Narrative:

We were on an instrument training flight on an IFR flight plan and in VFR conditions. While accomplishing the missed approach procedure contained in the localizer/DME back course B approach into the yakima airport chinook approach cleared us to enter the hold at 4500 ft or below. Chinook approach was also vectoring a VFR single engine who was over selah and heading south for a simulated ILS approach into yakima airport. Since the other aircraft was ahead of us we were cleared to enter the published hold. Our plan was to fly the VOR approach next and had to wait for the other aircraft to clear. The hold offered a good training opportunity and time to set up for the next approach. Chinook approach was issuing traffic alerts to both us and the other single engine however we were in a slow climb and had our back to the overtaking traffic. We could not see the target. I had assumed that since chinook approach was handling both aircraft that he would vector the other plane around us since we were on an IFR flight plan. While working with the flight computer to enter the hold I noticed a TA alert and looked in the area indicated by TCAS and saw the passing warrior overhead. According to TCAS it passed 400 ft above us. At that moment chinook approach made another traffic alert to aircraft Y who claimed to had of seen us. During the radio transmission from chinook I heard the alarm going off in the background indicating the close converging situation. At the time the event took place my student and I were deeply involved with entering the hold and were having difficulty with the flight computer. Background noise in the intercom; exchanges with my student and frequent radio communications made it difficult to hear and comprehend all the instructions that were being given to the other aircraft. During the heavy workload I lost track of what aircraft Y was doing and assumed that ATC was working to keep us separated. We were at our assigned altitude and flying the procedure that we were cleared to do however somehow the other single engine ended up in our airspace. The radio transmissions that followed between ATC and aircraft Y suggested that somehow we were at fault. Perhaps we missed an instruction from ATC or had incorrectly interpreted a direction however there were no urgent calls from chinook approach to instruct us to do anything different. During a time of high work load pilots tend to shed functions that do not seem to be a priority. My goal at the time was to help my student to understand his aircraft better by utilizing his flight management computer to properly enter the hold. In an effort to maximize the training benefit that the hold entry offered I neglected to assess a positive understanding of the unfolding situation that ATC was having with the other aircraft. A better reaction from me should have been to have given a higher priority to understanding where the other plane was and what it was doing. I should not have assumed that ATC would take responsibility to separate the VFR plane from us since we were on an IFR flight plan. I failed to recognize the danger of the high workload we were under and should of reduced our training goals at the moment until the situation had passed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Instructor and student pilot aboard a single engine aircraft on an IFR training flight suffer a close encounter with another VFR single.

Narrative: We were on an instrument training flight on an IFR flight plan and in VFR conditions. While accomplishing the missed approach procedure contained in the LOC/DME BC B approach into the Yakima airport Chinook approach cleared us to enter the hold at 4500 FT or below. Chinook Approach was also vectoring a VFR single engine who was over Selah and heading south for a simulated ILS approach into Yakima Airport. Since the other aircraft was ahead of us we were cleared to enter the published hold. Our plan was to fly the VOR approach next and had to wait for the other aircraft to clear. The hold offered a good training opportunity and time to set up for the next approach. Chinook Approach was issuing traffic alerts to both us and the other single engine however we were in a slow climb and had our back to the overtaking traffic. We could not see the target. I had assumed that since Chinook Approach was handling both aircraft that he would vector the other plane around us since we were on an IFR flight plan. While working with the flight computer to enter the hold I noticed a TA alert and looked in the area indicated by TCAS and saw the passing Warrior overhead. According to TCAS it passed 400 FT above us. At that moment Chinook Approach made another traffic alert to aircraft Y who claimed to had of seen us. During the radio transmission from Chinook I heard the alarm going off in the background indicating the close converging situation. At the time the event took place my student and I were deeply involved with entering the hold and were having difficulty with the flight computer. Background noise in the intercom; exchanges with my student and frequent radio communications made it difficult to hear and comprehend all the instructions that were being given to the other aircraft. During the heavy workload I lost track of what Aircraft Y was doing and assumed that ATC was working to keep us separated. We were at our assigned altitude and flying the procedure that we were cleared to do however somehow the other single engine ended up in our airspace. The radio transmissions that followed between ATC and Aircraft Y suggested that somehow we were at fault. Perhaps we missed an instruction from ATC or had incorrectly interpreted a direction however there were no urgent calls from Chinook approach to instruct us to do anything different. During a time of high work load pilots tend to shed functions that do not seem to be a priority. My goal at the time was to help my student to understand his aircraft better by utilizing his flight management computer to properly enter the hold. In an effort to maximize the training benefit that the hold entry offered I neglected to assess a positive understanding of the unfolding situation that ATC was having with the other aircraft. A better reaction from me should have been to have given a higher priority to understanding where the other plane was and what it was doing. I should not have assumed that ATC would take responsibility to separate the VFR plane from us since we were on an IFR flight plan. I failed to recognize the danger of the high workload we were under and should of reduced our training goals at the moment until the situation had passed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.