Narrative:

Flight on 3/thu/88 was my first online flight as copilot in any capacity or with this captain. The WX at indianapolis international was light rain and snow, visibility 1 1/2-2 mi. After landing runway 4L I contacted ground and received a clearance to taxi to gate, but this was quickly amended to taxi via runway 4L due to an aircraft on the parallel taxiway. The captain stopped short of runway 4L and I asked the ground controller if we were cleared to taxi onto runway 4L. Ground said 'standby' and then cleared us to taxi runway 4L and, I believe, hold short of runway 31. I looked at the captain and asked if he understood the clearance. He nodded affirmatively and was already starting the taxi roll. I had been to ind only 3 times total in the previous 2 weeks and was depending heavily on visual cues such as signs and taxi or hold lines. My initial orientation was confused once we started taxiing on runway 4L and the time interval to the intersecting runway was such that I didn't orientate to our position until I looked right and saw the runway edge lighting and an aircraft apparently initiating a takeoff roll. As I started to tell the captain of our position, ground control called and said, 'confirm holding short 31.' by this time we were approaching the runway centerline, the captain used his radio to apologize to ground and continued across the runway. As I looked back down the runway the aircraft was 50' in climb approximately 1500' away. In retrospect of the incident I have some suggestions on corrective action. One would be to install and require the use of voice activated intercoms with noise attenuating headsets and push to talk switches for any high noise level aircraft cockpit with 2 pilots. This reduces the communication workload and makes it easier to communication between pilots. Also some type of sign or hold lines at runway intxns, if those runways are to be used for taxi, would have aided me in quicker identify of position at this unfamiliar field. Supplemental information from acn 83290: there was some confusion as to whether I was to hold short of runway 4L. Ground control said to hold short and standby. After several aircraft movements on runway 4L I understood ground control to say, 'taxi down 4L hold short of 31.' I taxied onto runway 4L, and for reasons that are very unclr to me I entered runway 31. If taxi operations are going to be conducted on runways crossing runways, then having yellow hold short lines on the runways could help. Maybe that one additional visual cue might have down the trick. Ground control asked me to telephone the tower, which I did.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR-MDT UNAUTH RWY CROSSING AS ACFT WAS ON TKOF ROLL.

Narrative: FLT ON 3/THU/88 WAS MY FIRST ONLINE FLT AS COPLT IN ANY CAPACITY OR WITH THIS CAPT. THE WX AT INDIANAPOLIS INTL WAS LIGHT RAIN AND SNOW, VIS 1 1/2-2 MI. AFTER LNDG RWY 4L I CONTACTED GND AND RECEIVED A CLRNC TO TAXI TO GATE, BUT THIS WAS QUICKLY AMENDED TO TAXI VIA RWY 4L DUE TO AN ACFT ON THE PARALLEL TXWY. THE CAPT STOPPED SHORT OF RWY 4L AND I ASKED THE GND CTLR IF WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI ONTO RWY 4L. GND SAID 'STANDBY' AND THEN CLRED US TO TAXI RWY 4L AND, I BELIEVE, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 31. I LOOKED AT THE CAPT AND ASKED IF HE UNDERSTOOD THE CLRNC. HE NODDED AFFIRMATIVELY AND WAS ALREADY STARTING THE TAXI ROLL. I HAD BEEN TO IND ONLY 3 TIMES TOTAL IN THE PREVIOUS 2 WKS AND WAS DEPENDING HEAVILY ON VISUAL CUES SUCH AS SIGNS AND TAXI OR HOLD LINES. MY INITIAL ORIENTATION WAS CONFUSED ONCE WE STARTED TAXIING ON RWY 4L AND THE TIME INTERVAL TO THE INTERSECTING RWY WAS SUCH THAT I DIDN'T ORIENTATE TO OUR POS UNTIL I LOOKED RIGHT AND SAW THE RWY EDGE LIGHTING AND AN ACFT APPARENTLY INITIATING A TKOF ROLL. AS I STARTED TO TELL THE CAPT OF OUR POS, GND CTL CALLED AND SAID, 'CONFIRM HOLDING SHORT 31.' BY THIS TIME WE WERE APCHING THE RWY CENTERLINE, THE CAPT USED HIS RADIO TO APOLOGIZE TO GND AND CONTINUED ACROSS THE RWY. AS I LOOKED BACK DOWN THE RWY THE ACFT WAS 50' IN CLB APPROX 1500' AWAY. IN RETROSPECT OF THE INCIDENT I HAVE SOME SUGGESTIONS ON CORRECTIVE ACTION. ONE WOULD BE TO INSTALL AND REQUIRE THE USE OF VOICE ACTIVATED INTERCOMS WITH NOISE ATTENUATING HEADSETS AND PUSH TO TALK SWITCHES FOR ANY HIGH NOISE LEVEL ACFT COCKPIT WITH 2 PLTS. THIS REDUCES THE COM WORKLOAD AND MAKES IT EASIER TO COM BTWN PLTS. ALSO SOME TYPE OF SIGN OR HOLD LINES AT RWY INTXNS, IF THOSE RWYS ARE TO BE USED FOR TAXI, WOULD HAVE AIDED ME IN QUICKER IDENT OF POS AT THIS UNFAMILIAR FIELD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 83290: THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION AS TO WHETHER I WAS TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4L. GND CTL SAID TO HOLD SHORT AND STANDBY. AFTER SEVERAL ACFT MOVEMENTS ON RWY 4L I UNDERSTOOD GND CTL TO SAY, 'TAXI DOWN 4L HOLD SHORT OF 31.' I TAXIED ONTO RWY 4L, AND FOR REASONS THAT ARE VERY UNCLR TO ME I ENTERED RWY 31. IF TAXI OPS ARE GOING TO BE CONDUCTED ON RWYS XING RWYS, THEN HAVING YELLOW HOLD SHORT LINES ON THE RWYS COULD HELP. MAYBE THAT ONE ADDITIONAL VISUAL CUE MIGHT HAVE DOWN THE TRICK. GND CTL ASKED ME TO TELEPHONE THE TWR, WHICH I DID.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.