Narrative:

Inbound to hhr on an IFR flight plan from psp, cleared for (and accepted) a visual approach to hhr runway 25 at 1500'. Vectored south of the hhr VOR approach course by lax approach in very hazy and marginal visibility conditions. Suddenly was commanded by lax approach to 'climb immediately to 2000! Opp direction traffic at 12 O'clock, less than 1 mi, type and altitude unknown.' initiated straight ahead climb and observed traffic emerge from haze about 500' ahead, to the left and below my aircraft. Subsequently, approach vectored me east at 2000', but I was forced to climb to 2200' to avoid northbound traffic at or near 2000' which was unreported. Returned to 2000', accepted, cleared for and executed the VOR approach to hhr runway 25. The entire situation was a consequence of bad judgement on the part of lax approach for giving me the visual approach in such marginal conditions, and my less-than-good judgement in accepting it. A single engine small aircraft had, just before my approach, experienced great difficulty locating the airport as a consequence of the poor visibility and the fact that the sun was directly in the eyes of all aircraft approaching from the east. The judgement error in stipulating a visual approach was caused, according to lax TRACON's supervisor with whom I spoke by telephone immediately following the near collision, by their desire to maximize traffic flow into lax, and the requirement that the hhr VOR approach be interspersed with arriving lax ILS traffic. In fact, all approachs to lax were for the ILS approachs. Additionally, the inexcusable delay in reactivating the hhr localizer 25 approach (the localizer has been OTS for almost 8 months!) is a direct cause for the issuance of the visual approach by lax approach, even in continuing marginal conditions: on 3/tue, only 48 hours later, with visibility reported as 5 mi, but with conditions virtually the same, I was again given a visual to hhr 25! This time I refused to accept it and requested and was given the VOR approach after a minor delay. I was, however, pressured by approach to fly the approach at a higher than normal IAS. Both on sat, when the near collision occurred, and on tue, the airport was sighted at a distance of 2.0 mi, according to our LORAN C. Hhr was reporting VFR conditions in both instances, so clearly the sun was causing the reduced visibility. Finally, the extremely poor judgement of lax approach in the course vector must be mentioned: with hhr VFR, using runway 25 and a left hand pattern, any downwind departure (the course being taken by the aircraft with which I nearly collided) would put that aircraft south of hhr, east or sebnd, climbing out of pattern altitude. Giving me, an inbound to hhr, a course south of the lax 081 degree right, at 1500', puts me on a northwest course, intersecting with the above-described east or sebnd traffic. Had I been on the VOR approach, hhr would have had to hold its departing traffic on the ground, vector it away from me, or advise lax approach to do so. The system did not work simply because of the pressure on the controller to expedite arrs at lax, and the mistaken belief that they could squeeze another visual into hhr. That this attitude and mindset still continues is evidenced by the repetition of the approach instructions received from lax approach on tue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NEAR COLLISION BETWEEN SMT AND SMA WHILE SMT WAS ON VISUAL APCH.

