Narrative:

On final approach upon selecting landing gear down; several ECAM procedures were displayed along with their associated aural alerts. On the captains pfd; use man pitch trim was displayed briefly. As the pilot flying; I continued the approach while trying to assess the situation. The first officer remarked that during the initial cautions; the direct law ECAM procedure was displayed for a short period of time. He also remarked that several ECAM procedures were subsequently displayed in rapid succession; but could not recall what they were as they were rapidly changing. Eventually; the following ECAM procedures were displayed: F/control-slats locked; wing tip brakes on; automatic flight-automatic thrust off; thrust levers move. A go-around was executed at approximately 1500 afe (best guess) after coordinating with tower and addressing the auto thrust loss. Instructions were received from tower to a specified heading (southerly) and to maintain 3000 ft. The decision was made to execute a go-around because of reduced slat extension; and the required adjustment to the landing distance (8000 feet in length). During the go-around; the gear was raised; but the flaps were not moved for the obvious reason. The slats were positioned between the first and second dot in amber (QRH flaps=3: slats between 1 and 3) upon gear extension; with subsequent cautions/warnings; all of the following were lost: autopilot (attempts were made by me to engage both autopilots-one at a time- while on approach as well as later on during the flight) auto thrust (same as above). On both pfd's the following displays were lost: flight directors; all speed reference displays on the speed tape (F speed; green dot; vfe next; overspeed warning; vref; and stall warning). There were no X's to indicate direct law; but neither were there whiskers. Since there was no flight director guidance during the go-around; I maintained 10 to 20 KTS above the selected speed of 150 KTS. After established at 3000 ft; I called for ECAM actions. The procedure was accomplished and cleared; and the status page was checked (there was nothing on the sts page other than normal indications). I then directed the first officer to check for any follow up items in the QRH; which led us to F/control slats locked. At this point I made the decision to transfer aircraft control; and assigned the communication and flying duties to him. The QRH procedures were followed; and the new approach speed calculated; as well as applying the new landing distance. Up to this point; the information we had relayed to approach control was that we were working on a flight control problem. After accomplishing the QRH procedures; I gave the controller the required information; declared an emergency; and requested the emergency equipment. Shortly thereafter; I briefed the crew and passengers that we would be making a normal landing. I also briefed them that the emergency equipment would be present; not to be alarmed; and that we would be taxing to the gate. (As a footnote and to weigh all my options; I checked twice to see if any FCC lights were illuminated; and preformed a light test; while considering a computer reset to recover the autopilot etc. To avoid direct law when the gear was lowered. I referenced the QRH; which states that when resetting a computer in-flight; as a general rule; the crew must restrict computer resets to those listed in the computer reset table. I chose not to attempt a reset (not in reset table) in the event that doing so would compound the situation with unknown results. Additionally; I felt comfortable with the aircraft in its current configuration. I then took over as pilot flying and directed the first officer to review the QRH procedures I had accomplished as a backup; and then to reference the ECAM supplemental manual. A call to operations was then made; and an ACARS message was sent. Satisfied that we had thoroughly and correctly accomplished all the sops we then made preparationsfor the approach. Longest runway was chosen. A 15-mile final was requested; and the gear was lowered early to prepare for direct law in the event that it occurred. It did not; and a flaps 3 hand flown visual approach was made to a normal touchdown with auto brakes on med. Flaps were not retracted during taxi in. Maintenance conferred with maintenance control; tests were run; the aircraft was powered down; the flaps/slats were cycled several times; the condition could not be duplicated; there was no history; and the aircraft was released for flight. The condition did not reoccur during the next flight. The obvious question is how a slats locked condition resulted in the loss of the other components listed above. In my opinion; this should be reported to airbus industries to see if there is a software problem that caused this condition to occur. Had weather conditions not been ideal; a divert may have been required in order to execute a hand flown approach to CAT 1 minimums.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 Captain reports slats locked during approach with numerous secondary automation failures that should not have occurred. ECAM and QRH procedures were complied with and an uneventful landing ensued.

