37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 825010 |
Time | |
Date | 200902 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Large Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Mininum Equipment List (MEL) |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Maintenance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural MEL |
Narrative:
This report is related to the abuse of the intent of the MEL by air carrier X. I believe the intent of the MEL is to allow an aircraft with certain non-critical items inoperative to be flown from a location where no maintenance or parts are available to a location where maintenance can be performed. There appears to be a trend developing where air carrier X is deferring maintenance items in order to maintain its on-time schedule integrity rather than incurring the delay it will take to fix the item; even when maintenance and parts are available at a maintenance hub. A specific example is as follows: feb/09; flight ZZZ-ZZZ1. During the preflight inspection; the first officer noted that the outboard tire on the right main landing gear had an area approximately 12 inches x 12 inches of exposed steel protector ply. Maintenance was notified. After inspecting the tire; maintenance stated that the tire was deferrable per the MEL and it was their intent to defer the item. A discussion ensued between the captain and the mechanics involved. The captain stated that he was going to refuse the aircraft for safety reasons. Maintenance completed the deferral on the tire and the captain notified dispatch of the refusal. The tire was then replaced and the flight departed 27 minutes late. The concern is: why was the tire being deferred when obviously maintenance and parts were available? While the tire was being replaced; one of the mechanics brought the captain a copy of the MEL that they were using to defer the item. Reading the MEL only furthered the concern over this practice of deferring items; even when parts and maintenance are available. The MEL reads as follows: visual inspection of the tires -- remove the wheel when the tire is worn to the base of any groove in any location or if you can see any reinforcing material (metal or fabric). Tire wear characteristics (2) worn beyond limits -- if the tire is worn beyond the base of any groove in any location or if you can see the steel protector ply; it should be replaced. Note: if the protector ply becomes visible; the tire may continue in service for a maximum of 8 landings provided it does not wear to the first textile cord. Replacement is required prior to further flight if a textile cord becomes visible. Maintenance was using the above referenced note as the basis for deferring the tire and obviously disregarding the other areas of the MEL that clearly state that the tire should be replaced. The problem with the note is that how does anyone know how many landings have already taken place with the tire in that condition before it was noticed during a preflight inspection? I believe the intent of the note is to allow the aircraft to be flown to a location where repairs can be made; not to continue in service for 8 more landings in order to maintain on-time performance and schedule integrity. Is air carrier management really willing to gamble a hull loss over something as simple as replacing a tire? I believe maintenance is under some sort of directive from management that if repairing an item will cause a delay and the item can be legally deferred; then maintenance is to defer the item rather than repair it. Apparently on-time performance now takes precedence over safety. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated his carrier tracks pilots who delay or refuse an aircraft for any reason. That policy has affected the morale of many pilots; while feeling they are now the only ones questioning an aircraft's safety.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A Captain of an A320 raises concerns about his carrier abusing the MEL procedures and not repairing their aircraft; when maintenance and parts were available.
Narrative: This report is related to the abuse of the intent of the MEL by Air Carrier X. I believe the intent of the MEL is to allow an aircraft with certain non-critical items inoperative to be flown from a location where no maintenance or parts are available to a location where maintenance can be performed. There appears to be a trend developing where Air Carrier X is deferring maintenance items in order to maintain its on-time schedule integrity rather than incurring the delay it will take to fix the item; even when maintenance and parts are available at a maintenance hub. A specific example is as follows: Feb/09; Flight ZZZ-ZZZ1. During the preflight inspection; the First Officer noted that the outboard tire on the right main landing gear had an area approximately 12 inches x 12 inches of exposed steel protector ply. Maintenance was notified. After inspecting the tire; Maintenance stated that the tire was deferrable per the MEL and it was their intent to defer the item. A discussion ensued between the Captain and the mechanics involved. The Captain stated that he was going to refuse the aircraft for safety reasons. Maintenance completed the deferral on the tire and the Captain notified dispatch of the refusal. The tire was then replaced and the flight departed 27 minutes late. The concern is: Why was the tire being deferred when obviously maintenance and parts were available? While the tire was being replaced; one of the mechanics brought the Captain a copy of the MEL that they were using to defer the item. Reading the MEL only furthered the concern over this practice of deferring items; even when parts and maintenance are available. The MEL reads as follows: Visual inspection of the tires -- remove the wheel when the tire is worn to the base of any groove in any location or if you can see any reinforcing material (metal or fabric). Tire wear characteristics (2) worn beyond limits -- if the tire is worn beyond the base of any groove in any location or if you can see the steel protector ply; it should be replaced. Note: If the protector ply becomes visible; the tire may continue in service for a maximum of 8 landings provided it does not wear to the first textile cord. Replacement is required prior to further flight if a textile cord becomes visible. Maintenance was using the above referenced note as the basis for deferring the tire and obviously disregarding the other areas of the MEL that clearly state that the tire should be replaced. The problem with the note is that how does anyone know how many landings have already taken place with the tire in that condition before it was noticed during a preflight inspection? I believe the intent of the note is to allow the aircraft to be flown to a location where repairs can be made; not to continue in service for 8 more landings in order to maintain on-time performance and schedule integrity. Is air carrier management really willing to gamble a hull loss over something as simple as replacing a tire? I believe maintenance is under some sort of directive from management that if repairing an item will cause a delay and the item can be legally deferred; then maintenance is to defer the item rather than repair it. Apparently on-time performance now takes precedence over safety. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: Reporter stated his carrier tracks pilots who delay or refuse an aircraft for any reason. That policy has affected the morale of many pilots; while feeling they are now the only ones questioning an aircraft's safety.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.