Narrative: INBOUND TO HHR ON AN IFR FLT PLAN FROM PSP, CLRED FOR (AND ACCEPTED) A VISUAL APCH TO HHR RWY 25 AT 1500'. VECTORED S OF THE HHR VOR APCH COURSE BY LAX APCH IN VERY HAZY AND MARGINAL VIS CONDITIONS. SUDDENLY WAS COMMANDED BY LAX APCH TO 'CLB IMMEDIATELY TO 2000! OPP DIRECTION TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK, LESS THAN 1 MI, TYPE AND ALT UNKNOWN.' INITIATED STRAIGHT AHEAD CLB AND OBSERVED TFC EMERGE FROM HAZE ABOUT 500' AHEAD, TO THE LEFT AND BELOW MY ACFT. SUBSEQUENTLY, APCH VECTORED ME E AT 2000', BUT I WAS FORCED TO CLB TO 2200' TO AVOID NBOUND TFC AT OR NEAR 2000' WHICH WAS UNREPORTED. RETURNED TO 2000', ACCEPTED, CLRED FOR AND EXECUTED THE VOR APCH TO HHR RWY 25. THE ENTIRE SITUATION WAS A CONSEQUENCE OF BAD JUDGEMENT ON THE PART OF LAX APCH FOR GIVING ME THE VISUAL APCH IN SUCH MARGINAL CONDITIONS, AND MY LESS-THAN-GOOD JUDGEMENT IN ACCEPTING IT. A SINGLE ENG SMA HAD, JUST BEFORE MY APCH, EXPERIENCED GREAT DIFFICULTY LOCATING THE ARPT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE POOR VIS AND THE FACT THAT THE SUN WAS DIRECTLY IN THE EYES OF ALL ACFT APCHING FROM THE E. THE JUDGEMENT ERROR IN STIPULATING A VISUAL APCH WAS CAUSED, ACCORDING TO LAX TRACON'S SUPVR WITH WHOM I SPOKE BY TELEPHONE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE NEAR COLLISION, BY THEIR DESIRE TO MAXIMIZE TFC FLOW INTO LAX, AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE HHR VOR APCH BE INTERSPERSED WITH ARRIVING LAX ILS TFC. IN FACT, ALL APCHS TO LAX WERE FOR THE ILS APCHS. ADDITIONALLY, THE INEXCUSABLE DELAY IN REACTIVATING THE HHR LOC 25 APCH (THE LOC HAS BEEN OTS FOR ALMOST 8 MONTHS!) IS A DIRECT CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE VISUAL APCH BY LAX APCH, EVEN IN CONTINUING MARGINAL CONDITIONS: ON 3/TUE, ONLY 48 HRS LATER, WITH VIS RPTED AS 5 MI, BUT WITH CONDITIONS VIRTUALLY THE SAME, I WAS AGAIN GIVEN A VISUAL TO HHR 25! THIS TIME I REFUSED TO ACCEPT IT AND REQUESTED AND WAS GIVEN THE VOR APCH AFTER A MINOR DELAY. I WAS, HOWEVER, PRESSURED BY APCH TO FLY THE APCH AT A HIGHER THAN NORMAL IAS. BOTH ON SAT, WHEN THE NEAR COLLISION OCCURRED, AND ON TUE, THE ARPT WAS SIGHTED AT A DISTANCE OF 2.0 MI, ACCORDING TO OUR LORAN C. HHR WAS RPTING VFR CONDITIONS IN BOTH INSTANCES, SO CLEARLY THE SUN WAS CAUSING THE REDUCED VIS. FINALLY, THE EXTREMELY POOR JUDGEMENT OF LAX APCH IN THE COURSE VECTOR MUST BE MENTIONED: WITH HHR VFR, USING RWY 25 AND A LEFT HAND PATTERN, ANY DOWNWIND DEP (THE COURSE BEING TAKEN BY THE ACFT WITH WHICH I NEARLY COLLIDED) WOULD PUT THAT ACFT S OF HHR, E OR SEBND, CLBING OUT OF PATTERN ALT. GIVING ME, AN INBOUND TO HHR, A COURSE S OF THE LAX 081 DEG R, AT 1500', PUTS ME ON A NW COURSE, INTERSECTING WITH THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED E OR SEBND TFC. HAD I BEEN ON THE VOR APCH, HHR WOULD HAVE HAD TO HOLD ITS DEPARTING TFC ON THE GND, VECTOR IT AWAY FROM ME, OR ADVISE LAX APCH TO DO SO. THE SYS DID NOT WORK SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURE ON THE CTLR TO EXPEDITE ARRS AT LAX, AND THE MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT THEY COULD SQUEEZE ANOTHER VISUAL INTO HHR. THAT THIS ATTITUDE AND MINDSET STILL CONTINUES IS EVIDENCED BY THE REPETITION OF THE APCH INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM LAX APCH ON TUE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.