Narrative:

We had dealt with a fuel quantity indication problem before takeoff and also during the flight. Our workload; and consequently fatigue; had been significantly higher throughout the flight as we monitored and recorded the problem and communicated the issue to the company via ACARS. About an hour before arrival; even before coast-in; center began giving us altitude changes and vectors (at one point as much as 90 degrees off course) apparently due to a significant volume of traffic. Arriving in TRACON airspace; the vectors and repeated changes in speed and altitude assignment continued. Our workload and fatigue were steadily increasing. At one point during descent we discussed this. I asked my first officer to 'back me up.' we had planned for a runway yr visual approach backed up by the ILS; with the hope of possibly getting runway X. After the constant vectors off course and altitude restrictions; we commented that there was little chance of getting runway X. Runway yr was the active route in the FMC; tuned and identified in the ILS receiver; and I had the yr approach chart on top of the runway X chart clipped on my yoke. We were cleared direct to an interserction with charted altitude and speed restrictions; after being vectored off course and held significantly high on profile. Just prior to reaching the intersection; we were given a heading to intercept the yr localizer; and then almost immediately a change to fly present heading to intercept the runway X localizer. At that point I was using level 3 automation with the speed brakes extended to get back on descent profile. I asked my first officer to program the runway X approach and re-tune the ILS. We were about 25 miles from the airport; and I asked for an intercept leg to xxxxx intersection; not realizing that I was still looking at my runway yr approach plate. My first officer said he didn't know where xxxxx was; so I programmed an intercept leg 078 degrees to xxxxx direct wwwww and the rest of the runway X approach. We agreed that it looked good; and I engaged LNAV. Shortly after LNAV intercepted the 078 leg to xxxxx; approach called and said it looked like we had intercepted the yr localizer; and gave us a heading to intercept the runway X localizer. I went back to level 3 automation and then saw that I still had the runway yr chart out and had incorrectly programmed xxxxx instead of zzzzz. We were still more than 20 miles out. Shortly thereafter the autopilot captured the runway X localizer with considerable bracketing; and then engaged altitude hold instead of capturing the glideslope as I intended. I disconnected the autopilot and flew the remainder of the approach in level 2 automation. Fatigue and high workload were factors; and this was the third of three operational errors on our part during this flight. My poor attention to detail and cross-checking were symptoms of fatigue due to disruption of circadian rhythm. I had been awake for about nineteen hours. During the layover I had one complete; uninterrupted sleep cycle but then later was unable to sleep when I tried to nap. Fatigue is typical for most crewmembers on most of our hawaiian pairings; which are constructed in a way that; according to NASA sleep research; is highly likely to cause significant fatigue. In my experience; the only hawaiian pairings that don't produce this much fatigue have extended layovers of fifty plus hours; allowing an opportunity for two complete sleep cycles instead of only one and a half; as happens with most of our pairings. To reduce fatigue; hawaiian layovers (all layovers; actually) should be designed considering existing guidance resulting from sleep research. The air traffic management system must be significantly upgraded to adequately deal with the current level of air traffic congestion; which will continue to cause incidents due to high workload for pilots and controllers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Fatigued due to circadian disruptions on their layover; aircraft fuel system anomalies; a long flight and traffic delays; the flight crew of a B757-200 mis-programmed their FMS. A track deviation resulted.

Narrative: We had dealt with a fuel quantity indication problem before takeoff and also during the flight. Our workload; and consequently fatigue; had been significantly higher throughout the flight as we monitored and recorded the problem and communicated the issue to the company via ACARS. About an hour before arrival; even before coast-in; Center began giving us altitude changes and vectors (at one point as much as 90 degrees off course) apparently due to a significant volume of traffic. Arriving in TRACON airspace; the vectors and repeated changes in speed and altitude assignment continued. Our workload and fatigue were steadily increasing. At one point during descent we discussed this. I asked my First Officer to 'back me up.' We had planned for a Runway YR visual approach backed up by the ILS; with the hope of possibly getting Runway X. After the constant vectors off course and altitude restrictions; we commented that there was little chance of getting Runway X. Runway YR was the active route in the FMC; tuned and identified in the ILS receiver; and I had the YR approach chart on top of the Runway X chart clipped on my yoke. We were cleared direct to an interserction with charted altitude and speed restrictions; after being vectored off course and held significantly high on profile. Just prior to reaching the intersection; we were given a heading to intercept the YR localizer; and then almost immediately a change to fly present heading to intercept the Runway X localizer. At that point I was using Level 3 automation with the speed brakes extended to get back on descent profile. I asked my First Officer to program the Runway X approach and re-tune the ILS. We were about 25 miles from the airport; and I asked for an intercept leg to XXXXX intersection; not realizing that I was still looking at my Runway YR approach plate. My First Officer said he didn't know where XXXXX was; so I programmed an intercept leg 078 degrees to XXXXX direct WWWWW and the rest of the Runway X approach. We agreed that it looked good; and I engaged LNAV. Shortly after LNAV intercepted the 078 leg to XXXXX; Approach called and said it looked like we had intercepted the YR localizer; and gave us a heading to intercept the Runway X localizer. I went back to Level 3 automation and then saw that I still had the Runway YR chart out and had incorrectly programmed XXXXX instead of ZZZZZ. We were still more than 20 miles out. Shortly thereafter the autopilot captured the Runway X localizer with considerable bracketing; and then engaged altitude hold instead of capturing the glideslope as I intended. I disconnected the autopilot and flew the remainder of the approach in Level 2 automation. Fatigue and high workload were factors; and this was the third of three operational errors on our part during this flight. My poor attention to detail and cross-checking were symptoms of fatigue due to disruption of circadian rhythm. I had been awake for about nineteen hours. During the layover I had one complete; uninterrupted sleep cycle but then later was unable to sleep when I tried to nap. Fatigue is typical for most crewmembers on most of our Hawaiian pairings; which are constructed in a way that; according to NASA sleep research; is highly likely to cause significant fatigue. In my experience; the only Hawaiian pairings that don't produce this much fatigue have extended layovers of fifty plus hours; allowing an opportunity for two complete sleep cycles instead of only one and a half; as happens with most of our pairings. To reduce fatigue; Hawaiian layovers (all layovers; actually) should be designed considering existing guidance resulting from sleep research. The air traffic management system must be significantly upgraded to adequately deal with the current level of air traffic congestion; which will continue to cause incidents due to high workload for pilots and controllers.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.