Narrative:

Fatigue issue actually started during takeoff the flight before. As the pilot flying; I elected to use toga for takeoff; LLWS alert in effect but none reported. Crew set mct/flex at takeoff after 80 KTS ECAM warning appeared throttle position. First officer verified power setting was good and we continued. It wasn't until 1;200 with climb power selected that we both realize that toga was not set. In the departure briefing; I verified toga was to be used and requested that the power be set/checked by 80 KTS. The rest of the flight was normal; minimum radio traffic at XA00; until we started descent in to ZZZ. 2 radio calls were missed and one; during approach; required verification 3 times for heading and altitude change. Considered calling out fatigue in ZZZ; not wanting to cause a system delay; after a cup of coffee and aircraft preparation I felt that the ZZZ to ZZZ1 leg could be made safely. At pushback; missed the before start checklist call. After engine start; missed the taxi light; brake pressure check and taxi instructions. The first officer was alert and said he was not fatigued and we continued. After takeoff; a few missed calls but no serious issue. Asked the first officer to verify all settings and readbacks. Advised the company by ACARS that I would need to be replaced in ZZZ1 for the ZZZZ turn. This flight meets all far requirements; but is not safe by any standard. Scheduling is exposing the crew to 3 low operation performance periods; 2 of which are in 1 duty period. In NASA's testimony before congress; they reported: 'the period 3-5 am is a circadian low point for performance and alertness. During this time; the brain triggers sleep and sleepiness. The other period of increased sleepiness is roughly 3-5 pm. This continued shifting of work cycles; night/day; day/night and 4 legs duty period that start on the back side; 3-5 am; continuing through the 3-5 pm period in the same duty period will result in an incident or accident.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 Captain describes the procedural and clearance deviations that he suffered before declaring fatigue and removing himself from the pairing.

Narrative: Fatigue issue actually started during takeoff the flight before. As the pilot flying; I elected to use TOGA for takeoff; LLWS alert in effect but none reported. Crew set MCT/FLEX at takeoff after 80 KTS ECAM warning appeared throttle position. First Officer verified power setting was good and we continued. It wasn't until 1;200 with climb power selected that we both realize that TOGA was not set. In the departure briefing; I verified TOGA was to be used and requested that the power be set/checked by 80 KTS. The rest of the flight was normal; minimum radio traffic at XA00; until we started descent in to ZZZ. 2 radio calls were missed and one; during approach; required verification 3 times for heading and altitude change. Considered calling out fatigue in ZZZ; not wanting to cause a system delay; after a cup of coffee and aircraft preparation I felt that the ZZZ to ZZZ1 leg could be made safely. At pushback; missed the Before Start checklist call. After engine start; missed the taxi light; brake pressure check and taxi instructions. The First Officer was alert and said he was not fatigued and we continued. After takeoff; a few missed calls but no serious issue. Asked the First Officer to verify all settings and readbacks. Advised the company by ACARS that I would need to be replaced in ZZZ1 for the ZZZZ turn. This flight meets all FAR requirements; but is not safe by any standard. Scheduling is exposing the crew to 3 low operation performance periods; 2 of which are in 1 duty period. In NASA's testimony before Congress; they reported: 'The period 3-5 AM is a circadian low point for performance and alertness. During this time; the brain triggers sleep and sleepiness. The other period of increased sleepiness is roughly 3-5 PM. This continued shifting of work cycles; night/day; day/night and 4 legs duty period that start on the back side; 3-5 AM; continuing through the 3-5 PM period in the same duty period will result in an incident or accident.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.