Narrative:

On climb out our air driven generator deployed while the captain (pilot monitoring) completed the after takeoff checklist flow. This occurred as we were climbing through 8000 ft to our assigned altitude of 10000 ft with departure. When the air driven generator deployed; we were around 8600 ft below a sct layer of clouds; which appeared to be around 10;000 MSL. When the air driven generator deployed and took over powering the primary AC electrics; I lost my primary indicators on the pfd and the autopilot disconnected as a result of losing YD2. At this point I announced I was on standby instruments; with the autopilot inoperative. At this point we received a handoff to center and the captain requested we stay with departure; get vectors clear of traffic and permission to level at 9000 ft to stay clear of the clouds while we addressed the issue; to which we were granted. The captain asked if I could handle the aircraft while he runs the checklist; to which I replied by asking him to take control of the aircraft while I revert my pfd to indicate those indications of pfd 1. We did this; and I took control of the aircraft hand flying; maintaining 9000 ft and following ATC assigned vectors. The captain completed bnormal checklist from the manual and the AC power was restored to normal; with both engine generators providing the primary AC electrical power; with the exception of my IRS still inoperative (as it could not realign in flight) and the yd inoperative; rendering the autopilot inoperative. Around this time the captain communicated with the flight attendant regarding our situation; and tentative plan of action. He advised them that the aircraft is flying normally; we had an abnormal electrical malfunction; which we needed time to address; and asked them to remain seated and give us some time to address the issue. He would be getting back to them; and making an announcement to the passengers once he knew more. At this point; the captain asked what I thought about returning to our departure airport; and we decided that based on our situation and current position; returning VFR would be a better choice than continuing to destination where they were advertising ILS approaches; with thunderstorms in the forecast. The captain sent dispatch an ACARS message advising them that we were returning; and would communicate more on the ground...no emergency necessary. Dispatch returned with an acknowledgment message and advice to watch our landing weight. (We were predicting a landing around 71000 pounds so this was not a concern). We set up for the visual approach; and briefed it accordingly. The captain then advised approach that we would be returning for landing; and asked that the equipment be standing by simply as a precaution. Once we got our final vector; we called the airport in sight and began our final approach. The aircraft handled normally; through descent; approach; and landed without further incident. The trucks followed us during the landing roll and taxi but were not utilized. Once we came to a stop at the gate; we completed all checklists and began the required communications with operations; ramp personnel; dispatch; operations; arff; flight attendants; passengers; etc. At this point; I do not know exactly why this incident occurred. The captain (pilot monitoring) was advised by personnel in operations today that it is possible the reason the air driven generator deployed yesterday was because he switched the generators to the off position; while in-flight. I suspect this could have been the cause; because it happened right as he ran the after takeoff flow/checklist. It is also possible this was not the cause of the incident; and if this is the case; I am not sure why it happened. If this was a case of improper checklist usage; I think continued emphasis on the importance of knowing the checklist flows; proper and diligent completion of the checklists is extremely important; because things like this can happen if we rely too heavily on memory and do not slow down and take the time to completethem properly. Ideally; the pilot flying should back up the pilot monitoring and vise-versa in all stages of flight. However; in this example; during the initial climb out; the pilot flying cannot watch the piot monitoring complete the checklist flow items. These are items expected to be completed properly without specific confirmation by the pilot flying (examples of these items can be found in emergency checklists as those; which require a; 'confirm?' probe followed by the response 'confirmed.' by the pilot flying. Because normal checklist items are normally completed with out specific supervision by the other pilot; there is a loss of redundancy in the cockpit; and because of this specific emphasis needs to be placed on the safe; accurate completion of these checklists.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-900 flight crew experienced loss of electrical power on departure; possibly due to the Captain shutting down the generators.

Narrative: On climb out our ADG deployed while the Captain (pilot monitoring) completed the after takeoff checklist flow. This occurred as we were climbing through 8000 FT to our assigned altitude of 10000 FT with departure. When the ADG deployed; we were around 8600 FT below a SCT layer of clouds; which appeared to be around 10;000 MSL. When the ADG deployed and took over powering the primary AC electrics; I lost my primary indicators on the PFD and the autopilot disconnected as a result of losing YD2. At this point I announced I was on standby instruments; with the autopilot inoperative. At this point we received a handoff to center and the Captain requested we stay with departure; get vectors clear of traffic and permission to level at 9000 FT to stay clear of the clouds while we addressed the issue; to which we were granted. The Captain asked if I could handle the aircraft while he runs the checklist; to which I replied by asking him to take control of the aircraft while I revert my PFD to indicate those indications of PFD 1. We did this; and I took control of the aircraft hand flying; maintaining 9000 FT and following ATC assigned vectors. The captain completed bnormal Checklist from the manual and the AC power was restored to normal; with both engine generators providing the primary AC electrical power; with the exception of my IRS still inoperative (as it could not realign in flight) and the YD inoperative; rendering the autopilot inoperative. Around this time the Captain communicated with the Flight Attendant regarding our situation; and tentative plan of action. He advised them that the aircraft is flying normally; we had an abnormal electrical malfunction; which we needed time to address; and asked them to remain seated and give us some time to address the issue. He would be getting back to them; and making an announcement to the passengers once he knew more. At this point; the Captain asked what I thought about returning to our departure airport; and we decided that based on our situation and current position; returning VFR would be a better choice than continuing to destination where they were advertising ILS approaches; with thunderstorms in the forecast. The Captain sent dispatch an ACARS message advising them that we were returning; and would communicate more on the ground...no emergency necessary. Dispatch returned with an acknowledgment message and advice to watch our landing weight. (We were predicting a landing around 71000 LBS so this was not a concern). We set up for the visual approach; and briefed it accordingly. The Captain then advised approach that we would be returning for landing; and asked that the equipment be standing by simply as a precaution. Once we got our final vector; we called the airport in sight and began our final approach. The aircraft handled normally; through descent; approach; and landed without further incident. The trucks followed us during the landing roll and taxi but were not utilized. Once we came to a stop at the gate; we completed all checklists and began the required communications with operations; ramp personnel; dispatch; operations; ARFF; flight attendants; passengers; etc. At this point; I do not know exactly why this incident occurred. The Captain (pilot monitoring) was advised by personnel in operations today that it is possible the reason the ADG deployed yesterday was because he switched the generators to the OFF position; while in-flight. I suspect this could have been the cause; because it happened right as he ran the after takeoff flow/checklist. It is also possible this was not the cause of the incident; and if this is the case; I am not sure why it happened. If this was a case of improper checklist usage; I think continued emphasis on the importance of knowing the checklist flows; proper and diligent completion of the checklists is extremely important; because things like this can happen if we rely too heavily on memory and do not slow down and take the time to completethem properly. Ideally; the pilot flying should back up the pilot monitoring and vise-versa in all stages of flight. However; in this example; during the initial climb out; the pilot flying cannot watch the piot monitoring complete the checklist flow items. These are items expected to be completed properly without specific confirmation by the pilot flying (examples of these items can be found in emergency checklists as those; which require a; 'Confirm?' probe followed by the response 'Confirmed.' by the pilot flying. Because normal checklist items are normally completed with out specific supervision by the other pilot; there is a loss of redundancy in the cockpit; and because of this specific emphasis needs to be placed on the safe; accurate completion of these checklists.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.