Narrative:

Captain turned final to visually follow a lifeguard pilatus aircraft to runway. During the turn to final aircraft decelerated to clean maneuver airspeed at which time I asked 'ready for flaps 1?'; captain then called and received flaps 1. Aircraft continued to decelerate on final and I had to ask 'want more flaps?' as aircraft slowed below flaps 5 maneuver airspeed. I had to again prompt captain to call for flaps 15 due to slowing airspeed. It was apparent to me that airspeed was not being 'scanned' sufficiently and so became more of a focus point for me as we were now on below 2000 ft AGL and still closing on the pilatus ahead. With clearance to land; landing gear down; final flaps of 30 selected; and checklist complete; captain began to decelerate below the briefed vref +5 target airspeed. Company policy; says 'target airspeed is a minimum of vref +5 KTS.' it says pilot not flying should call out deviations. As aircraft decelerated to vref; I called 'there's vref' at which point the captain accelerated a few knots and came right back to just below vref as I called 'vref' with a bit more urgency. The captain accelerated briefly and slowed towards vref again and I said 'let's not fly vref; ok?' the captain replied; 'I'm going to fly vref'. As the aircraft's airspeed continued to diverge slightly on either side of vref; my attention is almost entirely devoted to ensuring the aircraft does not decelerate into a pre-stall buffet. As we are below 500 ft AGL at this point; I determine that to take control of the aircraft away from the captain is more hazardous to passengers and crew than guarding both power and the yoke for what appears to be an inevitable tower directed go around. My flight experience includes navy instructor time taking new pilots to the aircraft carrier and I felt that closely monitoring controls was the safest option. If we had been directed to go around; it would have taken a very aggressive power addition to avoid further aircraft deceleration as the attitude of the aircraft changed from descent to climb. The captain appeared to be fixated on landing despite having to disregard company policy; safety recommendation; and showed a total disregard for the first officer's concerns.additionally; the captain had violated both company policy and the far's the evening prior with me as first officer and ignored my voiced concerns in both cases. This is the most egregious case of willful violation of both fars and company policy that I have witnessed in 10 years of part 121 flying. The most dangerous element of this event is that he showed a total disregard for his very experienced co-pilots respectful input. This has been shown time and again to be a major factor in a large number of fatal airline mishaps. After the shutdown checklist was complete; I let the captain know the same. I also told him that he was taking chances with my life and the life of the passengers and that the policies and regulations were designed to prevent exactly that. He replied that he disagreed and mentioned the safety margin of 1.3 times the stall speed at vref. I didn't think I could remain civil while outlining a fraction of the reasons we need to maintain the safety margin. What needs to be done? I don't know. Pairing this captain with a weak first officer and a bad situation is a recipe for a mishap. The company has a great CRM program and a pretty straightforward policy on willful safety violations. I know that me and my family will never fly on an aircraft this captain pilots. I asked the company to pull the cockpit voice recorder recording when we got to the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 First Officer reports on a Captain who seemed oblivious to the First Officers concerns and inputs regarding airspeed during a visual approach behind a much slower aircraft.

Narrative: Captain turned final to visually follow a Lifeguard Pilatus aircraft to runway. During the turn to final aircraft decelerated to clean maneuver airspeed at which time I asked 'Ready for Flaps 1?'; Captain then called and received Flaps 1. Aircraft continued to decelerate on final and I had to ask 'Want more flaps?' as aircraft slowed below Flaps 5 maneuver airspeed. I had to again prompt Captain to call for Flaps 15 due to slowing airspeed. It was apparent to me that airspeed was not being 'scanned' sufficiently and so became more of a focus point for me as we were now on below 2000 FT AGL and still closing on the Pilatus ahead. With clearance to land; landing gear down; final flaps of 30 selected; and checklist complete; Captain began to decelerate below the briefed Vref +5 target airspeed. Company policy; says 'target airspeed is a minimum of Vref +5 KTS.' It says pilot not flying should call out deviations. As aircraft decelerated to Vref; I called 'There's Vref' at which point the Captain accelerated a few knots and came right back to just below Vref as I called 'Vref' with a bit more urgency. The Captain accelerated briefly and slowed towards Vref again and I said 'Let's not fly Vref; OK?' The Captain replied; 'I'm going to fly Vref'. As the aircraft's airspeed continued to diverge slightly on either side of Vref; my attention is almost entirely devoted to ensuring the aircraft does not decelerate into a pre-stall buffet. As we are below 500 FT AGL at this point; I determine that to take control of the aircraft away from the Captain is more hazardous to passengers and crew than guarding both power and the yoke for what appears to be an inevitable tower directed go around. My flight experience includes Navy instructor time taking new pilots to the aircraft carrier and I felt that closely monitoring controls was the safest option. If we had been directed to go around; it would have taken a very aggressive power addition to avoid further aircraft deceleration as the attitude of the aircraft changed from descent to climb. The Captain appeared to be fixated on landing despite having to disregard company policy; safety recommendation; and showed a total disregard for the First Officer's concerns.Additionally; the Captain had violated both company policy and the FAR's the evening prior with me as First Officer and ignored my voiced concerns in both cases. This is the most egregious case of willful violation of both FARs and company policy that I have witnessed in 10 years of Part 121 flying. The most dangerous element of this event is that he showed a total disregard for his very experienced co-pilots respectful input. This has been shown time and again to be a major factor in a large number of fatal airline mishaps. After the shutdown checklist was complete; I let the Captain know the same. I also told him that he was taking chances with my life and the life of the passengers and that the policies and regulations were designed to prevent exactly that. He replied that he disagreed and mentioned the safety margin of 1.3 times the stall speed at Vref. I didn't think I could remain civil while outlining a fraction of the reasons we need to maintain the safety margin. What needs to be done? I don't know. Pairing this Captain with a weak First Officer and a bad situation is a recipe for a mishap. The company has a great CRM program and a pretty straightforward policy on willful safety violations. I know that me and my family will never fly on an aircraft this Captain pilots. I asked the company to pull the cockpit voice recorder recording when we got to the gate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.