Narrative:

Mlt X departed VFR from shv to bad, less than 10 mi away. Another airport, dtn airport, is located between shv and bad. The aircraft climbed to 2500' (approximately 2200' AGL) to cross the dtn airport. Bad is in the adjacent sector (radar east). Bad is 2 mi outside of my airspace. I saw no traffic to conflict with the aircraft, so I coordinated with the radar east controller to keep the aircraft on my frequency and change straight to the tower to save a frequency change. En route the aircraft passed just southeast of the dtn airport at 2500' MSL. Our facility letter of agreement with bad tower (a military operated tower) calls for us to give inbound arrival information to the tower 15 flying miles from the runway. Since the 2 airports are only 10 mi apart, it would be barely 15 flying miles total, allowing for a 4-5 mi final. The position description of the coordinator controller for my sector requires him/her to give the inbound information to the tower. I switched the aircraft to the tower frequency 4-5 mi west of the airport. The coordinator controller had not given the arrival information to the tower and I had not verified that prior to the frequency change to the tower. The inbound was rapidly given and received by the tower before the aircraft checked in on the tower frequency, however when this information was passed, the aircraft was considerably less than 15 flying miles from the runway. The aircraft was on a right base leg. The tower had another aircraft in the VFR pattern (mlt Y) that was turning a left base. The tower ultimately had mlt X break out for resequencing. Mlt X was unhappy with this operation. The impression he gave me was that he was trying to get to bad to land as quickly as possible and didn't like the break out (but then, who does?). Granted, the tower received the arrival information late and was surprised. I was questioned as to why I had not verified that the coordinator had not completed required arrival information to the tower. I guess we both failed as a team. I was also questioned for my reason for allowing the aircraft to fly in the proximity of the dtn airport at 2500' MSL. I don't precisely recall ever having done this before, but I did not perceive it to be particularly unsafe. Although not justifying this operation in the vicinity of dtn airport, other controllers have done the same thing on occasion. Needless to say, it will be a very long time before anyone from this facility does anything like that again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RADAR CTLR AND COORDINATOR FAILED TO COORDINATE THE VFR ARR OF AN MLT AT AN ADJACENT MIL ARPT. ARR CONFLICTED WITH ACFT IN PATTERN.

Narrative: MLT X DEPARTED VFR FROM SHV TO BAD, LESS THAN 10 MI AWAY. ANOTHER ARPT, DTN ARPT, IS LOCATED BTWN SHV AND BAD. THE ACFT CLBED TO 2500' (APPROX 2200' AGL) TO CROSS THE DTN ARPT. BAD IS IN THE ADJACENT SECTOR (RADAR E). BAD IS 2 MI OUTSIDE OF MY AIRSPACE. I SAW NO TFC TO CONFLICT WITH THE ACFT, SO I COORDINATED WITH THE RADAR E CTLR TO KEEP THE ACFT ON MY FREQ AND CHANGE STRAIGHT TO THE TWR TO SAVE A FREQ CHANGE. ENRTE THE ACFT PASSED JUST SE OF THE DTN ARPT AT 2500' MSL. OUR FAC LETTER OF AGREEMENT WITH BAD TWR (A MIL OPERATED TWR) CALLS FOR US TO GIVE INBND ARR INFO TO THE TWR 15 FLYING MILES FROM THE RWY. SINCE THE 2 ARPTS ARE ONLY 10 MI APART, IT WOULD BE BARELY 15 FLYING MILES TOTAL, ALLOWING FOR A 4-5 MI FINAL. THE POS DESCRIPTION OF THE COORDINATOR CTLR FOR MY SECTOR REQUIRES HIM/HER TO GIVE THE INBND INFO TO THE TWR. I SWITCHED THE ACFT TO THE TWR FREQ 4-5 MI W OF THE ARPT. THE COORDINATOR CTLR HAD NOT GIVEN THE ARR INFO TO THE TWR AND I HAD NOT VERIFIED THAT PRIOR TO THE FREQ CHANGE TO THE TWR. THE INBND WAS RAPIDLY GIVEN AND RECEIVED BY THE TWR BEFORE THE ACFT CHKED IN ON THE TWR FREQ, HOWEVER WHEN THIS INFO WAS PASSED, THE ACFT WAS CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN 15 FLYING MILES FROM THE RWY. THE ACFT WAS ON A RIGHT BASE LEG. THE TWR HAD ANOTHER ACFT IN THE VFR PATTERN (MLT Y) THAT WAS TURNING A LEFT BASE. THE TWR ULTIMATELY HAD MLT X BREAK OUT FOR RESEQUENCING. MLT X WAS UNHAPPY WITH THIS OPERATION. THE IMPRESSION HE GAVE ME WAS THAT HE WAS TRYING TO GET TO BAD TO LAND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND DIDN'T LIKE THE BREAK OUT (BUT THEN, WHO DOES?). GRANTED, THE TWR RECEIVED THE ARR INFO LATE AND WAS SURPRISED. I WAS QUESTIONED AS TO WHY I HAD NOT VERIFIED THAT THE COORDINATOR HAD NOT COMPLETED REQUIRED ARR INFO TO THE TWR. I GUESS WE BOTH FAILED AS A TEAM. I WAS ALSO QUESTIONED FOR MY REASON FOR ALLOWING THE ACFT TO FLY IN THE PROX OF THE DTN ARPT AT 2500' MSL. I DON'T PRECISELY RECALL EVER HAVING DONE THIS BEFORE, BUT I DID NOT PERCEIVE IT TO BE PARTICULARLY UNSAFE. ALTHOUGH NOT JUSTIFYING THIS OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF DTN ARPT, OTHER CTLRS HAVE DONE THE SAME THING ON OCCASION. NEEDLESS TO SAY, IT WILL BE A VERY LONG TIME BEFORE ANYONE FROM THIS FAC DOES ANYTHING LIKE THAT AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.