Narrative: On final approach upon selecting landing gear down; several ECAM procedures were displayed along with their associated aural alerts. On the Captains PFD; USE MAN PITCH TRIM was displayed briefly. As the pilot flying; I continued the approach while trying to assess the situation. The First Officer remarked that during the initial cautions; the DIRECT LAW ECAM procedure was displayed for a short period of time. He also remarked that several ECAM procedures were subsequently displayed in rapid succession; but could not recall what they were as they were rapidly changing. Eventually; the following ECAM procedures were displayed: F/CTL-SLATS LOCKED; Wing tip brakes on; AUTO FLT-AUTO THRUST OFF; Thrust levers move. A go-around was executed at approximately 1500 AFE (best guess) after coordinating with tower and addressing the auto thrust loss. Instructions were received from tower to a specified heading (southerly) and to maintain 3000 FT. The decision was made to execute a go-around because of reduced slat extension; and the required adjustment to the landing distance (8000 feet in length). During the go-around; the gear was raised; but the flaps were not moved for the obvious reason. The slats were positioned between the first and second dot in amber (QRH FLAPS=3: SLATS between 1 and 3) Upon gear extension; with subsequent cautions/warnings; all of the following were lost: Autopilot (attempts were made by me to engage both autopilots-one at a time- while on approach as well as later on during the flight) Auto Thrust (same as above). On both PFD's the following displays were lost: Flight Directors; all speed reference displays on the speed tape (F Speed; Green Dot; VFE next; Overspeed Warning; VREF; and Stall Warning). There were no X's to indicate direct law; but neither were there whiskers. Since there was no flight director guidance during the go-around; I maintained 10 to 20 KTS above the selected speed of 150 KTS. After established at 3000 FT; I called for ECAM actions. The procedure was accomplished and cleared; and the status page was checked (there was nothing on the STS page other than normal indications). I then directed the First Officer to check for any follow up items in the QRH; which led us to F/CTL SLATS LOCKED. At this point I made the decision to transfer aircraft control; and assigned the communication and flying duties to him. The QRH procedures were followed; and the new approach speed calculated; as well as applying the new landing distance. Up to this point; the information we had relayed to approach control was that we were working on a flight control problem. After accomplishing the QRH procedures; I gave the controller the required information; declared an emergency; and requested the emergency equipment. Shortly thereafter; I briefed the crew and passengers that we would be making a normal landing. I also briefed them that the emergency equipment would be present; not to be alarmed; and that we would be taxing to the gate. (As a footnote and to weigh all my options; I checked twice to see if any FCC lights were illuminated; and preformed a light test; while considering a computer reset to recover the autopilot etc. to avoid Direct Law when the gear was lowered. I referenced the QRH; which states that when resetting a computer in-flight; as a general rule; the crew must restrict computer resets to those listed in the Computer Reset Table. I chose not to attempt a reset (not in reset table) in the event that doing so would compound the situation with unknown results. Additionally; I felt comfortable with the aircraft in its current configuration. I then took over as pilot flying and directed the First Officer to review the QRH procedures I had accomplished as a backup; and then to reference the ECAM Supplemental Manual. A call to operations was then made; and an ACARS message was sent. Satisfied that we had thoroughly and correctly accomplished all the SOPs we then made preparationsfor the approach. Longest runway was chosen. A 15-mile final was requested; and the gear was lowered early to prepare for Direct Law in the event that it occurred. It did not; and a Flaps 3 hand flown visual approach was made to a normal touchdown with Auto Brakes on MED. Flaps were not retracted during taxi in. Maintenance conferred with Maintenance Control; tests were run; the aircraft was powered down; the flaps/slats were cycled several times; the condition could not be duplicated; there was no history; and the aircraft was released for flight. The condition did not reoccur during the next flight. The obvious question is how a SLATS LOCKED condition resulted in the loss of the other components listed above. In my opinion; this should be reported to Airbus Industries to see if there is a software problem that caused this condition to occur. Had weather conditions not been ideal; a divert may have been required in order to execute a hand flown approach to CAT 1 minimums.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.