Narrative:

The possible occurrence happened during a return trip to wall kill, ny from philadelphia, PA, in 3/88. One of the passenger was a flight instructor with whom I worked. On the return, it was only the other CFI and myself in the aircraft. I was elected to fly the return trip as PIC. I had not flown under instrument reference in nearly 19 months--I asked my friend if he would mind if I did some time under the hood. He eagerly agreed since he was a new CFI and had not flown with another pilot under the hood. It soon became apparent that I was having to work/think harder than usual as I was tiring easily. When I returned to visual reference flight we were approaching solberg VOR, I thought. My friend tuned the VOR to huguenot and visually navigation'd to an area he thought was huguenot. As we proceeded it became apparent that he was in error. I was confused from switching from the hood and trusting him because, although he was a new instructor, he had began searching the sectional for clues that would put what we saw outside into a logical place where we thought we should be. I did not realize that he had not been keeping very good track of our position. We tuned and began to navigation to huguenot on the VOR. This resulted in a nwesterly heading. Considering the winds, we were clearly east of our planned route. We identified essex county airport after the flight and in consideration of the time when we saw the airport, our corrective action and the shape of the ny TCA, it may have been possible that we inadvertently skirted the perimeter of this TCA. Since we did not positively identify our position until we were clear of the area, it is not possible to say for sure if we did in fact penetrate the area. The floor of the TCA in this area is 3000 ft--we were in cruise flight at 3500 ft. Contributing to this event were the following factors: 1) failure of the pilots to communication and decide who was to navigation and what the duties of each pilot were to be. I had made assumptions and obviously so did the other instructor. Due to the fact that we were both competent pilots, we both thought the other knew where we were. 2) the inability to positively identify the boundaries of the ny TCA by use of right's and distances, ie, DME TCA boundaries would be much more easily defined. Specific rtes such as those proposed by AOPA might also be a solution. The current design of TCA airspace requires excessive workload if one is to utilize all the air near, but not in, the TCA!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA SMA UNAUTH PENETRATION OF AIRSPACE N90.

Narrative: THE POSSIBLE OCCURRENCE HAPPENED DURING A RETURN TRIP TO WALL KILL, NY FROM PHILADELPHIA, PA, IN 3/88. ONE OF THE PAX WAS A FLT INSTRUCTOR WITH WHOM I WORKED. ON THE RETURN, IT WAS ONLY THE OTHER CFI AND MYSELF IN THE ACFT. I WAS ELECTED TO FLY THE RETURN TRIP AS PIC. I HAD NOT FLOWN UNDER INST REF IN NEARLY 19 MONTHS--I ASKED MY FRIEND IF HE WOULD MIND IF I DID SOME TIME UNDER THE HOOD. HE EAGERLY AGREED SINCE HE WAS A NEW CFI AND HAD NOT FLOWN WITH ANOTHER PLT UNDER THE HOOD. IT SOON BECAME APPARENT THAT I WAS HAVING TO WORK/THINK HARDER THAN USUAL AS I WAS TIRING EASILY. WHEN I RETURNED TO VISUAL REF FLT WE WERE APCHING SOLBERG VOR, I THOUGHT. MY FRIEND TUNED THE VOR TO HUGUENOT AND VISUALLY NAV'D TO AN AREA HE THOUGHT WAS HUGUENOT. AS WE PROCEEDED IT BECAME APPARENT THAT HE WAS IN ERROR. I WAS CONFUSED FROM SWITCHING FROM THE HOOD AND TRUSTING HIM BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH HE WAS A NEW INSTRUCTOR, HE HAD BEGAN SEARCHING THE SECTIONAL FOR CLUES THAT WOULD PUT WHAT WE SAW OUTSIDE INTO A LOGICAL PLACE WHERE WE THOUGHT WE SHOULD BE. I DID NOT REALIZE THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN KEEPING VERY GOOD TRACK OF OUR POS. WE TUNED AND BEGAN TO NAV TO HUGUENOT ON THE VOR. THIS RESULTED IN A NWESTERLY HDG. CONSIDERING THE WINDS, WE WERE CLEARLY E OF OUR PLANNED RTE. WE IDENTIFIED ESSEX COUNTY ARPT AFTER THE FLT AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TIME WHEN WE SAW THE ARPT, OUR CORRECTIVE ACTION AND THE SHAPE OF THE NY TCA, IT MAY HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE THAT WE INADVERTENTLY SKIRTED THE PERIMETER OF THIS TCA. SINCE WE DID NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFY OUR POS UNTIL WE WERE CLR OF THE AREA, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY FOR SURE IF WE DID IN FACT PENETRATE THE AREA. THE FLOOR OF THE TCA IN THIS AREA IS 3000 FT--WE WERE IN CRUISE FLT AT 3500 FT. CONTRIBUTING TO THIS EVENT WERE THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: 1) FAILURE OF THE PLTS TO COM AND DECIDE WHO WAS TO NAV AND WHAT THE DUTIES OF EACH PLT WERE TO BE. I HAD MADE ASSUMPTIONS AND OBVIOUSLY SO DID THE OTHER INSTRUCTOR. DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE WERE BOTH COMPETENT PLTS, WE BOTH THOUGHT THE OTHER KNEW WHERE WE WERE. 2) THE INABILITY TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE BOUNDARIES OF THE NY TCA BY USE OF R'S AND DISTANCES, IE, DME TCA BOUNDARIES WOULD BE MUCH MORE EASILY DEFINED. SPECIFIC RTES SUCH AS THOSE PROPOSED BY AOPA MIGHT ALSO BE A SOLUTION. THE CURRENT DESIGN OF TCA AIRSPACE REQUIRES EXCESSIVE WORKLOAD IF ONE IS TO UTILIZE ALL THE AIR NEAR, BUT NOT IN, THE TCA!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.