Narrative:

Runway 28R was closed at sfo for repairs and had been closed for over 30 min with NOTAM on ATIS. Air carrier X was on approach to runway 28L. Visibility was approximately 5 miles, with some scattered rain showers. Air carrier X was on qba visual, and cleared to land runway 28L, which pilot clearly acknowledged. Apparently pilots lost sight of airport, and rather than execute missed approach, continued in IMC conditions by utilizing the runway 28R ILS localizer without authorization. Aircraft was observed by controllers emerging from rain shower on short final for the wrong runway. Go around instructions issued, with late pilot response nearly causing runway incursion on closed runway with several vehicles/personnel on runway near midfield. Pilot judgement clearly in error by: a) acceptance of visual approach. B) failure to advise ATC prior to entering IMC. C) failure to request assistance upon entering IMC. D) assuming it safe to intercept localizer well inside of approach gate. East) failure to remember runway assignments. F) failure to closely monitor ATIS for closure information. G) failure to scan runway before landing. H) failure to respond quickly to ATC instruction (go around). Pilot blamed approach control for clearing them for a visual; this has no merit, since weather conditions often quickly change from good to bad - the pilots have the best seats in deciding whether or not a visual approach clearance should be accepted/discontinued. There would have been absolutely no delay to the aircraft had they requested an ILS approach to 28L, due to light traffic. These poor judgements by the pilots gave some grey hairs to the construction folks, controllers, and perhaps the passengers on the flight. These pilot's training histories should be examined; there appears to be some very serious deficiencies. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter advises there was no formal occurrence followup. Tapes were played to make sure that aircraft had been given landing clearance on runway 28L. It had. Rain shower was between airport and san mateo bridge, and tower did not realize aircraft was lining up for runway 28R until it came out of rain on very short final. Could not recall official WX at time, but think overall visibility was 5 mi. Does not know why tipp toe approach was not used while runway 28R was closed, but pointed out that quiet bridge can be used for either runway. Aircraft pullup was very close to runway. Reporter was local controller and there was phone conversation with PIC of air carrier after incident. Not sure why flight crew was landing wrong runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR ALMOST LANDED ON CLOSED RWY WITH MEN AND EQUIPMENT OPERATING ON THAT RWY. MADE GO AROUND AT ABOUT 20' AGL.

Narrative: RUNWAY 28R WAS CLOSED AT SFO FOR REPAIRS AND HAD BEEN CLOSED FOR OVER 30 MIN WITH NOTAM ON ATIS. ACR X WAS ON APPROACH TO RWY 28L. VISIBILITY WAS APPROX 5 MILES, WITH SOME SCATTERED RAIN SHOWERS. ACR X WAS ON QBA VISUAL, AND CLRED TO LAND RWY 28L, WHICH PILOT CLEARLY ACKNOWLEDGED. APPARENTLY PILOTS LOST SIGHT OF AIRPORT, AND RATHER THAN EXECUTE MISSED APPROACH, CONTINUED IN IMC CONDITIONS BY UTILIZING THE RWY 28R ILS LOC WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION. ACFT WAS OBSERVED BY CTLRS EMERGING FROM RAIN SHOWER ON SHORT FINAL FOR THE WRONG RWY. GO AROUND INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED, WITH LATE PLT RESPONSE NEARLY CAUSING RWY INCURSION ON CLOSED RWY WITH SEVERAL VEHICLES/PERSONNEL ON RWY NEAR MIDFIELD. PLT JUDGEMENT CLEARLY IN ERROR BY: A) ACCEPTANCE OF VISUAL APCH. B) FAILURE TO ADVISE ATC PRIOR TO ENTERING IMC. C) FAILURE TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE UPON ENTERING IMC. D) ASSUMING IT SAFE TO INTERCEPT LOC WELL INSIDE OF APCH GATE. E) FAILURE TO REMEMBER RWY ASSIGNMENTS. F) FAILURE TO CLOSELY MONITOR ATIS FOR CLOSURE INFORMATION. G) FAILURE TO SCAN RWY BEFORE LNDG. H) FAILURE TO RESPOND QUICKLY TO ATC INSTRUCTION (GO AROUND). PLT BLAMED APCH CTL FOR CLEARING THEM FOR A VISUAL; THIS HAS NO MERIT, SINCE WEATHER CONDITIONS OFTEN QUICKLY CHANGE FROM GOOD TO BAD - THE PLTS HAVE THE BEST SEATS IN DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT A VISUAL APCH CLRNC SHOULD BE ACCEPTED/DISCONTINUED. THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABSOLUTELY NO DELAY TO THE ACFT HAD THEY REQUESTED AN ILS APCH TO 28L, DUE TO LIGHT TFC. THESE POOR JUDGEMENTS BY THE PILOTS GAVE SOME GREY HAIRS TO THE CONSTRUCTION FOLKS, CTLRS, AND PERHAPS THE PASSENGERS ON THE FLIGHT. THESE PILOT'S TRAINING HISTORIES SHOULD BE EXAMINED; THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME VERY SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR ADVISES THERE WAS NO FORMAL OCCURRENCE FOLLOWUP. TAPES WERE PLAYED TO MAKE SURE THAT ACFT HAD BEEN GIVEN LNDG CLRNC ON RWY 28L. IT HAD. RAIN SHOWER WAS BETWEEN ARPT AND SAN MATEO BRIDGE, AND TWR DID NOT REALIZE ACFT WAS LINING UP FOR RWY 28R UNTIL IT CAME OUT OF RAIN ON VERY SHORT FINAL. COULD NOT RECALL OFFICIAL WX AT TIME, BUT THINK OVERALL VISIBILITY WAS 5 MI. DOES NOT KNOW WHY TIPP TOE APCH WAS NOT USED WHILE RWY 28R WAS CLOSED, BUT POINTED OUT THAT QUIET BRIDGE CAN BE USED FOR EITHER RWY. ACFT PULLUP WAS VERY CLOSE TO RWY. RPTR WAS LCL CTLR AND THERE WAS PHONE CONVERSATION WITH PIC OF ACR AFTER INCIDENT. NOT SURE WHY FLT CREW WAS LNDG WRONG RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.