Narrative:

Early in the takeoff roll; after takeoff power had been set; I saw an amber light on the annunciator panel. I glanced at it and saw that it was the right engine fuel computer light. Briefly scanning the engine instruments; I noted right engine N1 at 99.5% and the itt needle above the red line; with the digital indication showing about 900 degrees and slowly increasing. By this time; airspeed was well in excess of 80 knots. I reduced power on the right engine to bring itt back below the takeoff limit and continued the takeoff. After leaving the terminal area and completing the after takeoff checklist; we performed the appropriate checklist for the failed fuel computer. Other than the fuel computer being inoperative; the engine continued to operate normally for the remainder of the flight. Upon completion of the flight; maintenance was notified and appropriate engine parameters from the itt excursion were recorded in the aircraft log. Although we brief that we will abort a takeoff for any reason on the call of the pilot flying or pilot not flying below 80 KTS; there generally isn't any need to abort for any of the amber lights on the annunciator panel. The increased N1 made me think of the engine runaways we have practiced at recurrent; for which my response has always been to continue the takeoff. In any case; by the time I had determined the exact nature of the problem to be able to take corrective action; we were well past 80 KTS at which point; with two running engines and no other known problems; I would not elect to abort the takeoff. I elected to continue the flight because; due to the brevity and relative severity of the itt excursion (i.e.; not very severe) and because the engine was otherwise operating normally; it did not seem necessary to divert or return. It occurred to me after the fact that instead of looking at the engine instruments and reducing power myself (briefly diverting my attention from the runway during takeoff); that I might have instead called out the annunciator to the pilot not flying and let him take action on it. But it seems likely to me that any abnormal communication during takeoff creates enormous potential for miscommunication; greater diversion of attention; and much bigger safety problems. Thinking of what to say; how to say it; and actually getting it out clearly would probably take longer than the even lasted anyway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Lear 35 Captain reports momentary ITT excursion during takeoff and continues after slight power reduction. Flight continues to destination where logbook entry is made. There is some question whether the flight should have continued or returned.

Narrative: Early in the takeoff roll; after takeoff power had been set; I saw an amber light on the annunciator panel. I glanced at it and saw that it was the right engine fuel computer light. Briefly scanning the engine instruments; I noted right engine N1 at 99.5% and the ITT needle above the red line; with the digital indication showing about 900 degrees and slowly increasing. By this time; airspeed was well in excess of 80 knots. I reduced power on the right engine to bring ITT back below the takeoff limit and continued the takeoff. After leaving the terminal area and completing the after takeoff checklist; we performed the appropriate checklist for the failed fuel computer. Other than the fuel computer being inoperative; the engine continued to operate normally for the remainder of the flight. Upon completion of the flight; maintenance was notified and appropriate engine parameters from the ITT excursion were recorded in the aircraft log. Although we brief that we will abort a takeoff for any reason on the call of the pilot flying or pilot not flying below 80 KTS; there generally isn't any need to abort for any of the amber lights on the annunciator panel. The increased N1 made me think of the engine runaways we have practiced at recurrent; for which my response has always been to continue the takeoff. In any case; by the time I had determined the exact nature of the problem to be able to take corrective action; we were well past 80 KTS at which point; with two running engines and no other known problems; I would not elect to abort the takeoff. I elected to continue the flight because; due to the brevity and relative severity of the ITT excursion (i.e.; not very severe) and because the engine was otherwise operating normally; it did not seem necessary to divert or return. It occurred to me after the fact that instead of looking at the engine instruments and reducing power myself (briefly diverting my attention from the runway during takeoff); that I might have instead called out the annunciator to the pilot not flying and let him take action on it. But it seems likely to me that any abnormal communication during takeoff creates enormous potential for miscommunication; greater diversion of attention; and much bigger safety problems. Thinking of what to say; how to say it; and actually getting it out clearly would probably take longer than the even lasted anyway.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.