Narrative:

I was in contact with monterey approach for several mins prior to incident. Radar contact was established and a discrete code was given. I was also sending mode C information. I was about to begin a VFR descent when I spotted the other aircraft (an small aircraft) coming within 5 degrees of head on at my altitude. There was insufficient time to initiate evasive action, however I could tell we would miss. The other aircraft did not take evasive action either. My aircraft was traveling at 125 KTS true airspeed and my position and strobe lights were on. This is especially distressing due to the presence of TRSA service and the fact that both aircraft had been in contact with monterey approach. The other aircraft had just departed monterey and had been asked to squawk 1200 and service was terminated a few moments before the incident. Also heard on the frequency shortly before the incident was the controller asking for altitude verification from the other aircraft. The pilot responded 5500'. As the other aircraft left he requested altitude readout. The controller responded 6300'. The controller released the aircraft based on a incorrect mode C readout that had been verified. The aircraft was actually still within the TRSA at 5500'. Traffic level at the time was not especially high, I noted one IFR arrival during the sequence. The controller had a very difficult time communicating a transponder code assignment to what sounded like a student pilot shortly before the incident. In closing, it is clear that see and be seen simply is not effective. To spot a small aircraft head on at same altitude is extremely difficult. The TRSA concept failed to work.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TWO SMA'S HAVE NMAC IN VICINITY OF MRY.

Narrative: I WAS IN CONTACT WITH MONTEREY APCH FOR SEVERAL MINS PRIOR TO INCIDENT. RADAR CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED AND A DISCRETE CODE WAS GIVEN. I WAS ALSO SENDING MODE C INFO. I WAS ABOUT TO BEGIN A VFR DSCNT WHEN I SPOTTED THE OTHER ACFT (AN SMA) COMING WITHIN 5 DEGS OF HEAD ON AT MY ALT. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT TIME TO INITIATE EVASIVE ACTION, HOWEVER I COULD TELL WE WOULD MISS. THE OTHER ACFT DID NOT TAKE EVASIVE ACTION EITHER. MY ACFT WAS TRAVELING AT 125 KTS TRUE AIRSPD AND MY POS AND STROBE LIGHTS WERE ON. THIS IS ESPECIALLY DISTRESSING DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF TRSA SVC AND THE FACT THAT BOTH ACFT HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH MONTEREY APCH. THE OTHER ACFT HAD JUST DEPARTED MONTEREY AND HAD BEEN ASKED TO SQUAWK 1200 AND SVC WAS TERMINATED A FEW MOMENTS BEFORE THE INCIDENT. ALSO HEARD ON THE FREQ SHORTLY BEFORE THE INCIDENT WAS THE CTLR ASKING FOR ALT VERIFICATION FROM THE OTHER ACFT. THE PLT RESPONDED 5500'. AS THE OTHER ACFT LEFT HE REQUESTED ALT READOUT. THE CTLR RESPONDED 6300'. THE CTLR RELEASED THE ACFT BASED ON A INCORRECT MODE C READOUT THAT HAD BEEN VERIFIED. THE ACFT WAS ACTUALLY STILL WITHIN THE TRSA AT 5500'. TFC LEVEL AT THE TIME WAS NOT ESPECIALLY HIGH, I NOTED ONE IFR ARR DURING THE SEQUENCE. THE CTLR HAD A VERY DIFFICULT TIME COMMUNICATING A TRANSPONDER CODE ASSIGNMENT TO WHAT SOUNDED LIKE A STUDENT PLT SHORTLY BEFORE THE INCIDENT. IN CLOSING, IT IS CLR THAT SEE AND BE SEEN SIMPLY IS NOT EFFECTIVE. TO SPOT A SMA HEAD ON AT SAME ALT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. THE TRSA CONCEPT FAILED TO WORK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.