Narrative:

We started with an arduous & lengthy taxi to our departure runway for a quick reposition flight to smo only to last 15 minutes. With the weather reports provided by the company & available on ATIS; the smo metars showed no signs of concern; not even hinting the need for an IMC published missed approach. Smo ATIS indicated 6sm visibility in haze. Shortly after takeoff from lax; I gave a listen to the ATIS frequency one more time as part of the 'short segment' list of duties. It showed the data indicated above. With a few more keystrokes on the FMS & the setting of the landing speeds in the mfd; the 'short segment' checklist was completed. We were vectored to intercept the final approach course of the VOR or GPS-a for runway 21 at smo. Upon checking into tower frequency; we were cleared to land on runway 21; but we were assigned to report the runway in sight. On the final segment of the approach before reaching MDA (just prior to the map); we saw the runway & began an aggressive descent (fully configured & stabilized). At approximately 1 to 2 miles out; I reported 'runway insight' as required by the smo tower controller. Noteworthy: the ceiling & visibility was less than the VMC conditions advertised on the ATIS. When the descent became too aggressive to satisfy company sops; I called 'go around' & we executed the go-around. When I announced 'we are going around'; smo tower assigned us left-closed traffic 'with a tight turn south of the field' which inferred visual procedures. However; I replied; 'we are unable to make left traffic because we are IMC.' the smo tower controller reiterated 'make a tight pattern south of the field' followed by multiple traffic advisories to which I quickly replied 'we are now above the cloud layer; we are unable to maintain VMC; we need a frequency change to approach control for vectors back around for another go.' the controller on smo local tower position became frantic with heading & altitude instructions followed by anxious words like 'now' & 'immediately'. It appeared as if we were being radar vectored around close proximity traffic. Being a former tower controller myself; I did not feel comfortable with radar separation being provided by a VFR tower controller. Therefore; I reiterated the need to re-establish radio contact with 'so-cal approach' for radar vectors at another go at the VOR or GPS-a. After little more radio volleying; we were handed back to so-cal approach. I asked so-cal approach for 'alternate missed approach instructions'...to which the controller responded 'just execute the published missed'. I explained to her the conflicting VFR circle instructions given by smo tower earlier; but the so-cal controller reassured us IFR separation/protection for the published missed approach procedure should we need it again. We were subject to the same sequence of radar services; but this time to a normal approach to landing on runway 21 at smo with the same tower controller (this time demonstrating a more professional prowess and radio etiquette. We landed safely. Perhaps if I would have told smo tower that 'we are executing the published missed approach' we would have been received a little easier by the frazzled tower controller. We were planning to be in VMC for the approach so 'visual calls' were briefed. When the unlikely need for the go-around arose due to the late sighting of the runway; my 'go-around' call could have been amended with 'execute published missed approach'. Maybe a calculated vdp would have helped with planning the final approach. In all honesty; we were not ready for the missed approach...despite being fully configured & stabilized up to the final descent point.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Jet departure from LAX to SMO described a very confused go-around event because of weather conditions and confused ATC instructions; reporter indicated clearer communications on their part may have prevented the event.

Narrative: We started with an arduous & lengthy taxi to our departure runway for a quick reposition flight to SMO only to last 15 minutes. With the weather reports provided by the company & available on ATIS; the SMO METARS showed no signs of concern; not even hinting the need for an IMC published missed approach. SMO ATIS indicated 6sm visibility in Haze. Shortly after takeoff from LAX; I gave a listen to the ATIS frequency one more time as part of the 'Short Segment' list of duties. It showed the data indicated above. With a few more keystrokes on the FMS & the setting of the landing speeds in the MFD; the 'Short Segment' checklist was completed. We were vectored to intercept the final approach course of the VOR or GPS-A for Runway 21 at SMO. Upon checking into tower frequency; we were cleared to land on Runway 21; but we were assigned to report the runway in sight. On the final segment of the approach before reaching MDA (just prior to the MAP); we saw the runway & began an aggressive descent (fully configured & stabilized). At approximately 1 to 2 miles out; I reported 'RUNWAY INSIGHT' as required by the SMO Tower Controller. Noteworthy: the ceiling & visibility was less than the VMC conditions advertised on the ATIS. When the descent became too aggressive to satisfy company SOPs; I called 'GO AROUND' & we executed the go-around. When I announced 'WE ARE GOING AROUND'; SMO Tower assigned us left-closed traffic 'with a tight turn south of the field' which inferred visual procedures. However; I replied; 'We are unable to make left traffic because we are IMC.' The SMO Tower controller reiterated 'make a tight pattern south of the field' followed by multiple traffic advisories to which I quickly replied 'we are now above the cloud layer; we are unable to maintain VMC; We need a frequency change to approach control for vectors back around for another go.' The Controller on SMO local tower position became frantic with heading & altitude instructions followed by anxious words like 'NOW' & 'IMMEDIATELY'. It appeared as if we were being radar vectored around close proximity traffic. Being a former tower controller myself; I did not feel comfortable with radar separation being provided by a VFR tower controller. Therefore; I reiterated the need to re-establish radio contact with 'SO-CAL APPROACH' for radar vectors at another go at the VOR or GPS-A. After little more radio volleying; we were handed back to SO-CAL Approach. I asked SO-CAL Approach for 'ALTERNATE MISSED APPROACH INSTRUCTIONS'...to which the controller responded 'JUST EXECUTE THE PUBLISHED MISSED'. I explained to her the conflicting VFR circle instructions given by SMO Tower earlier; but the SO-CAL Controller reassured us IFR separation/protection for the published missed approach procedure should we need it again. We were subject to the same sequence of radar services; but this time to a normal approach to landing on Runway 21 at SMO with the same Tower Controller (this time demonstrating a more professional prowess and radio etiquette. We landed safely. Perhaps if I would have told SMO tower that 'WE ARE EXECUTING THE PUBLISHED MISSED APPROACH' we would have been received a little easier by the frazzled tower controller. We were planning to be in VMC for the approach so 'visual calls' were briefed. When the unlikely need for the go-around arose due to the late sighting of the runway; my 'GO-AROUND' call could have been amended with 'EXECUTE PUBLISHED MISSED APPROACH'. Maybe a calculated VDP would have helped with planning the final approach. In all honesty; we were not ready for the missed approach...despite being fully configured & stabilized up to the final descent point.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.