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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 843035 |
Time | |
Date | 200907 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Duke 60 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Route In Use | None |
Flight Plan | None |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Brake System |
Person 1 | |
Function | Single Pilot |
Qualification | Flight Crew Commercial Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50 Flight Crew Total 2500 Flight Crew Type 300 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control Ground Excursion Runway |
Narrative:
There appeared to be a discrepancy between the pilot and co-pilot's airspeed indicator. To verify this we initiated a high-speed taxi on the runway. The runway was sufficiently long according to the poh for accelerate and stop for the current conditions. Upon conclusion of the test phase (reaching rotation speed); the power was retarded and brakes applied. Braking occurred but was insufficient to stop the aircraft before running off the end of the runway approximately 20 ft. The brakes had been tested prior to beginning the run; but not to emergency braking capability. When brakes were applied the wheels continued to spin ie; there was insufficient braking to comply with the poh standard for emergency braking as would occur in an aborted takeoff. Since this sort of braking is; by definition; only used in emergencies; the brakes' inability to perform was unknown. If there had been a warning mechanism or a policy to test such hard braking; the over-run would not have occurred.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A BE-60 on a high speed runway taxi for airspeed indicator maintenance overran the runway's end when the emergency braking did not stop the aircraft as aircraft performance manual indicated.
Narrative: There appeared to be a discrepancy between the pilot and co-pilot's airspeed indicator. To verify this we initiated a high-speed taxi on the runway. The runway was sufficiently long according to the POH for accelerate and stop for the current conditions. Upon conclusion of the test phase (reaching rotation speed); the power was retarded and brakes applied. Braking occurred but was insufficient to stop the aircraft before running off the end of the runway approximately 20 FT. The brakes had been tested prior to beginning the run; but not to emergency braking capability. When brakes were applied the wheels continued to spin ie; there was insufficient braking to comply with the POH standard for emergency braking as would occur in an aborted takeoff. Since this sort of braking is; by definition; only used in emergencies; the brakes' inability to perform was unknown. If there had been a warning mechanism or a policy to test such hard braking; the over-run would not have occurred.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.