addition; it might be prudent to verbalize the completion of each check to the other pilot and receive concurrence prior to moving on to the next check. Human performance considerations: this event occurred due to a number of contributing factors. First and most directly; it was due to rushing to action.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Both flight test pilots aboard a B777 undergoing a post maintenance flight check reacted unilaterally to an over temperature of the right engine following a shutdown and re-light test. Result was both engine fuel shut off levers being actuated. Quick reaction to restore the left engine minimized the consequences.

Narrative: The flight was a functional check flight on aircraft following maintenance. The crewmembers are both qualified flight test pilots. Part of the functional check flight profile requires checking the engine relight capability. Each engine requires a 5 minute cool-down and a 5 minute warm-up. A couple of minutes after perceiving a normal air start relight of the right engine; the engine experienced an EGT overtemp. When the condition was noticed by me (pilot flying); I immediately reached over and selected the right engine fuel control switch to cutoff but failed to confirm before doing so. Almost at the same time; but very slightly after my response; the pilot not flying quickly grabbed the left fuel control switch and moved it to cutoff; also without confirming. I saw the mistake happening but wasn't quick enough to stop it. I believe that I caught his hand and the switch before it actually reached the 'Cutoff' position and returned it to the 'Run' position. The engine was never shut down. I noted that the EGT 'may' have decreased 3-5 degrees during the event. The switch was out of the 'Run' position for less than 0.5 seconds. How the problem arose: After being told by the pilot flying (pilot not flying performs the checks) that a normal restart on the right engine had been achieved; we began the 5 minute warm-up on the engine. At that time I also began setting up for the next check which involves slowing the aircraft down. Meanwhile the First Officer was performing the APU Fire Handle Shutdown check. During this period; the right engine EGT continued to slowly increase from its normal stabilized EGT of approximately 450 degrees without being noticed by the crew. The overtemp occurred approximately 1.5 minutes after the pilot not flying announced that it was a normal restart. Our check requires the relight attempt at the bottom of the air start envelope (250 KTS). Because I began slowing the aircraft after we thought we had a good restart; the slower airspeed exacerbated the condition leading to the overtemp. The real problem arose because of a rush to prevent damage to the overtemping right engine. Contributing factors: The functional check flight profile is a comprehensive check of all emergency and abnormal systems on the aircraft prior to returning it to revenue service. The check is quite extensive and it is easy to find oneself distracted with other events (ATC; etc.) in the midst of checking a system. In this case; the pilot not flying who was conducting the tests failed to notice the overtemp because he perceived the engine to have already attained a stabilized restart and didn't continue to monitor the relight. When he did notice the overtemp; he rushed to secure it but selected the wrong fuel control switch. The pilot flying understood the right engine to be relit; and didn't notice the slowly creeping EGT increase because he had begun to configure (slow) the aircraft for the next check. It is imperative on 2 pilot crew airplanes to back up and to verify the actions of the other pilot. The pilot flying observed the pilot not flying's mistake and stopped it before it would have caused a disruption. During the functional check flight; it is even more critical to monitor the other pilot. Both of us failed to do that. Corrective actions: I will recommend that our flight test group review our functional check flight profiles to insure that we provide adequate time and airspace for all of the required checks. Changes will be recommended to reduce the possibility of rushing and allow for more time to accomplish checks. This in turn will enhance the ability of both pilots to monitor the other to prevent errors such as this. In addition; it might be prudent to verbalize the completion of each check to the other pilot and receive concurrence prior to moving on to the next check. Human performance considerations: This event occurred due to a number of contributing factors. First and most directly; it was due to rushing to action.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.